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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the causes of the growth of contingent work and its implications 
for labour. It focuses on German core manufacturing sectors, where contingent work 
recently increased to a great extent and the metal union started organising agency 
workers and bargaining on their behalf. In contrast, existing literature expects the 
German core manufacturing to rely on a stable specific-skilled workforce and on labour 
management coalitions while contingent work affects the service periphery. 
 
The thesis contends that the literature has overestimated employers’ interests in 
retaining their skilled workforce as well as the stability of cross-class coalitions, which 
are supposed to support the equilibrium between core and peripheral labour market 
segments. The main argument is that labour will include contingent workers in its 
representation domain when employers’ segmentation strategies start developing 
competition between contingent and permanent workers and threatening the existence 
of the core workforce. Institutional change undermining labour cohesiveness and 
increasing employer discretion is found to trigger this process.  
 
The first paper examines how weakening negotiated and legal employment protections 
have affected the association between specific skills and stable employment. It finds 
that the whole manufacturing workforce –including specific-skilled workers- have 
become more likely to be on a temporary contract since the eighties, also thanks to the 
routine nature of work.  
 
The second paper examines how labour influenced the workplace arrangements for 
agency workers in four automotive plants. It finds that inclusive arrangements are the 
outcome of the combination of labour power –rooted in workplace industrial relations 
and conditions external to the plant - and labour commitment to a homogeneous 
workforce.   
 
The third paper explains the union campaign for agency workers started in 2007. By 
analysing the union’s strategies towards agency workers from the seventies until 2012, 
it shows that the union adopted an inclusive strategy because growing agency work 
threatened the collectively agreed standards for core workers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THE GROWTH OF CONTINGENT WORK AND THE 
CHALLENGES TO LABOUR REPRESENTATION 
 
 
 
This thesis investigates the causes of the growth of contingent work and its implications 
for labour representation. Contingent workers are usually lower paid and have more 
precarious jobs than the permanent workforce; furthermore, they often are neither 
organised in the union nor covered by collective agreements. As this study concerns 
inequalities in working conditions, protection and representation, its research enquiry is 
ultimately related to the broader question central to the industrial relations and political 
economy literature of why labour market outcomes differ across workers. 
 
The segmentation literature in the seventies put as first differences in labour market 
outcomes at the centre of the analysis.
1
 Previously, the working class was mainly seen 
as homogeneous. Most prominently, Marx’s analysis emphasised the commonalities 
across workers as “wage-laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are 
reduced to selling their labor-power in order to live” (Marx and Engels 1906: 12). The 
commonality of workers’ interests against capital was supposed to contribute to 
overcoming individual self-interests, leading to a united front of representation of the 
working class (Marx and Engels 1906: Ch. 1; see also Ollman 1968). Braverman (1974) 
furthered Marx’s analysis regarding the mechanisms through which the capitalist 
process of production drives the formation of the working class. He contended that new 
technologies and scientific management techniques deskill the working class, leading to 
the “interchangeability of persons and functions” (p.359). 
 
In contrast with the picture of a homogeneous working class constituted by 
interchangeable individuals, the works by Doeringer and Piore (1971), Osterman (1974) 
and Berger and Piore (1980) showed that the workforce is segmented along gender and 
ethnic lines and, primarily, between internal and external labour markets. Workers in 
                                                 
1
 With the exception of Lester (1951) and Kerr (1954).   
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internal labour markets are skilled and enjoy good wages and working conditions; in 
contrast, employees in external labour markets are employed in unstable, low-paid and 
dead-end positions. While some Marxist authors argued that segmentation was the 
outcome of employers’ control strategies (Reich, Gordon et al. 1973), most models of 
dual labour markets have interpreted it as the outcome of employers’ efficiency-seeking 
strategies and labour market institutions. Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Osterman 
(1974) argued that the skill requirements of complex technologies in company’s core 
are one of the main factors driving segmentation. Among others, Rubery (1978) and 
Jacoby (1983) pointed out the active role of labour in bargaining with the management 
the boundaries between external and internal labour markets in order to protect the core 
workforce from market pressure. 
 
The segmentation literature developed mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries, whose 
“liberal” model of capitalism is characterised by flexible and deregulated labour 
markets. The comparative political economy literature instead highlighted that in 
coordinated forms of capitalism, high wages and employment security for the whole 
workforce were successfully associated with efficient production strategies based on 
high skills, innovative technology and complex work organisation. This model of 
production was supported by cooperation between encompassing labour organisations 
and management (Dore 1973; Albert 1991; Streeck 1991). Given the broad political 
support and the competitiveness on international markets, coordinated, or social, models 
of capitalism were argued to persist despite the liberalising pressures of globalisation 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). 
 
In the last ten years the literature has acknowledged the erosion of coordinated models 
of capitalism – such as in Denmark, France, Germany and Japan. Institutional changes 
have mainly been interpreted through a core-periphery framework, suggesting that the 
core of the economy is still coordinated while the periphery has become increasingly 
flexible and deregulated (Emmenegger, Hausermann et al. 2012a; Thelen 2014). As the 
coordinated economy par excellence, Germany is now the paramount example of a dual 
economy. The German manufacturing sector, which represents the core of the German 
coordinated production model, is argued to have maintained the traditional 
characteristics of a stable specific-skilled workforce and close labour management 
cooperation. The cross-class coalition in manufacturing is supposed to rely on the 
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common interest of maintaining high wages and good working conditions for the core 
manufacturing workforce; at the same time, cost competitiveness is achieved at the 
expense of the service periphery, which is increasingly deregulated and flexibilised 
(Eichhorst 2012; Thelen 2012; Hassel 2014). 
 
This PhD project starts from two observations, which are at odds with the core-
periphery analysis of the current changes in the labour markets of coordinated 
economies, and particularly of Germany. First, contingent work has been dramatically 
increasing in the last ten years in German core manufacturing sectors. Second, the 
German metal union IG Metall launched a campaign in 2007 for organising agency 
workers and started bargaining on their behalf. The present thesis argues that these 
phenomena challenge the traditional understanding that contingent workers occupy a 
secondary labour market segment, which is separate from and not in competition with 
the core workforce. Previous literature seems to have overestimated employers’ 
interests in retaining their skilled workforce as well as the stability of labour-
management arrangements, which are supposed to maintain coordinated and flexible 
labour market segments in a dual equilibrium. Furthermore, the thesis sheds new light 
on the extent of liberalisation trends: The marketisation of the employment relationship 
has not spared the core of the coordinated economy par excellence, triggering the 
reaction of the powerful German metal union, which started organising workers 
traditionally considered as marginal. 
 
The main argument is that labour will include contingent workers in its representation 
domain when their presence on the labour market starts threatening the standards and 
the future existence of the core workforce. Institutional changes undermining labour 
cohesiveness and increasing employer discretion trigger this process because they allow 
employers’ increasing use of contingent work, which slowly erodes the size of the 
traditional core workforce and develops competition dynamics between contingent and 
permanent workers. Overall, the PhD project shows that institutional change driven by 
liberalisation affects the workforce throughout the whole political economy in the long 
run, making the interests between “core” and “marginal” workforce converge and 
leading to broader working class solidarities. 
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The introduction is organised as follows. The next section illustrates the relevance of 
contingent work both from a social and an academic perspective. Section two, three and 
four present respectively the three academic debates this thesis will contribute to. 
Section five illustrates the main changes in the German model over the last thirty years, 
motivating the focus of this thesis on German core manufacturing sectors. The sixth and 
final section presents the content and the structure of the thesis. 
 
 
1  The changing employment relationship: From facts to theory 
 
 
1.1 The growth of contingent work and the challenges for labour 
 
“Guestworkers and other captive workers, contingent workers and contract labor in the United States, 
hold a crystal ball into the economy. If you look at it, it is a pretty terrifying picture. At the end of this 
transformation, […] we will be trapped in an economy of temporary work. We will be climbing supply 
chains instead of career ladders. We will be working to get out of debt, rather than building wealth.” 
 
Soni Saket, Executive Director of the National Guestworkers’ Alliance and the New Orleans Workers’ 
Center for Racial Justice and National Guestworker Alliance, 14 February 2013. 
 
In the Jerry Wurf Memorial Lecture at Harvard Law School in 2013, Soni Saket made 
gloomy predictions about the future of work. In his speech he reported that over 40 
million contingent workers were employed in the US in 2006 (US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics cit. in Saket 2013); and since the end of the crisis in 2009 these numbers have 
been constantly rising - the US staffing industry has been growing with rates around 
9%, and temporary help contracts now make up 19% of the newly created jobs 
(Bloomberg News 10.05.2013). Also in Europe, part-time and fixed-term work, agency 
work and freelance contracts have become increasingly common in the labour market, 
and the rates are expected to rise in the future (Giaccone 2011; Koch 2013). In the EU-
28 temporary contracts are 14% of the total workforce and their rate is 43% among 
young workers aged between 15 and 24 (Eurostat 2014). 
 
The growth of contingent work has been attributed to shifting structural factors such as 
the development of the service and knowledge economy relative to traditional 
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manufacturing (Castells 1996); technological change, especially advances in IT, which 
contributed to job polarisation between core high-skilled employees and peripheral 
workers (Smith 1997: 332 f.); and the financialisation of the economy and companies’ 
shareholder-value orientation, which made companies more vulnerable to market 
uncertainty and more oriented towards short-term profits (Dörre 2001; Koch 2013). In 
addition, since the nineties national governments have implemented policies providing 
companies with greater flexibility in supposedly rigid labour markets. These policies 
have mainly consisted of the deregulation of labour markets and of industrial relations 
(OECD 1994; Kalleberg 2009: 3; Koch 2013: 33). They have been promoted as job-
creating policy instruments as growth rates of Western economies slowed down since 
the eighties and unemployment started rising at higher levels than in the past. At the 
same time, labour started losing its political influence, also because of declining union 
density and bargaining coverage rates. 
 
While the effect of labour market flexibilisation on unemployment is contested in the 
literature,
2
 there is broad agreement that the expansion of contingent work represents a 
concerning trend for society. Indeed, nonstandard contracts
3
 are often associated with 
low pay, limited benefits and bad working conditions, and expose contingent workers to 
higher poverty risks than workers in a standard employment relationship (McGovern, 
Smeaton et al. 2004; Maurin and Postel-Vinay 2005). Precarious working and living 
conditions limit individuals’ ability to plan their lives and to successfully integrate and 
actively participate in society (Bourdieu 1998; Castel and Dörre 2009; Standing 2011). 
National governments and the European Union have recognised the need for an 
intervention in order to guarantee employment and income security to the new 
workforce. While the use of contingent contracts has not been re-regulated
4
 (Koch 
2013: 42), equal treatment provisions for some forms of contract and specific welfare 
policy instruments – for example unemployment benefits and training – have been, at 
least partly, slowly implemented (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Bonoli 2007; Arrowsmith 2009). 
 
But the growth of contingent work does not represent a challenge only for national 
policy makers. As traditional working class actors, labour unions have been struggling 
with the representation of contingent workers, who present lower union density rates 
                                                 
2
 See discussion and findings by Scarpetta (1996) and Bassanini and Duval (2006).  
3
 “Nonstandard” and “contingent” will be used as synonyms.  
4
 With the exception of France.  
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and lower coverage of collective bargaining arrangements compared to standard 
workers (Ebbinghaus, Goebel et al. 2008; Vandaele and Leschke 2010). On the one 
hand, contingent workers are difficult to organise. They are more vulnerable to 
employers’ retaliation and, therefore, more afraid than permanent workers of joining 
unions and participating in industrial action. Furthermore, contingent workers are 
difficult to approach and even identify for the union because they often change their 
workplace and in some cases they do not share the same employer as their colleagues. 
On the other hand, unions have historically developed on the basis of the stable 
employment relationships and set their political priorities according to the interests of 
their core membership. As the interests of the latter are different from those of the 
contingent workforce, unions might not be willing or able to initiate deep 
organisational changes in order to adapt their goals and their representation forms to 
the new labour force (Ross and Martin 1999; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011). 
 
Despite the obstacles, the representation of contingent workers is a vital issue for the 
future of unions and of industrial democracy. Labour power has been declining and 
unions’ ability to set standards for the old and new workforce is increasingly dependent 
on their mobilisation potential. Indeed, unions have progressively lost political support 
of left-wing parties, making the influence of national politics more difficult than in the 
past (Ross and Martin 1999: 14 f.). Furthermore, their traditional membership pool of 
permanent workers - mainly in manufacturing or in the public sector - is declining so 
unions will need to organise the new workforce as well (Western 1995; Lee 2005).  
Contingent workers represent an important and growing part of the economy which has 
so far remained at the margins of the bargaining arena. Their inclusion in the union 
bargaining domain would give contingent workers a collective voice in order to achieve 
better working conditions. 
 
 
1.2 Contingent work as object of research 
 
The casualisation of work has been identified as one of the most important changes – if 
not the most important - in the labour market in the last twenty years (Kalleberg 2009). 
Some scholars have interpreted the expansion of contingent work as the erosion of the 
Fordist class compromise, which relied on workers’ acceptance of the Taylorist mode 
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of mass production in exchange for family-supporting wages and employment security 
(Alonso and Martinez-Lucio 2006); similarly, other scholars have stressed that the 
phenomenon of contingent work represents a (re)commodification or marketisation of 
the employment relationship in comparison to Fordist times (McGovern, Hill et al. 
2007: Chapter 2; Hyman 2013). Indeed, contingent work falls out – at least partly - of 
the existing regulation standards regarding wages and social security bargained 
between labour and management. Furthermore, the temporary nature of the 
employment relationship prevents labour from bargaining over new work standards 
because it impairs workers’ resistance to managerial practices (Hyman 2013).  
 
Since the nineties, research has explored the deterioration of stable employment, 
highlighting different aspects of the changing employment relationships. In their 
research on white-collar careers in the US Osterman (1996) and Cappelli (1999) 
documented the declining length of tenure and the increasing flexibility of work 
contracts, suggesting the end of “career jobs”. In their comparative study of four large 
companies in the manufacturing and service sector, Grimshaw et al. (2001) have shown 
that employers’ use of temporary contracts and staff agencies has contributed to 
increasingly flat and network-based work hierarchies. Rubery at al. (2002) have argued 
that the use of sub-contracting and agency work led to new multi-employer 
relationships, even blurring organisational boundaries. At the individual level, the 
increasingly flexible and fragmented employment relationship between employees and 
the organisation has been found to also affect the psychological contract between 
managers and workers, which relies on commitment and mutual trust (Coyle‐Shapiro 
and Kessler 2002; Guest 2004).  
 
The diffusion of market-based mechanism in the employment relationship has raised 
questions on the role of employers and labour in this process. First, research has 
investigated why employers have made increasing use of contingent work and in what 
labour market segments or job positions. Some scholars have found that employers’ use 
of contingent work is driven by efficiency considerations regarding market volatility, 
the customer market segment, and the requirements in terms of skills and tasks 
(Mangum, Mayall et al. 1984; Purcell 1998; Kalleberg 2003; Kalleberg, Reynolds et al. 
2003). Other scholars have investigated the politics underlying the use of contingent 
work in more detail and have illustrated how labour market and industrial relations 
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institutions contribute to shape the employers’use of contingent work (Olsen and 
Kalleberg 2004; Gautiè and Schmitt 2010; Eichhorst and Marx 2011).  
 
Second, scholars have looked at labour responses to the expansion of contingent work. 
The existing literature provides mixed evidence and expectations. Unions have often 
been argued to contribute to the divide between permanent and contingent workers, 
suggesting that unions are conservative organisations focussing exclusively on the 
interests of their core membership (Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Lindbeck and Snower 
2002). In contrast, research has also found that unions have increasingly started 
including contingent workers in order to counteract labour market liberalisation and 
labour decline (Heery and Adler 2004; MacKenzie 2009).  
 
As the study of the employment relationship is inevitably interrelated with the analysis 
of capitalism (Edwards and Wajcman 2005), a third relevant debate at the macro-level 
has focused on the implications of the marketisation of the employment relationship for 
the trajectory of change of national political economies. On the one hand, scholars have 
stressed the dualisation of some coordinated political economies between stable core 
and a flexible periphery, which is supported by labour-management coalitions aimed at 
protecting insiders’ and employers’ interests (Emmenegger, Hausermann et al. 2012b; 
Thelen 2014). On the other hand, scholars have argued that the liberalisation of the 
employment relationship is an employer-driven phenomenon, which will not stop at the 
core unless labour manages to counteract it (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Howell 2011; 
Tapia and Turner 2013). 
 
The next sections present the abovementioned debates in more detail. Section two 
presents the discussion of efficiency-related vs. institutional factors for determining the 
use of contingent work. The third section contains the debate about unions’ strategies 
towards contingent work. Section four illustrates the macro-debate about the trajectory 
of change of national political economies. 
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2 Market vs. institutions as determinants of contractual arrangements 
 
A central question to research in the field of sociology, industrial relations and 
management is under what conditions employers offer workers employment security, 
high wages and good working conditions. In the seventies, the segmentation literature 
studied as first
5
 the division of the labour market between stable well-paid jobs with 
chances of career progression and precarious dead-end jobs. The literature 
distinguishes between internal, or primary, labour markets and external, or secondary, 
labour markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Osterman 1987). In Internal Labour 
Markets (ILMs) “the pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of 
administrative rules and procedures” (Doeringer and Piore 1971:2).  ILMs are 
characterised by job ladders, qualification requirements, training programs and a 
system of rules on compensation and duty distribution. In contrast, the employment 
relationship in external labour markets relies on market-driven mechanisms, and 
workers are mainly employed on contingent contracts (Doeringer and Piore 1971; 
Berger and Piore 1980; Osterman 1994).   
 
The segmentation literature considers internal and external labour markets as separate 
market segments dedicated to different functions, and suggests several factors 
contributing to the creation and stability of ILMs. On the one hand, it points out 
efficiency-related factors driving employers’ staffing strategies, such as the specificity 
of skill requirements and the complexity of work organisation which characterise core 
job positions. Workers in ILMs perform companies’ core functions and therefore 
employers offer them high wages and career perspectives in order to retain them. In 
contrast, peripheral workers are supposed to be assigned to easy tasks requiring general 
or no skills, and are mainly used as a buffer workforce for coping with demand peaks 
and economic downturns (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Berger and Piore 1980; Osterman 
1987). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the division between internal 
and external labour markets is primarily the outcome of bargaining between labour and 
management. Unions have an interest in ILM arrangements because they limit 
competition among workers and help them to maintain control over skill supply and 
workers’ knowledge. Workers in secondary labour markets are those who fall out of the 
union bargaining domain (Rubery 1978; Elbaum 1983; Jacoby 1983; Althauser 1989). 
                                                 
5
 With the exception of Lester (1951) and Kerr (1954).  
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The debate about the role of production requirements vs. institutional factors for 
determining the working conditions and, in particular, the type of work contract is still 
central in the academic literature. The debate on High Performance Work Systems 
(HPWSs) is prominent in this regard. HPWSs are characterised by a complex work 
organisation based on teamwork and knowledge sharing; furthermore, employers 
provide training and guarantee high wages and employment security in order to build a 
committed, skilled and stable workforce (Pfeffer 1996: 36; Butler, Felstead et al. 2005: 
4).
6
 In the bundle of practices of HPWSs, employment security is a fundamental 
element because it leads to employees’ high productivity through experience and 
commitment (Brown, Reich et al. 1993; Appelbaum, Bailey et al. 2000). Indeed, in their 
quantitative cross-sectoral study of US establishments Cappelli and Neumark (2004) 
found that HPWSs are associated with lower voluntary and involuntary turnover as well 
as with lower incidence of contingent contracts. 
7
 
 
Some scholars have argued that employers have a rational interest in adopting HPWSs 
as they constitute their comparative advantage on national and international markets 
(Arthur 1994; Osterman 1994; Appelbaum, Bailey et al. 2000). In their study of work 
practices in US apparel, steel, medical equipment and imaging industries, Appelbaum et 
al. (2000) found that workers reported higher job satisfaction and better working 
conditions (for example high wages, employment security, and work autonomy) in 
companies adopting HPWSs than in the other companies; furthermore, HPWSs were 
found to positively contribute to companies’ performance. In their multi-level analysis 
of HPWSs, productivity and turnover in the Chinese hotel industry Yun et al. (2007) 
found similar results. Thus, HPWSs have been argued to represent a win-win situation 
for both employers and employees. 
 
However, not all employers have the same interest in adopting HPWSs, which are 
closely associated with the product market strategy. Companies competing in value-
                                                 
6
 The definitions of HPWSs is very controversial and will not be discussed here. For more details see 
Becker and Gerhart (1996).  
7
 Some studies found a trade-off between the implementation of HPWSs and the use of temporary 
contracts as a buffer Gramm and Schnell (2001); Kalleberg (2001). The academic discussion regarding 
this issue uses similar argument as the early segmentation literature. For this reason, the following 
discussion focuses on the academic debate about different factors conducive to HPWSs, which is central 
to the literature about HPWSs (Kalleberg 2001).  
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added markets are more likely to adopt HPWSs because employers can benefit from the 
long-term returns on investments in human resource practices such as the development 
of human capital and the high quality of their products. In contrast, companies whose 
competitiveness is mainly based on costs - especially labour costs – are less likely to 
adopt HPWSs and rather employ workers on contingent contracts (Youndt, Snell et al. 
1996; Lepak and Snell 2002). For a similar reason, temporary work tends to be 
concentrated in services as the linkage between production quality and a stable 
committed workforce has been argued to be stronger in manufacturing (Appelbaum, 
Bailey et al. 2000: 21; Bosch and Kalina 2008). In service companies research found 
that high performance practices including employment security are adopted only for top 
customer market segments such as in the case of the call centre sector (Batt 2002) and 
of banking (Keltner and Finegold 1996). 
 
The argument linking production requirements, HPWSs and employment stability has 
been challenged from different perspectives. First, some scholars have argued that 
employers have a strategic interest to employ temporary high-skill workers for 
specialised positions because this form of work organisation fosters innovation, 
contributing to the company’s competitive advantage (Matusik and Hill 1998). 
Saxenian (1996) and Jones (1996) have shown that workers in the Silicon Valley IT 
industry and in the independent filmmaking industry were employed in external labour 
markets, with great benefits in terms of innovation.  
 
Second, research findings have questioned the necessity of employment security for 
HPWSs. Employment security is supposed to contribute to achieving workers’ 
commitment to the company through increased job quality, mutual trust among 
employees, and identification with the company (Whitener 2001; Zacharatos, Barling, 
et al. 2005). However, the study of six establishments in different sectors in the UK 
conducted by Edwards et al. (1998) found that employment security favours the 
acceptance of total quality management practices, but that commitment can also be the 
outcome of a disciplined environment characterised by close monitoring and 
performance-based appraisal systems. In their analysis of the Workplace Employment 
Relations Study in 2000, McGovern et al. (2007) found that workers’ commitment – 
measured by increased work effort – was positively correlated with the fear of job 
losses (McGovern, Hill et al. 2007: 233). Similarly, in his analysis of a survey of US 
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manufacturing companies Osterman (1998) found that establishments characterised by 
HPWSs made comparatively more use of contingent work, and workers were 
committed because they feared job losses due to companies’ restructuring. 
 
The third point of critique regards the role of institutions for ensuring employees’ 
benefits, including employment stability, which was almost neglected by the early 
literature on HPWSs (i.a. Appelbaum, Bailey et al. 2000). In contrast, the VoC 
framework underscores the relevance of institutions for providing different sets of 
available strategies to companies, and shows that institutions in CMEs better support 
HPWSs than in LMEs (Hall and Soskice 2001). For instance, by comparing the 
Japanese and US manufacturing sector, Brown and Reich (1997) concluded that the 
Japanese system of industrial relations favours HPWSs because the bargaining 
institutions ensure mutual commitment between employers and employees, and the 
“institution of lifetime employment” reduces the costs of vocational training and raises 
the costs of quitting for employees. In contrast, unregulated labour markets in the US 
favour the growth of unstable low-skill employment. In his research on the relationship 
between workplace representation, HPWSs and firm performance in German 
establishments, Zwick (2004) found that the presence of works councils is positively 
related to high-performance practices and to high company productivity. 
 
Other scholars stressed the pivotal role of collective voice institutions in the workplace 
as power resources labour can use for ensuring that HPWSs actually deliver positive 
outcomes for employees, including job security (Doellgast 2010; Doellgast 2012). In 
her comparison between German and US call centres, Doellgast (2010) found that the 
presence of works councils in Germany favoured the adoption of human resource 
practices entailing work autonomy and training, in contrast with US establishments. In 
her in-depth qualitative study of the aerospace and pharmaceutical industries in the UK, 
Lloyd (2000) found that the presence of collective voice mechanism and labour market 
regulation was fundamental for making companies adopt HPWSs and actually investing 
in their employees. 
 
The debates in the segmentation literature and in the HPWS literature agree that 
industrial relations institutions are crucial for determining workers’ outcomes in sectors 
such as low-end services, where there is weak or no association between employment 
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security, high wages and good working conditions on the one hand and companies’ 
performance on the other hand (Boxall 2003: 15 f.; Lloyd, Warhurst et al. 2013). 
Among others, the Russell Sage Foundation project on low wages in advanced countries 
shows that strong unions and strict legal regulation regarding contingent work limited 
the use of precarious work in services such as the catering and hotel industry, nursing, 
cleaning and retail (Applebaum 2010; Gautiè and Schmitt 2010). 
 
However, the debate regarding what factors influence the provision of employment 
security from the employer's side is more controversial in sectors such as high-quality 
manufacturing. As illustrated above, in those sectors some scholars have argued that 
employers have rational interests in providing high wages and employment security 
and, more generally, in maintaining internal labour markets for the core workforce. In 
contrast, others have argued that industrial relations are critical for ensuring 
employment security and good wages even in those sectors - especially because high-
performance practices are not necessarily linked with positive outcomes for workers. 
Therefore, the question regarding the extent to which employers would support stable 
employment and high wages even with weak or declining industrial relations 
institutions is still open. 
 
This section has presented the debate regarding the determinants of workers’ outcomes 
and, in particular, of employment security. The literature underscoring the role of 
institutions does not discuss the role of unions as actors but only as institutions 
constraining employers’ strategies. However, as the workforce is fragmented, unions 
might have an ambivalent role towards marginal workforce segments. The next section 
illustrates the debate about unions’ strategies towards contingent workers. 
 
 
3  The controversial role of labour in segmented labour markets 
 
Scholars have advanced different arguments regarding unions’ approach towards 
contingent workers. On the one hand, unions have been argued to contribute to the 
marginalisation of contingent workers on the labour market. On the other hand, unions 
were found to organise contingent workers and to bargain on their behalf in order to 
improve their working conditions. The segmentation literature argues that unions 
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bargain skill and occupational demarcations within the workforce in order to control the 
workforce supply on the labour market. Child (1967) and Wilkinson (1974) studied how 
unions bargained over technologies and skill demarcations in the British metal and 
printing industry, influencing the workforce structure within the company in order to 
maintain control over their wages and skills (see also the review by Rubery 1978). 
Further research in the UK and in the US illustrated how unions contribute to build up 
ILMs - ports of entry, training systems and career ladders - in order to control the skill 
supply and workers’ knowledge (Rubery 1978; Jacoby 1983; Althauser 1989). 
 
According to this perspective, unions contribute to the workforce segmentation by 
excluding parts of the workforce from the access to ILMs and pushing them into 
peripheral labour markets. This perspective is predominant in economics where unions 
are considered to represent exclusively the interests of labour market insiders – 
permanent workers in full-time employment – at the expense of labour market outsiders 
– unemployed and temporary workers. In particular, the economists Lindbeck and 
Snower (1986; 2002) claim that unions contribute to unemployment and to the increase 
of contingent work: In order to serve the interests of their members, unions bargain high 
wages and job security for labour market insiders. By so doing, they prevent outsiders 
from competing with insiders and force them into low wage and unstable jobs or even 
into unemployment.  
 
Scholars in the industrial relations and sociological tradition found evidence that unions 
act according to an insider-outsider logic: In his research on labour market flexibility in 
South Korean large entreprises, Yang (2006) found that unions obtained job security for 
their members at the expense of marginal workers. In Poland Zientara (2008) found that 
Polish unions discriminated against job seekers as they fought to maintain high 
employment protection for permanent workers and refused public sector reforms. In 
Germany Hassel (2014) and Thelen (2012) argue that unions and works councils in core 
manufacturing companies agreed to the flexibilisation of the service periphery in order 
to ensure high wages and employment stability to their core members.  
 
In contrast to this evidence, the union revitalisation literature contends that unions can 
also start including marginal segments of the workforce, in particular when their 
institutional and organisational power resources have been declining. Expanding the 
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organisation and bargaining domain to contingent workers represents a strategic 
reaction to membership decline or a strategy to compensate for the loss of support from 
politics or institutions (Katz, Batt et al. 2002; Frege and Kelly 2004; Heery and Adler 
2004). The earlier revitalisation literature suggests that unions’ strategies are path-
dependent and reflect unions’ identity and their institutional context (Baccaro, Hamann 
et al. 2003; Frege and Kelly 2003). This implies that some unions are more likely than 
others to start broadening the agenda and organising campaigns towards the marginal 
workforce. Organising strategies towards marginal workers are also more likely to be 
adopted by unions whose power relies on their membership and whose identity is closer 
to a social movement than to a social partner. UK and US unions, after many years of 
steady membership decline, have been found to organise migrant workers (Holgate 
2005; Fine 2006), and service workers in the cleaning (Erickson, Fisk et al. 2002) and 
hotel industry (Wells 2000). In contrast, unions with institutionalised bargaining rights 
such as German, Italian and Spanish unions are more likely to focus on their core 
membership – protecting insiders - and try to re-gain institutional power by entering 
negotiations over social pacts at the national level (Baccaro, Hamann et al. 2003). 
 
While this evidence suggests that unions’ strategies are path-dependent, more recent 
revitalisation research has found that the decline of traditional power resources is also 
one of the most important conditions for unions’ path-breaking behaviour (Greer 2008a; 
Bacon and Samuel 2009; Turner, 2009; Vandaele and Leschke 2010). Thus, even 
unions with a social partnership tradition and institutionalised bargaining rights might 
adopt strategies outside their “repertoire of contention”8 if the traditional institutional 
channels of influence have lost their effectiveness. For instance, Dutch unions were 
found to try to organise fixed-term workers in addition to offering them services 
targeting their specific needs (Vandaele and Leschke 2010); the German service union 
Ver.Di started a campaign for precarious workers of the supermarket chain Lidl 
(Gajewska and Niesyto 2009) and the Austrian whitecollar union opened its 
organisational domain to the self-employed (Pernicka, Aust et al. 2007). 
 
The union revitalisation literature is partly compatible with the insider-outsider 
perspective because it acknowledges that not all unions include marginal workers in 
their representation domain. However, the union revitalisation literature also 
                                                 
8
  Tilly (1978).    
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acknowledges that unions can change their strategies and become more inclusive. Still, 
existing literature has not closely examined under what conditions (and at what point) 
unions respond to resource decline by adopting new strategies because it mainly 
focused on exceptional campaigns for organising marginal workers and relies on case 
studies conducted over a short time period. 
 
 
4 The debate about convergence and divergence of national models 
 
The political economy literature distinguishes between coordinated, or organisation-
oriented, and liberal, or market-oriented, employment systems, which are at the centre 
of national political economies (McGovern, Hill et al. 2007: 36 f.). The debate 
dominating the political economy literature regards the changing trajectory of national 
capitalist systems under the pressure of globalisation, whether they are going to 
converge on a system or rather maintain national differences. Thus, the increasing 
marketisation of the employment relationship in the form of work casualisation has 
implications for this debate because it implies a shift towards a liberal employment 
system. 
 
 
4.1 From convergence to Varieties of Capitalism 
 
The debate about convergence and divergence of employment systems started in the 
eighties. A group of scholars argued that national systems were going to converge on 
the model of a service-oriented, liberal market economy due to the impact of 
technological change, trade, regional integration and capital mobility (Bell 1973; 
Baumol, Blackman et al. 1989; Verspagen 1991). In response, other scholars contended 
that different national institutional constellations in terms of labour markets, industrial 
relations and welfare institutions allow countries to differentiate and specialise their 
production systems in order to achieve a comparative advantage on international 
markets (Streeck and Katz 1984; Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986). Strong unions and 
worker representation in the workplace, high employment protection and encompassing 
collective agreements constitute incentives for companies to upgrade their product 
strategies and adopt high-quality manufacturing production systems. Streeck (1991) and 
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Berggren (1993) found evidence of this process in the German and Swedish automotive 
industries, respectively. In contrast, low and fragmented wage standards, weak unions 
and low dismissal protection encourage companies to choose low value-added markets 
because they do not have to invest in training and technology in order to maintain 
competitive production costs (Ackroyd and Procter 1997). For instance, Craft and 
Thomas argue that this constituted the comparative advantage of UK manufacturing on 
international markets between 1910 and 1935 (Crafts and Thomas 1986). Given their 
different institutional assets, countries are expected to respond differently to 
globalisation pressure and maintain their national diversity (Goldthorpe 1984; Berger 
and Dore 1996).   
 
The framework of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) is built on these insights. The main 
distinguishing characteristic of this framework is that firms are the central rational 
actors which strategically interact with other firms and their workforces in different 
ways according to the institutional context. Institutions allow companies to solve their 
strategic interaction problems in institutional arenas such as industrial relations, 
corporate governance, training and labour markets. These are interlocked through 
institutional complementarities, which guarantee the coherence and economic success 
of the political economy. In Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) such as Anglo-Saxon 
countries, strategic interaction takes place through market-based mechanisms because 
industrial relations are weak, labour markets flexible and corporate governance 
fragmented. Manufacturing in LMEs reflects the low-road type while the institutional 
structure favours specialisation in areas where flexibility and radical innovation is 
required, such as pharmaceuticals and software development. In contrast, in 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), manufacturing companies successfully 
specialise in high value-added product strategies because the vocational training system 
provides a skilled workforce, encompassing collective agreements set high and 
homogeneous wage levels, and workplace representation fosters labour management 
cooperation at company level. As national institutions are the source of comparative 
advantage, employers are supposed to have an interest in maintaining the institutional 
assets, and political economies are expected to follow divergent path-dependent 
trajectories. Most interestingly, the VoC literature argues that companies in CMEs have 
a rational interest in maintaining coordinating institutions which decommodify the 
employment relationship (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2007). 
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4.2 Two paths of endogeneous institutional change: Dualisation vs. liberalisation 
 
Despite the VoC expectations of stability, research has found evidence that coordinated 
market economies had started changing at least by mid-nineties. For instance, Vogel 
(2005) found that Japanese companies reduced their commitment to lifetime 
employment by hiring increasing numbers of temporary workers. In Germany, Hassel 
(1999) documented the declining coverage of collective bargaining and of works 
councils and the progressive decentralisation of industrial relations. As a result, the 
literature dedicated increasing attention to mechanisms of endogeneous change, which 
is a process of incremental change driven by actors in their everyday implementation 
and enactment of institutions (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Actors themselves can be 
initiators of change if they do not completely follow the pattern of behaviour prescribed 
by institutions (Hall and Thelen 2009: 10). Institutions can be ambiguous or poorly 
enforced and can always be reinterpreted contextually or circumvented (Jackson 2005); 
they are contested by social actors with different interests, who might defend or try to 
change them (Hall and Thelen 2009: 27). 
 
The introduction of agency brought “new life” to the debate about convergence vs. 
divergence of national political economies. In fact, the interpretation of the role labour 
and management play in the institutional change of CMEs distinguishes the two main 
interpretations of institutional change: On the one hand, some scholars argue that CMEs 
have changed into dual economies, maintaining a coordinated core while the periphery 
is increasingly flexibilised (Emmenegger, Hausermann et al. 2012b; Thelen 2012). On 
the other hand, a group of scholars underscore that CMEs have also been following a 
changing trajectory of liberalisation, and dualisation is just a phase of liberalisation 
rather than an institutional equilibrium (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Howell 2011). 
 
The dualisation literature takes a political-coalitional approach to institutional change. It 
stresses that temporary and low-wage contracts are concentrated among young workers, 
low-skill workers and (low-end) service workers, which are peripheral market segments 
separate from core labour markets. This division between a deregulated periphery and a 
coordinated core is due to the political coalitions driving institutional change in CMEs 
(Emmenegger, Häusermann et al. 2012b). The literature has focused on the role of 
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labour-management, or productivity, coalitions in the institutional arena of labour 
market and industrial relations – a term which was first used by Windolf (1989) in his 
article on the decentralisation of industrial relations in Germany and Italy. According to 
the dualisation perspective, employers and unions, which represent permanent workers 
in full-time employment, have a common interest in maintaining coordination 
mechanisms. Employers support coordination at least in those sectors where they 
constitute a source of comparative advantage; unions have direct representational 
interests in maintaining the wages and working conditions of their core members. For 
this reason, they agree, implicitly or explicitly, to the flexibilisation at the margins of 
the labour market (Emmenegger, Hausermann et al. 2012b; Thelen 2014).  
 
Evidence from different countries supports this argument. In his study of labour markets 
in Japan and South Korea, Peng (2012) argues that the partial deregulation of the labour 
market, which led to the increase of contingent contracts, was the result of tacit 
agreements between employers and unions, especially in large enterprises, supported by 
the government. Palier and Thelen (2010) have attributed to national coalitions of 
business and unions in export manufacturing the dualisation of the labour market 
between permanent and contingent workers in France and Germany. These cross-class 
coalitions support the industrial relations and labour market institutions in the core of 
the coordinated model, while flexibilisation and deregulation have been limited to the 
periphery of the economy. This arrangement benefits the export sector, as the reduction 
of service costs allows it to stay competitive. 
 
The theoretical framework of the dualisation literature relies on three main pillars. First, 
it does not break away from the VoC tradition but it rather shows that the coordinated 
model still exists, at least in the core of national political economies; however, it does 
not deliver egalitarian outcomes because the coordinating institutions are not as 
encompassing as they used to be (Thelen 2009: 486). Second, dualisation is not only 
driven by structural changes such as increased competition on national and international 
markets and the rise of services, but it is rather the outcome of policy choices. Thus, the 
preferences and strategies of political parties, employers and unions are fundamental for 
filtering structural dualisation tendencies (e.g. tertiarisation). In this framework, the role 
of unions is considered to be even more important than that of employers – who are 
considered to be always pro-dualisation – “as their support can be pivotal for the 
 30 
 
formation of a political coalition facilitating dualisation” (Emmenegger, Häusermann et 
al. 2012b: 310). Third, core and periphery are in a relatively stable dual equilibrium, 
which will last in the long term. On the one hand, peripheral workers are not as well 
represented through unions and political parties in the institutional sphere, and, 
therefore, reforming institutions to their advantage is difficult. On the other hand, 
atypical workers “do not work in the same jobs for less money; they work in different 
jobs” than permanent workers in full-time employment (Emmenegger, Häusermann et 
al. 2012b: 316). Emmenegger et al. (2012b) argue further that the clear division 
between the two labour market segments prevents the competition and “two different 
‘labor market regimes’ may coexist alongside each other, one for the insiders and one 
for the outsiders” (p. 317).  
 
In contrast to the dualisation literature, a group of scholars argues that all advanced 
political economies have been undergoing an inexorable process of liberalisation. 
Already in the nineties Cappelli (1999b; 2001) argued that market-mediated 
mechanisms were expanding to the detriment of ILMs in the US. More recent literature 
has highlighted common tendencies towards liberalisation across LMEs and CMEs 
even though liberalisation trends progress at a different pace according to the national 
institutional context (Baccaro and Howell 2011; Heyes, Lewis et al. 2014). This 
framework underscores the role of labour market and welfare institutions as constraints 
over market forces rather than as structures of incentives influencing actors’ (especially 
employers’) formation of preferences. Adopting a Polanyian perspective, Streeck has 
argued that institutions are the outcome of the continuous conflictual interplay between 
societal attempts to regulate the market through collective institutions and capitalist 
actors' attempts to undermine regulation for individual economic advantage (Streeck 
2009: 4). As labour has been declining, dualisation should be seen only as a phase of 
the liberalisation process rather than as dual equilibrium, because the fringe might 
eventually “eat the core” (Streeck 2010: 512). Liberalisation in the arenas of labour 
markets and industrial relations are identified in trends such as increasing employer 
discretion, the decentralisation and individualisation of decision-making and the 
diffusion of price-based mechanisms (Baccaro and Howell 2011). 
 
This literature suggests a different mechanism underlying liberalisation than the 
dualisation literature, which focuses on the common interests between employers and 
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labour to maintain a coordinated core and a flexible periphery. In contrast, this literature 
focuses on employers’ interests in reducing costs and negotiated constraints on 
unilateral decision-making via liberalising employment relations and labour market 
regulation. First, research has found evidence that employers’ strategies changed from 
cooperation to promoting institutional change or avoidance of institutions. Even in 
countries and sectors where they were expected to support social partnership, stable 
employment and encompassing collective agreements, employers were found to openly 
push for the deregulation of labour markets and industrial relations. Kinderman (2005) 
and Menz (2005) found German employers to openly advocate for the liberalisation of 
the labour market and the decentralisation of industrial relations. Similarly, the Swedish 
employers’ associations withdrew their representatives from the national government 
agencies at the beginning of the nineties, undermining the corporatist system (Johansson 
2003). Second, while employers have sometimes maintained formal institutions, they 
have used them differently for pursuing their aims, changing the meaning and scope of 
institutions. For instance, Sako and Kotosaka (2012) found that the Japanese “Shunto” - 
the yearly national collective bargaining round for setting wage floors for the whole 
economy – has become the employers’ instrument to justify wage increases in line with 
companies’ performance rather than to acceptable living standards (Sako and Kotosaka 
2012: 86 ff.). Third, employers were found to avoid existing institutions by exploiting 
existing loopholes. Employers have been found to use temporary contracts and 
subcontractors for avoiding sectoral collective agreement, employment protection 
legislation and union control. These employers' strategies were found in the retail, hotel 
and catering sector in France and Germany (Jaehrling and Méhaut 2012), in the 
construction sectors in Finland, Germany and the Netherlands (Lillie, Wagner et al. 
2014) and in the call centre sector across Europe (Doellgast, Batt et al. 2009). 
 
The main explanation for why these changes have taken place is declining labour 
power, which impairs labour from counteracting employers’ liberalising strategies. In 
all advanced political economies – even though the extent varies across countries - 
unionisation rates have been declining, bargaining coverage has been shrinking and 
union ties to left-wing political parties have been loosening (Ross and Martin 1999; 
Bryson, Ebbinghaus et al. 2011). In this context, unions’ defensive strategies to protect 
the core through concessions, also including the flexibilisation at the periphery, are 
interpreted as a signal of labour weakness (Doellgast 2008; Greer 2008b) rather than a 
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political choice as in the dualisation literature. Given the power imbalance between 
labour and management, these so-called political coalitions are not sustainable in the 
long run. Some optimistic accounts have highlighted unions’ potential as 
countermovements (Turner 2009; Tapia and Turner 2013) even though their attempts 
have not managed to reverse the trend so far. 
 
The crucial point in the debate between the dualisation and liberalisation perspectives is 
the evaluation of the stable dual equilibrium between core manufacturing and the 
service periphery. The question is whether liberalisation will spare core manufacturing 
sectors and, in particular, whether peripheral workers are potential substitutes for core 
ones. If the boundaries are more blurred than the dualisation literature suggests and 
there is competition and even substitution between the two labour market segments, 
dualisation is just likely to be an intermediate step in a process of ongoing 
liberalisation. However, the debate is still open, as existing dualisation literature has 
often neglected the overtime dimension, and instead conducted macro-level 
comparative analyses which provide a static picture of the workforce segmentation 
(Barbieri 2009; Häusermann and Schwander 2010; Marx 2011). Similarly, the literature 
on liberalisation has provided case studies within a limited time frame, which does not 
provide information on the trend (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Lillie and Greer 2007). 
The few works taking into consideration overtime trends have not looked specifically at 
workplace dynamics between core and peripheral workers and between labour and 
management, especially in core manufacturing (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Howell 
2011; Thelen 2014). 
 
Section two, three and four have illustrated three ongoing academic debates relevant to 
the analysis of contingent work. Even though they were presented separately, they are 
actually closely related to each other. Indeed, the debate about the convergence and 
divergence of national employment systems is centred around two main controversies, 
which are respectively the focus of the academic debates previously presented. On the 
one hand, the dualisation literature and the liberalisation perspectives disagree regarding 
the extent to which stable employment and high wages are a result of employers’ 
interest in coordinating institutions and coordinated labour market outcomes or rather of 
labour power resources. This is the core of the debate illustrated in section two. On the 
other hand, the two strands of literature ascribe different roles to unions either as labour 
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market insiders’ representatives or as potential countermovements to employers’ 
segmentation strategies. This discussion was illustrated in section three. 
 
The next section shows that German core manufacturing sectors represent a critical case 
for studying the expansion of contingent work from the perspective of all three debates. 
 
 
5 The critical case study of German core manufacturing sectors 
 
Since the seventies, Germany has represented the model of social capitalism, and export 
manufacturing has always been regarded as the core of the economy, which best reflects 
the characteristics of the “social” or “coordinated” model (Albert 1991; Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  However, in the nineties the German production model started 
changing, and the literature is currently divided regarding the interpretation of these 
changes for the trajectory of the political economy. 
 
 
5.1 The German coordinated model 
 
In the seventies and eighties, research on industrial relations and political economies 
focused on the German model of Diversified Quality Production (DQP). This 
production model distinguished itself from mass production because it specialised in 
innovative, technologically advanced and high-quality manufacturing production, and 
increased product variety without decreasing the amount of production. As the markets 
for DQP were less price-sensitive than for mass production, German manufacturing 
companies could at least partly avoid the cost pressure of international mass markets 
(Sorge and Streeck 1987). 
 
In the narrative of the German model, industrial relations have a pivotal role for the 
origin of DQP because they constrain and enable employers’ strategies for product 
upgrading (Streeck 1991; Streeck 1992). Institutions considered particularly relevant are 
vocational training, workplace codetermination, sectoral bargaining and employment 
protection. First, German vocational training provided workers with sector- and firm-
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specific skills, allowing them to perform independent work without close supervision 
(Roth 1997: 117). Second, German works councils, which enjoy consultation and 
codetermination rights on qualitative issues
9
, favoured cooperation between labour and 
management in the workplace (Müller-Jentsch 1995: 14; Hyman 2001: 120). At the 
same time, they were also the union’s arm in the companies, as in the eighties the 
unionisation rates of works councils were high in the manufacturing industry, reaching a 
peak of over 90 percent in the steel industry (Niedenhoff 1981: 27-30). Third, wage 
standards were set by sectoral bargaining rounds between the union and the employers’ 
association. In the eighties the sectoral coverage of collective metal agreements was 
between 70 and 80% (Doellgast and Greer 2007: 57). The metal union had high 
mobilisation potential during the negotiations because the union density in the metal 
sector was around 40-45% (Hassel and Schulten 1998: 499). Finally, employment 
protection for permanent workers was among the highest in Europe and the use of 
temporary work was strictly regulated by law (Mosley 1994). 
 
These institutions contributed to the formation and stability of the DQP model. 
Encompassing agreement at sectoral and at workplace level prevented employers from 
compressing labour costs through wage cuts and high dismissal protection limited 
employers’ abilities to reduce the workforce. These constraints forced employers to 
invest in technology for increasing productivity and to adjust their products to high-
quality markets. The low wage differentials encouraged employers to invest in broad 
training instead of focusing on a few professional figures (Streeck 1992: 32). The 
skilled workforce and the works councils pushed employers to collaborate to create “a 
flexible, non-Taylorist organisation of work” (Streeck 1991: 25), which relied on 
teamwork, task rotation, and mutual trust (Kern and Schumann 1984; Sorge and Streeck 
1987; Jürgens, Malsch et al. 1993).  
 
While Streeck’s interpretation of the origin of the German model highlights the 
constraining role of institutions (Streeck 1991), the VoC framework stresses the role of 
institutions for solving coordination problems with the workforce and with other 
companies. For instance, centralised and coordinated bargaining, setting homogeneous 
wages and working conditions at sectoral levels, limits the risk of poaching, assuring 
employers a return on their investments in training (Soskice 1999; Hall and Soskice 
                                                 
9
 Such as working time or work organisation.  
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2001). In addition, high employment protection legislation ensures stable employment 
to employees who would otherwise be unwilling to commit to specific training 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). In the VoC framework, 
institutions are functional to employers’ interests because they constitute the source of 
comparative advantage on international markets by facilitating the intra-firm and 
labour-management coordination within and across different institutional spheres (for 
example labour market, industrial relations, and training/education). For this reason, 
employers, who represent the central actors in the VoC framework, have a rational 
interest in maintaining coordinating institutions. Thus, the VoC framework emphasises 
the stability of the (German) coordinated model. This fundamental difference between 
the VoC framework and the sets of arguments pointing out institutions as power 
resources becomes relevant to the interpretation of the changes in the German model 
illustrated in the next section. 
 
 
5.2 The transformation of the German model 
 
In the nineties, the German model entered a period of crisis and the high labour costs 
have been argued to constitute the main factors responsible for its loss of 
competitiveness. The competitiveness problem was exacerbated thanks to the rise of 
other competitors - such as US and Japanese manufacturers – which proved that there 
were alternative (and cheaper) ways to DQP, bringing the labour-cost competition into 
high-quality product markets (Herrigel 1997). 
 
However, Germany did not shift its economic model based on export manufacturing 
towards services even though the economies of US and UK were often presented as the 
models to follow at the time (Gries and Birk 1999; Krämer 1999). German employers 
instead responded to the cost pressure from international markets by heavily 
restructuring manufacturing production. On the one hand, they introduced lean 
production techniques in order to improve company performance. These measures led 
to the reduction of job positions and had ambiguous effects on the organisation of work 
(Jürgens 1997). While forms of work self-organisation and group work developed 
among skilled workers, the work in new greenfield sites rather presented Tayloristic 
features (Roth 1997). On the other hand, companies restructured their value chain into 
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modules which could be carried out by suppliers both in Germany and abroad. The 
value chain of big manufacturing companies became fragmented as companies made 
increasing use of subcontractors (Jürgens 2004: 419; Doellgast and Greer 2007; Greer 
2008b); besides setting up new plants in Eastern Germany, companies started 
outsourcing abroad, and especially to Eastern Europe, which offered close and cheap 
production sites (Kinkel and Lay 2003; Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2006). According to 
a survey by the Fraunhofer Institut, over 40 percent of companies in core manufacturing 
sectors outsourced part of their production abroad between 1999 and 2001. For over 75 
percent of these companies the reason behind outsourcing was the reduction of 
production costs (Kinkel and Lay 2003: 4). 
 
The debate over outsourcing and the future of Germany as a production site 
(Standortdebatte) contributed to building a consensus around the necessity to cut labour 
costs in order to re-gain competitiveness and to save Germany as a manufacturing 
production site (Upchurch 2000: 113). This discourse helped to legitimise the future 
policy measures and reforms in the institutional arenas of collective bargaining, labour 
market and welfare, aimed at strengthening market-based mechanisms (Upchurch 2000: 
76; Silvia 2010: 223). 
 
In the first half of the nineties, employers’ associations – especially Gesamtmetall – 
introduced the option of membership without applying the sectoral agreement (Ohne 
Tarifbindung (OT)-Mitgliedschaften). Even so, the rate of employees working in 
companies which are members of an employers’association declined from 80%  in 1980 
to 60% in 2008 (ICTWSS 2011). The coverage rate is even lower in the metal sector, 
especially in Eastern Germany: While in Western Germany the membership rates in the 
employers association dropped from around 65%  to 52% in 2008, the density in 
Eastern Germany went from around 50% in 1995 to 16% in 2008 (Silvia 2010). This 
trend contributed to the decline of the rate of establishments covered by collective 
agreements, which dropped from 59.3% in 1995 to 26.2% in 2010 in core 
manufacturing sectors even though it is still almost 80% for establishments with more 
than 500 employees (Data of the Institute for Employment Research  in Baccaro and 
Benassi 2014). Furthermore, since the post-unification membership boom, overall union 
density declined from 36% in 1991 to 19.3% in 2009 (Bispinck, Dribbusch et al. 2010: 
13) even though IG Metall is still a strong union with its 2.24 million members. 
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However, its organisation rate changes according to the specific industry: in the car 
industry it is around 70% while the electronics and IT industry is characterised by 30% 
union density (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011: 18). 
 
In addition to shrinking bargaining coverage, the use of opening clauses started 
spreading since the mid-nineties as an instrument for amending the wage and working 
time standards set by sectoral collective agreements. The use of these workplace 
agreements - Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness (PECs) – was bargained 
between unions and employers in 1994 and quickly spread across sectors. In 2007 
51.5% establishments covered by collective agreements had opening clauses in core 
manufacturing sectors (Data of the Institute for Employment Research  in Baccaro and 
Benassi 2014). Given the pressure for concessions due to the credible threat of 
disinvestment, the PECs have soon become an institutionalised instrument for co-
management and have often amended sectoral bargaining provisions (Rehder 2003). 
 
At national level, the most significant labour market reforms took place in 2003 under 
the Red-Green coalition government. The so called Hartz reforms – from the name of 
the Head of the Commission in charge of the reforms, Peter Hartz – changed the system 
of unemployment benefits
10
 and deregulated the use of atypical work. Hartz I focused 
on agency work, setting up staff agencies for unemployed people at every local 
employment office. At the same time, limitations on the use of agency work were lifted. 
Companies could hire on agency contracts without specifying the reason for the fixed-
term and without offering any guarantee of a permanent job afterwards. Dismissal 
protection was lowered as agencies could employ agency workers on contracts which 
lasted only until the end of their assignment at the hiring company. The equal pay 
principle could be amended by collective agreement (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011: 
5). Hartz II created minijobs and midijobs, which are employment contracts with lower 
social security contributions and tax rates. Minijobs and midijobs can generate an 
income of maximum 400€ and 800€ respectively a month. The reform lifted the 
limitation of 15 hours/week which used to apply to marginal employment, offering 
employers an exit option from the collective agreements (Weinkopf 2009a: 13). 
                                                 
10
 The Hartz IV reform will not be discussed here. See for further details Hassel and Schiller (2010).  
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Furthermore, Hartz II created subsidies for self-employment (Ich-AG) (Jacobi and 
Kluve 2006: 21). 
 
The literature has documented that the German coordinated model underwent profound 
changes in the institutional arenas of industrial relations and labour markets (among 
others) over the last twenty years. Therefore, the political economy and industrial 
relations literature had to amend the stability scenario offered by VoC. However, 
existing research currently disagrees on the extent and interpretation of these changes. 
Germany is, in fact, the centre of the dispute between the two factions presented in the 
fourth section: the dualisation literature and the authors arguing that institutions have 
become universally more liberalised across the economy. 
 
 
5.3 Dualisation vs. liberalisation perspectives on German core manufacturing 
 
The dualisation literature contends that flexibilisation and deregulation took place only 
at the service periphery while core manufacturing sectors are still coordinated (i.a. Hall, 
2007; Hassel, 2014; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2014).  The literature suggests 
that coordination in German manufacturing is supported by cross-class coalitions 
between labour and management. German manufacturing employers are considered 
“outspoken defenders of industry wide bargaining” who “appreciate the advantages of 
dealing with strong and unified bargaining partners” (Thelen 2014: 48). Furthermore, 
labour-management relations at company-level are seen as extremely cooperative and 
the diffusion of PECs is interpreted as the expression of shared interests in company’s 
competitiveness of both employers and works councils (Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014: 49). 
Labour in core manufacturing sectors is considered to be as strong as in the heydays of 
the German model, and even stronger because export manufacturing success is 
increasingly dependent on the close coordination of different production phases and, 
therefore, employers want to avoid industrial action at any cost (Thelen 2001; Thelen 
and van Wijnbergen 2003). 
 
According to this literature, the presence of a flexible and deregulated labour market in 
the service sector is due to low unionisation rates but, most of all, to employers’ 
fragmentation as they do not have the same interest in coordination as employers in the 
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manufacturing sector (Thelen 2014: 52). Thus, employers in services do not apply 
collective agreements and make great use of atypical work, especially minijobs, which 
have been liberalised through the Hartz reforms. In her latest work, Thelen (2014) 
argues that the increasing size of services compared to manufacturing naturally leads to 
the dualisation of the German economy. However, earlier works by Thelen herself and 
other scholars suggested that the cross-class coalition in manufacturing contributed to 
the liberalisation of the periphery by supporting (or, in the case of unions, more or less 
implicitly consenting to) policy measures and labour market reforms reducing the costs 
of services. In this way, manufacturing would stay competitive in terms of costs without 
impairing the standards of the core workforce. Thanks to the powerful coalitions of 
actors, the German economy is believed to be in a dual equilibrium between a 
coordinated manufacturing sector and a service periphery (Palier and Thelen 2010; 
Thelen 2012; Hassel 2014). 
 
In contrast with the dualisation literature, a group of scholars contend that liberalisation 
does not distinguish only low-end services but rather affects the whole German political 
economy. They highlight that the trajectory of German industrial relations and labour 
market institutions has been clearly moving towards increasing liberalisation if this is 
analysed over time. Thus, even though the extent of change varies between 
manufacturing and services, the two segments are not in a dual equilibrium but they are 
rather moving in the same direction (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Benassi 2014). Long-
term analyses show that, even in core manufacturing sectors, union density and 
collective bargaining coverage have become less encompassing in comparison to the 
traditional German model of the eighties and early nineties (Bosch, Haipeter et al. 2007: 
331 f.; Baccaro and Benassi 2014). Furthermore, qualitative studies have shown that 
atypical work has been increasingly used not only in the service sector (Bosch and 
Kalina 2008) but also in manufacturing companies (Holst, Nachtwey et al. 2010).  
 
This evidence questions employers’ support for coordinating institutions in core 
manufacturing sectors. As cost-competition has become increasingly relevant also in 
high-quality market segments, export manufacturing companies need not only to 
constantly innovate their technologies and product but also cut costs (Herrigel 2014). 
For instance, the metalworking association of Saxony and large firms were found to 
openly promote the opt-out from sectoral agreement in favour of greater 
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decentralisation (Raess 2006). Even when collective bargaining institutions are still in 
place, employers can avoid them or manipulate their meaning and function. In core 
manufacturing sectors employers have been using subcontractors for industrial services 
(for example logistics and facility maintenance) and components. By so doing, 
employers can circumvent the high wage standards set by sectoral collective agreements 
because subcontractors are usually not covered or covered by less favourable 
agreements in terms of workers’ outcomes (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Helfen 2011).  
The existence of competing collective agreements at workplace level is now used for 
increasing wage competition within the company’s workforce instead of 
decommodifying labour (Holst 2014). Furthermore, employers have used the threat of 
relocation and made works councils co-responsible for plant-level investments in order 
to gain more leverage in company-level bargaining; the diffusion of concession 
bargaining changed the function of codetermination which has become an instrument to 
serve firms’ short-term logic rather than to exercise industrial democracy in the 
workplace (Höpner and Jackson 2002: 364). 
 
This section has shown how the German political economy has changed over time from 
the traditional coordinated model. Some scholars have shown that these changes 
towards liberalisation have not spared the core of the German political economy, the 
manufacturing sectors (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Holst, Nachtwey et al. 2010). 
However, the prominent view in the literature is that German core manufacturing 
sectors have maintained their coordinating characteristics despite institutional changes 
such as the decentralisation of industrial relations and the flexibilisation of the labour 
market (Herrigel 2010; Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014).  This recent quote by Thelen (2014) 
exemplifies this point: 
 
“Consistent with the logic of VoC, heightened competition in international markets has if anything 
intensified cooperation between labor and capital in the manufacturing sector and shored up traditional 
institutions and practices, including coordinated wage bargaining and labor-management cooperation at 
the firm-level […] by the mi-1990s at latest, industrial relations in Germany had become increasingly 
bifurcated between a stable core (where traditional institutions and social partnership still held sway) and 
a growing periphery concentrated especially in emerging service sectors (where weaker unions struggle 
against employers whose interests with respects to labor relations are very different from those of 
industry).” (Thelen 2014: 47) 
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German core manufacturing sectors represent a least-likely case for the study of the 
following two phenomena as they are fundamentally at odds with the dualisation 
scenario of a stable core based on labour-management cooperation. First, contingent 
work has been dramatically increasing in the last ten years in German core 
manufacturing sectors. Second, the German metal union IG Metall launched a social 
movement-style campaign in 2007 for organising agency workers and started 
bargaining on their behalf. As German core manufacturing sectors are supposed to 
present the characteristics of CMEs and of high value-added sectors implementing high 
performance practices (for example training, complex work organisation, high wages, 
employment security), the analysis of changes in the employment relationship offers 
precious insights for understanding the factors leading to coordinated (or not) labour 
market outcomes and labour's role in increasingly segmented labour markets. The next 
section will illustrate how this thesis contributes to the academic debates mentioned in 
the previous three sections, supported by evidence from the German manufacturing 
sector. 
 
 
6 Contribution and structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis addresses three main issues, which are still debated in the academic 
literature. The first debate regards the conditions under which companies make use of 
contingent work. As illustrated in section two, there is an ongoing discussion in the 
literature regarding the extent to which employers’ use of temporary work is determined 
by production requirements rather than by industrial relations institutions, especially in 
high value-added sectors. The second research issue concerns labour's role in 
increasingly segmented labour markets. While some scholars have argued that unions 
exclusively protect the interests of the core workforce, other scholars have shown that 
unions can include agency workers. However, it has remained unclear under what 
conditions unions decide to switch to inclusive strategies. The third debate regards the 
implication of the marketisation of the employment relationship for the trajectory of 
change of CMEs. While some argue that some coordinated economies are constituted 
by a coordinated core and a liberalised periphery in a stable dual equilibrium between 
each other, other scholars argue that liberalisation is affecting all political economies 
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and will not spare the core in the long term. However, the literature is still missing 
conclusive evidence. 
 
By addressing these debates, this study focuses on German core manufacturing sectors, 
which have been argued to have maintained the traditional characteristics of the German 
model of high-quality production such as a stable skilled workforce and labour-
management cooperation. Cross-class coalitions are supposed to have maintained a 
stable manufacturing core at the expense of the service periphery, which has been 
increasingly flexibilised. In contrast to this scenario, these sectors have recently 
experienced a dramatic growth of contingent work; in response, the German metal 
union has become more inclusive towards contingent workers by organising them and 
bargaining on their behalf. Thus, the thesis addresses the question of why contingent 
workers could grow to such an extent in German core sectors as to trigger unions’ 
inclusive strategies. 
 
This thesis argues that these phenomena challenge the traditional core-periphery 
framework according to which contingent workers occupy a secondary labour market 
segment, which is separate from and not in competition with the core workforce. This 
thesis first evaluates the explanatory power of employers’ interest in coordinated labour 
market outcomes as opposed to the role of labour power resources, concluding that 
previous literature has overestimated employers’ interests in maintaining coordinated 
and flexible labour market segments in dual equilibrium. In contrast, employers’ use of 
temporary contracts puts core workers under pressure and can even trigger competition 
between the two labour market segments. This core-periphery dynamic questions the 
stability of labour-management arrangements which supposedly rely on the protection 
of core workers at the expense of the marginal workforce; instead, this dynamic is 
argued to explain why unions have started including contingent workers in their 
representation domain. This evidence, based on data at the individual, workplace and 
sectoral level from the eighties until 2012 sheds new lights on the extent of 
liberalisation trends in CMEs as the marketisation of the employment relationship has 
not spared the core of the coordinated market economy par excellence. 
 
The main argument of the thesis is that labour will include contingent workers in its 
representation domain when their presence on the labour market starts threatening the 
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standards and the future existence of the core workforce. Institutional changes 
undermining labour cohesiveness and increasing employer discretion trigger this 
process because they allow employers’ use of contingent work, which slowly erodes the 
size of the traditional core workforce and develops competition dynamics between 
contingent and permanent workers. Overall, the PhD project shows that institutional 
change driven by liberalisation affects the workforce throughout the whole political 
economy in the long run, making the interests between “core” and “marginal” 
workforce converge and favouring broader working class solidarities. 
 
Each paper in this thesis contains a distinct contribution to the debates illustrated in 
section 2, 3 and 4. The following three abstracts provide an overview of each paper, 
illustrating the methods, the findings and the original contribution. 
 
 
6.1 Paper 1: Do specific skills still lead to stable employment? The role of weakening 
“beneficial constraints” in German core manufacturing sectors 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between skills, work organisation, and 
contingent employment contracts in German core manufacturing sectors. The analysis 
contributes to debates about the growth of contingent work in Germany in recent years, 
as well as the profile of employees affected by this trend. The VoC and dualisation 
literatures have contended that manufacturing employers in CMEs like Germany have a 
sustained interest in retaining permanent employment contracts for workers with 
industry-specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2014; Hassel 2014). Other 
scholars, instead, have argued that strong industrial relations institutions are critical for 
stable employment (Streeck 1991; Lloyd and Payne 2006; Marsden 2010). The former 
set of arguments expects the “complementarity” between specific skills and stable 
employment to remain stable despite eroding negotiated and legal employment 
protection; in contrast, the latter literature strand would expect the casualisation of work 
to also proceed in the manufacturing core of CMEs. 
 
The analysis relies on quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative analysis is 
based on five workers’ surveys from the German Federal Institute of Vocational 
Training and Education conducted between 1986 and 2012. The qualitative evidence is 
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used to illustrate the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between skills, 
work organisation and stable employment. It relies on interviews with human resource 
managers and workers’ representatives in German automotive and machine tool plants 
between 2010 and 2013. 
 
Findings confirm some of the expectations of the dualisation literature as contingent 
contracts are more common among workers who lack industry-specific vocational 
training, and the rate of contingent work among this group relative to those with 
specific skills has increased over time. However, the paper also finds that the jobs held 
by core skilled workers are increasingly vulnerable to casualisation due to the routine 
nature of work and labour market deregulation. These findings are compatible with the 
literature focusing on the role of industrial relations and work organisation in 
supporting the linkage between skills and employment stability. As the (increasing) 
levels of job routine in core manufacturing sectors facilitate the employment of 
temporary workers, the role of industrial relations is crucial for ensuring stable 
employment: While works councils still manage to advance skilled workers along the 
career ladder, labour market deregulation has eroded their ability to control external 
hiring and the transition of trainees to permanent employment. 
 
This paper suggests that the “complementarity” between specific skills and stable 
employment in German core manufacturing sectors has been overestimated in the 
literature and it also contributes to the broader debate about trajectories of change in 
coordinated political economies. By using individual-level data, the present paper has 
shown how the casualisation of work has affected the whole workforce even though its 
effect depends on their skills. 
 
 
6.2 Paper 2: The political economy of labour market segmentation: The case of the 
German automotive industry 
 
This paper compares the segmentation between standard workers and agency workers 
across four German automotive plants. In the period between 2010 and 2012 the plants 
differed in terms of the proportion of agency workers in the whole workforce, the length 
of their assignment, their function and their wage level compared to standard workers. 
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The paper explores the role of labour in determining different segmentation patterns 
between standard workers and agency workers in the workplace. The literature on union 
strategies towards contingent workers has analysed unions’ preferences regarding 
contingent workers but the level of analysis is at national or at sectoral level (Vandaele 
and Leschke 2010; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011). In contrast, research focusing on 
labour responses to employers’ segmentation strategies at workplace level has mainly 
focused on the role of sectoral and workplace institutions of collective voice for 
explaining different outcomes for contingent workers (Greer 2008a; Doellgast, Batt et 
al. 2009). This literature has neglected the role of different labour attitudes towards 
workforce segmentation; furthermore, it has not considered how conditions external to 
the company can affect labour strategies and their outcomes regarding the workforce 
segmentation (with the exception of Pulignano and Doerflinger 2013). 
 
The empirical analysis relies on interviews with human resource managers and 
workers’ representatives at company level and on unions’ internal documents and 
collective agreements. In addition to the interviews, the evidence has been collected 
through the analysis of company reports, company-level agreements, internal union 
publications, interviews with works councillors published in union magazines and in 
the local press, newspapers articles, and the reports of the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory. 
 
The findings of the case studies show that labour power was necessary to regulate 
segmentation in the workplace, which relied both on workplace industrial relations and 
external conditions such as the support of the national union, the socio-economic 
context of the plant and the timing of company-level agreements in regard to labour 
market reforms. However, labour power was not sufficient for achieving encompassing 
agreements for contingent workers as labour's commitment to a homogeneous 
workforce, which was found to vary across workplaces, made a fundamental difference. 
 
The present study provides an original contribution to the literature because it shows 
that the interaction between strategies and power is fundamental for understanding 
different segmentation patterns in the case studies; furthermore, it provides evidence 
that the labour responses to contingent work at workplace level are influenced by 
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factors external to the company as much as by internal industrial relations institutions 
(similar to the studies about unions’ involvement in workplace change by Locke 1992, 
Frost 2000 and Pulignano and Stewart 2012). 
 
 
6.3 Paper 3: Straight to the core — Explaining union responses to the casualisation of 
work: The IG Metall campaign for agency workers 
 
This paper explains why the German metal union has recently started organising agency 
workers and including them into its bargaining domain. The German metal union 
represents a critical case because it traditionally has strong institutional power resources 
and a broad membership. For this reason, it is not expected to include workers 
traditionally considered as marginal. However, industrial relations institutions have 
been eroding in Germany and the labour market reforms passed in 2003 deregulated the 
use of agency work. 
 
The existing literature provides different accounts of unions’ strategies regarding 
marginal workers in a context of declining industrial relations institutions. On the one 
hand, a group of scholars contend that unions prioritise their core constituencies and 
seek compromises with management (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). On the 
other hand, a body of research has shown that unions adopt inclusive strategies towards 
peripheral workers to counterbalance eroding bargaining power (Heery and Adler 2004; 
Turner 2009). Goldthorpe (1984) had argued that both inclusion and exclusion of 
marginal workers are equally viable strategies for unions in increasingly segmented 
labour markets. Dualism has ambiguous implications for unions as their core members’ 
“interests may be as much protected as undermined by dualism through the “shock 
absorber” function that the secondary workforce performs” (p. 339). 
 
Still, there has been little research into the conditions under which unions decide to 
undertake the one or the other strategy. To this end, the paper conducts an historical 
analysis of the strategy of the German metal union towards agency workers from 1970s 
until 2012. The analysis shows that exclusion and inclusion are subsequent phases of a 
strategy in constant evolution and identifies institutional change towards liberalisation 
in the labour market as an important condition for unions’ strategic re-orientation. 
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Liberalisation reconfigures the constraints and opportunities for actors and lifts 
constraints to the employer discretion (Baccaro and Howell, 2011: 527) so that 
employers can adopt aggressive segmentation strategies threatening the collectively 
agreed standards for the core workforce. Thus, the paper argues that the strategic choice 
depends on the (perceived) competition between core and peripheral employees related 
to employers’ personnel strategies; this affects the possible alignment of interests 
between unions’ core members on the one hand, and either management or peripheral 
employees on the other. 
 
The findings do not only contribute to the research on unions’ strategies. They also 
throw new light on the traditional concept of dual labour markets as a stable equilibrium 
between primary and secondary labour markets. Liberalisation opens up loopholes 
employers can exploit for circumventing legal and collectively agreed standards. By 
doing so, in the long run employers challenge the boundaries between core and 
periphery and undermine labour's bargaining power. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. The next three chapters are 
respectively dedicated to each of the papers in the same order they have just been 
presented. The fifth and final section summarises the findings of the PhD thesis and 
illustrates the main theoretical contributions. 
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Paper 1 
 
 
 
DO SPECIFIC SKILLS LEAD TO STABLE EMPLOYMENT? THE 
ROLE OF WEAKENING “BENEFICIAL CONSTRAINTS” IN 
GERMAN CORE MANUFACTURING SECTORS 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between skills, work organisation, 
and contingent employment contracts in German core manufacturing sectors. The 
Varieties of Capitalism and dualisation literatures have contended that employers in 
Coordinated Market Economies like Germany have a sustained interest in retaining 
permanent employment contracts for workers with specific skills. Findings confirm that 
contingent contracts are more common among workers who lack industry-specific 
vocational training, and the rate of contingent contracts among this group relative to 
those with specific skills has increased over time. However, the jobs held by core 
skilled workers have also become increasingly vulnerable to casualisation due to the 
routine nature of work and labour market deregulation. This suggests that the 
“complementarity” between specific skills and stable employment has been 
overestimated in the literature. The findings rely on the workers’ surveys of the German 
Federal Institute of Vocational Training and Education between 1986 and 2012 and on 
interviews with human resource managers and workers’ representatives in German 
automotive and machine tool plants between 2010 and 2013.  
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1 Introduction  
 
In all advanced political economies increasing competition on national and international 
markets, labour power decline and the progressive deregulation of labour markets 
through state policy have contributed to the expansion of contingent work (Houseman 
and Ōsawa 2003, Kalleberg 2009). Since mid-Nineties research in Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) such US and UK has shown that contingent work has been 
spreading throughout the workforce, from manufacturing to services and from 
bluecollar workers to managers (Osterman 1996, Cappelli 2001, Grimshaw, Ward et al. 
2001). While researchers on trends in LMEs agree that the casualisation of work has 
affected all groups of workers, research on contingent work in Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) such as Germany and Sweden has raised debates regarding the 
pervasiveness of casualisation because the stable employment relationship has long 
been argued to represent a fundamental trait of these political economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, Amable 2003). 
 
According to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature,
11
 production in CMEs – 
especially in manufacturing – relies on specific-skilled workers in a stable employment 
relationship. As these arrangements are a source of competitive advantage on 
international markets, employers are expected to support them even under increasing 
competitive pressure.  In contrast, LMEs are characterised by flexible labour markets, 
which are more suitable to sectors relying on radical innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
Amable 2003). Thus, while the casualisation of work in LMEs can be interpreted as a 
strengthening of the typical institutional traits, the same phenomenon in CMEs 
represents a departure from the traditional system of production and of employment 
relations.  
 
As a consequence, the literature has been debating the implications of labour market 
liberalisation trends in CMEs for their trajectory of change. On the one hand, some 
scholars have argued that CMEs have moved towards a dual model of political 
economy: The core of the political economy is supposed to have maintained traditional 
                                                 
1 I am referring here explicitly to the VOC literature because I use the terms “liberal” and “coordinated”. 
However, also other authors, who do not really belong to the VoC literature - for instance Streeck 
(1991,1992, 1997) and Marsden (1999)- pointed out similar characteristics for Germany, which is the 
coordinated market economy par excellence.  
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coordination characteristics while the periphery has become increasingly flexibilised 
and deregulated. The two segments are complementary and in equilibrium, as stability 
in the core is supported by the deregulation of the periphery (Palier and Thelen 2010, 
Emmenegger, Hausermann et al. 2012b). On the other hand, other scholars have argued 
that CMEs have been slowly converging on the liberal model – even though at a slow 
pace, marketisation processes will affect the core as well (Streeck 2009, Baccaro and 
Howell 2011).   
 
The debate has focused particularly on Germany, which is the paramount example of a 
CME.  In Germany, contingent work has been growing since the end of the nineties 
(Bosch and Kalina 2008, Kroos and Gottschall 2012) and manufacturing companies 
have increasingly outsourced industrial services and the production of components to 
subcontractors and staff agencies (Greer 2008b, Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2010). Some 
scholars have argued that these trends undermine coordinating institutions both in core 
and in peripheral workplaces, transforming the German political economy as a whole in 
the long term (Doellgast and Greer 2007, Streeck 2009, Baccaro and Benassi 2014). 
Other scholars have contended that core manufacturing sectors are still coordinated and 
rely on a stable specific-skilled workforce thank to the support of both employers and 
labour representatives while the service periphery is flexibilised (Thelen 2012, Hassel 
2014). 
 
The present paper examines trends towards the casualisation of work in the critical case 
of German core manufacturing sectors. In particular, it investigates the relationship 
between skills, work organisation and employment stability, which is crucial to the 
debate above.  Early political economy literature emphasised the constraining (and 
enabling) role of institutions in German manufacturing, and contended that strong 
industrial relations and high employment protection pushed employers to invest in the 
provision of industry-specific skills, to adopt a complex work organisation and to 
upgrade the production to high-quality markets (Streeck 1991, Streeck 1992). The VoC 
literature, instead, argued that the stable employment relationship is an outcome of 
employers’ interests in retaining specific-skilled workers, who are necessary to the 
high-quality production of German manufacturing. This literature only implicitly 
acknowledges the role of work organisation, suggesting a direct link between specific 
skills and stable employment (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
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Both sets of arguments picture a virtuous circle between skills, permanent employment 
and high-quality production. However, the first set of arguments relies on a power-
based understanding of labour market outcomes, stressing the role of labour power 
resources in determining wages and working conditions, including employment 
stability. Therefore, it expects the casualisation of work to affect core manufacturing 
sectors once institutional constraints are weakened, in line with the expectations for 
slow and pervasive liberalisation of the employment relationship mentioned earlier. In 
contrast, the second position focuses on employers’ efficiency-maximising strategies as 
drivers of labour market outcomes. Thus, it expects employers to maintain labour 
market coordination in core manufacturing, as suggested by the dualisation literature.  
 
The analysis of the growth of contingent work in German core manufacturing sectors is 
relevant also beyond the specific context because it allows examining the relationship 
between skills, work organisation, institutions and employment stability. Research in 
the VoC tradition has mainly examined the relationship between specific skills and 
stable employment through comparative – mainly quantitative - analyses (Gebel and 
Giesecke 2011, Vlandas 2013). Given their exclusive focus on the macro-level, these 
works have not tested the employer-driven mechanism suggested by the VoC theory. At 
the same time, this literature has not engaged with existing research based on qualitative 
case studies, which highlight the role of industrial relations institutions and of work 
organisation for sustaining the relationship between stable employment and good 
working conditions (Streeck 1991, Jürgens 2004, Lloyd and Payne 2006, Lloyd, 
Warhurst et al. 2013).  
 
This paper represents an attempt to bridge the gap between the two literature strands as 
it aims at understanding change at the political economy level through micro-level 
evidence. The empirical evidence is based, first, on a longitudinal statistical analysis of 
the workers’ surveys of the Federal Institute of Vocational Training and Education 
(1986-2012), which allows studying the relationship between skills, work organisation 
and stable employment over a long time period through which German labour market 
and industrial relations institutions have progressively eroded. Second, the paper 
combines the quantitative analysis with qualitative case study findings at workplace 
based on interviews with human resource managers and labour representatives in 
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automotive and machine tool building plants. The findings confirm some expectations 
of the VoC and dualisation literature as workers with industry-specific skills have been 
found less likely to be on a contingent contract than workers without specific skills; 
furthermore, skill specificity has become a more critical asset over time for protecting 
employees from work casualisation. However, findings also show that the rate of 
temporary contracts among workers with specific skills has increased over time. 
Evidence suggests that this trend is due to the routine nature of work and to labour 
market deregulation and weakening industrial relations institutions. Findings show the 
relationship between skills and employment stability is not as tightly coupled as 
suggested in the VoC and dualisation literature. Industrial relations are fundamental for 
limiting the casualisation of work as skill specificity can only partly protect workers, 
especially when the job is routine.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section explains why German core 
manufacturing sectors represent a critical case for studying the expansion of contingent 
work. The third section illustrates the hypotheses regarding the influence of skills and 
work organisation on the probability of being on a temporary contract. The fourth 
section presents the methodology. The fifth and sixth sections contain respectively the 
quantitative and the qualitative analysis. The seventh section discusses the findings and 
the eight section concludes.  
 
 
1 German core manufacturing sectors as a critical case study 
 
Since the seventies
12
 the segmentation literature has started looking at the relationship 
between skills, work organisation and employment stability. The main argument is that 
permanent workers in internal labour markets are assigned to job positions which are 
characterised by a complex work organisation and require specific skills. In contrast, 
workers in external labour markets are assigned to easy tasks requiring general or no 
skills and have precarious dead-end jobs (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Berger and Piore 
1980, Osterman 1987). Scholars in comparative political economy and industrial 
relations used similar arguments to differentiate between countries whose 
manufacturing production relied either on external or internal labour markets, 
                                                 
12 For earlier works see among others Kerr (1954).   
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depending on the national institutional context. Manufacturing production in market-
based economies such as the UK and the US is characterised by a general-skilled 
workforce and high turnover, which match mass production technologies and a 
Taylorist work organisation. In contrast, in coordinated or social forms of capitalism 
such as in Germany, Sweden and Japan, the manufacturing sectors are distinguished by 
a complex post-Taylorist work organisation, sophisticated technology and a skilled and 
stable workforce (Dore 1973, Streeck 1987, Berger and Dore 1996).   
 
German core manufacturing sectors are prototypical for the coordinated production 
model, where specific skills are tightly coupled with work organisation and stable 
employment; therefore, they represent a critical case for studying the expansion of 
contingent work. Indeed, the “Diversified Quality Production” of core manufacturing 
sectors – characterised by a broad range of high quality and technologically advanced 
products - traditionally relies on a stable workforce mainly constituted by 
Facharbeiter
13
 (Sorge and Streeck 1987, Streeck 1991). The workforce acquires 
occupational specific skills through dual vocational training, which  provides workers 
with a “broad-based knowledge of materials, tools, machinery and products” (Roth 
1997: 117); still, companies are deeply involved in the system as training takes place in 
the workplace (Busemeyer 2009). Overall, the existing literature has acknowledged that 
specific skills and employment stability are associated but it has stressed different 
mechanisms underlying this relationship.  
 
Streeck’s argument on “beneficial constraints” (1991; 1992) represents one of the first 
and best known illustrations of the relationship between skills and stable employment. 
He defines as “beneficial constraints”, among others, the strict employment protection 
legislation and the presence of strong labour representation at workplace, which 
characterised the German labour market from the seventies until the beginning of the 
nineties. As these institutions limited the ability of employers to dismiss their workers at 
will or hire on precarious contracts, the management needed to invest in training the 
whole workforce in order to increase their productivity and, in this way, to compress 
labour costs.
14
 Furthermore, the combination of a stable specific skilled workforce and 
strong works councils led to the implementation in manufacturing companies of a 
                                                 
13
 Facharbeiter is the German word indicating workers who completed a dual vocational training degree 
and is typicall used for professional figures in the manufacturing sector.  
14 A similar mechanism was suggested between inclusive sectoral agreements and training.  
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“flexible, non-Taylorist organisation of work”, which required a stable specific-skilled 
workforce (Streeck 1991: 25). On the one hand, the “redundant” capacities of the 
German Facharbeiter were necessary for this work organisation, characterised by 
teamwork and task rotation, exchange of information within and across teams, and 
autonomous work (Kern and Schumann 1984, Streeck 1991). On the other hand, stable 
employment was necessary to the complex work organisation relying on high 
commitment and mutual trust among workers (Sengenberger 1987).  
 
While Streeck’s argument addressed the origins of the virtuous circle between specific 
skills and stable employment,
15
 recent political economy literature has mainly looked at 
the mechanisms mutually enforcing this relationship. There are two main differences 
between the older literature and the recent comparative political economy literature of 
Varieties of Capitalism. First, the constraining role of institutions moved to the 
background while the VoC literature took a functionalist approach to institutions, seen 
more as resources for employers pursuing strategic advantage (Howell 2003: 105-110). 
The VoC literature contends that employers have an interest in retaining their specific-
skilled trainees as a return on their investment in training; workers are willing to invest 
in specific skills, which are transferable across employers only to a limited extent, 
because they have the perspective of a stable employment relationship (Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen et al. 2001, Hall and Soskice 2001). Second, the VoC literature does not 
explicitly discuss the role of work organisation, which constitutes the link in the older 
literature between skill specificity and the standard employment relationship. In 
contrast, the analyses based on the VoC framework assume a correspondence between 
specific skills and a complex work organisation
16
 and neglects work organisation as 
central explanation for the association between skills and stable employment. As just 
illustrated, the VoC literature suggests a direct causal relationship between the two 
elements, based on workers’ and employers’ individual preferences.  
 
Since the eighties, the literature on the German model has acknowledged that specific 
skills and stable employment are tightly coupled, but emphasised different mechanisms: 
While the older literature underscored the constraining role of industrial relations 
                                                 
15 There is also a lively debate regarding the different definition of “specific skills” in the political 
economy literature, which is not going to be illustrated here in detail. Very briefly, a further difference 
between Streeck’s work and VoC is the conceptualisation of “specific skills”, which relies on the human 
capital theory and the asset theory respectively. See Streeck (2011) for a detailed discussion.   
16 Jürgens (2004) also makes a similar argument. 
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institutions and of complex work organisation, the VoC literature has contended that the 
association relies on the strategic preferences of employers and workers within the 
institutional context. However, existing literature suggests that the traditional 
characteristics of the German model have changed in two areas central to the past 
literature:  Negotiated and legal employment protection has progressively weakened 
over the last twenty years and the work organisation has been argued to be 
(increasingly) routine despite the high skill level of the German manufacturing 
workforce.   
 
The first important set of changes regards the weakening of constraints on employers’ 
ability to hire and fire.  The use of temporary work has been progressively deregulated 
in Germany since the nineties. The OECD index of employment protection for 
temporary workers, which includes the dimensions of individual and collective 
dismissals, length of contract duration and equal treatment,  decreased from 5 in 1985 to 
3.25 in 1992, 2 in 1998 and 1 since 2006, while employment protection for permanent 
workers did not significantly change over time (OECD 2013). In 1990 the obligation to 
justify the use of temporary work was lifted for contracts up to 18 months, and six years 
later the maximum length was increased up to 24 months. In 1997 the duration of 
agency contracts with the hiring company was extended from 9 to 12 months and 
agencies were allowed to hire agency workers on temporary contracts (Oschmiansky 
and Kühl 2010). In 2004 the Hartz reforms lifted any limitation to the maximum 
duration and the obligation to motivate agency contracts. Furthermore, they allowed 
derogations by collective agreement to the principle of equal pay for agency workers 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013: 5). Due to unforeseen union competition from 
Christian unions, the DGB unions signed a collective agreement putting in place low 
wages for agency workers - around 30-40% lower than in the metal sector in 2009 
(Weinkopf 2009b). Only in the summer of 2012 did the DGB unions and the staff 
agencies’ employer association sign a collective agreement setting wage bonuses for 
reducing the wage gap between standard workers and agency workers. Sectoral 
agreements in core manufacturing sectors do not contain any provisions limiting the use 
of contingent work such as quotas.  
 
Works councils, even though they have formal bargaining rights over recruiting, have 
decreasing influence on employers’ staffing strategies. Union density, also in core 
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manufacturing sectors, has been declining after the re-unification membership boom 
and, while the automotive and steel industries are still well organised, union density 
greatly varies in the chemical and electronics industries (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011, 
Dribbusch and Birke 2012). Since the nineties, the law has allowed opening clauses at 
workplace level, which can even amend collective sectoral agreements. Works councils 
have increasingly been put under pressure to make concessions as companies started 
outsourcing production segments abroad, especially to Eastern Europe, and 
benchmarking the German production sites with new plants (Hassel and Rehder 2001, 
Rehder 2003). Thus, works councils could not prevent the outsourcing and 
subcontracting of components and industrial services such as logistics, catering and 
building maintenance (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Blöcker and Jürgens 2008). Similarly, 
works councils have not been effective in regulating the use of contingent work at 
company level. Besides lacking the preparation to face the challenge of temporary work 
(Promberger 2006: 138 ff.), works councillors have seen contingent work as an 
instrument for responding to firms’ need of flexibility and of cutting labour costs 
without worsening the conditions for the permanent workforce  (IG Metall study 
reported in Aust, Pernicka et al. 2007: 263).   
 
The second set of changes concerns work organisation. The continued importance of 
vocational training and the high rates of skilled workers in German core manufacturing 
sectors have provided support to the argument that the core of German capitalism has 
remained stable over time, without investigating changes in job characteristics (see also 
Jürgens 2004 for a similar remark on the VoC literature). However, research in 
industrial sociology has documented that the work organisation has moved away from 
the ideal type of “the end of the division of labour”17 based on task integration, if it has 
ever existed. First, scholars pointed out that the integrated work organisation has never 
spread across all occupations and production segments within core manufacturing 
sectors but it rather characterised only certain occupational profiles, while work in 
direct production, especially on the assembly line, was mainly organised along Fordist 
lines (Schumann 1994, Roth 1997, Jürgens 2004). Second, lean management 
techniques, which companies increasingly implemented over the nineties, did not lead 
to a further integration of work functions such as repairs, maintenance, quality checks 
and production. Work processes have become increasingly standardised and routine 
                                                 
17 Kern and Schumann (1984).  
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(Springer 1999), and this trend has also affected qualified positions: Lacher (2006) 
defines this phenomenon as the creation of “qualified routine work”, which puts an end 
to the “model of the poised and autonomous Facharbeiter” (Lacher 2006: 88). 
 
The institutional changes and the (increasingly) routinised nature of work can be seen as 
undermining two main conditions argued in previous literature to support the close 
relationship between high levels of specific skills and high employment stability in core 
manufacturing firms. This raises two questions regarding the effects of institutional 
change and job routine on this relationship: First, do we see an expansion of contingent 
work in core manufacturing firms? Second, if contingent work is expanding, to what 
extent are employees with specific skills protected from these trends? 
 
Existing literature suggests two possible answers to this question. On the one hand, the 
dualisation literature contends that contingent work would not expand in core 
manufacturing sectors, and particularly among the core skilled workforce, despite 
labour market deregulation and declining labour power (Hassel 2014; Thelen 2012). On 
the other hand, from a power resource perspective and similar to Streeck’s argument on 
beneficial constraints (1991; 1992), it could be argued that the relationship between 
stable employment and specific skills does not hold if institutional constraints are 
weakened and work organisation is routine.   
 
As both constitute equally plausible, but not established explanations, the present paper 
will further explore the relationship between skills, work organisation, institutions and 
stable employment. The next section illustrates the hypotheses derived from the 
literature.  
 
 
2 The role of skills and work organisation for the use of contingent work  
This section presents six hypotheses on the relationship between skills, work 
organisation and stable employment under the erosion of legislative and negotiated 
employment protections. The hypotheses are formulated at the individual level because 
the available dataset is a workers’ survey. The probability of being on a temporary 
contract is taken as a proxy for stable employment because it is assumed that the length 
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of tenure for workers on a temporary contract is shorter than for workers on a 
permanent contract.   
 
3.1 Skill specificity and employment stability in core sectors 
 
In the VoC literature the German dual vocational training represents the paramount 
example of a system providing specific skills as opposed to the system of general 
education of LMEs such as the US and UK. The dual vocational training is co-financed 
by the government and employers, and takes place both at school and in the workplace. 
The index of skill specificity provided by Iversen and Soskice (2001), which is widely 
used in the comparative political economy literature, measures skills in terms of their 
occupational specificity rather than of the firm-specific content. For this reason, the 
ability of this index to capture skill specificity has been questioned (Tåhlin 2008, 
Busemeyer 2009, Streeck 2011, Thelen and Busemeyer 2012). Among others, Marsden 
(1999) compares the provision of skills in France and Germany and contends that 
German occupational skills are not as specific as informal on-the-job training, which is 
instead considered “general” in the VoC literature (see also Streeck 2011: 17). Thelen 
and Busemeyer point out that German occupational skills are portable because of the 
existence of an authorised certification system (Busemeyer 2009, Thelen and 
Busemeyer 2012).  
 
Even though the literature disagrees on the firm-specific content of dual vocational 
training, all authors acknowledge that employers use dual vocational training as 
recruiting instruments for their skilled workforce. Employers are interested in retaining 
those workers who have been through vocational training and acquired valuable and 
specific skills to the company. For this reason, they offer workers with this industry-
specific training permanent contracts and good working conditions (Stevens 1996, 
Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001, Hall and Soskice 2001). In contrast, employers are 
less interested in retaining workers without this training and therefore are more likely to 
give them a temporary contract. Thus, the following proposition can be derived:  
 
Proposition 1: In German core manufacturing sectors, specific-skilled workers
18
 are 
less likely to be on a temporary contract than workers without specific training. 
                                                 
18 Please note that the term “specific skills” will refer from now on workers with a dual vocational 
training in a sector-relevant profession.  
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As employers’ interests in retaining their trainees are so central in the VoC framework, 
the relaxation of limitations to the use of contingent work is not expected to affect 
skilled workers. Quantitative analyses of workers’ surveys and household panels in 
Western countries recently investigated the effect of liberalising labour market reforms 
on the probability of being employed on a temporary contract according to skill level. 
All studies found that the effect of reforms is stronger on low-skilled or unskilled 
workers than on workers who have been through vocational training, that is, on specific 
skilled workers (Kahn 2007, Jacobi and Schaffner 2008, Gebel and Giesecke 2011).  
 
In German core manufacturing sectors, Palier and Thelen (2010), Thelen (2012) and 
Hassel (2014) even contend that the casualisation of work has not affected the core 
workforce. These sectors are supposed to still rely on a stable specific-skilled workforce 
because both employers and works councils have an interest in maintaining the working 
conditions of the core workforce unchanged. However, under increasing cost-
competition on national and international markets this status-quo in core manufacturing 
sectors can be sustained only because the service periphery of the German economy has 
been flexibilised and deregulated. This literature expects core specific–skilled workers 
not to be affected by the flexibilisation of work, suggesting a dualisation scenario in the 
German economy where core manufacturing sectors maintain their high-road 
equilibrium (Palier and Thelen 2010, Thelen 2012, Hassel 2014). These considerations 
lead to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: In German core manufacturing sectors, only workers without specific 
skills have become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time.  
 
 
3.2 A strategic perspective on employers’ strategies  
 
The political economy literature on skills often assumes that skills correspond to job 
requirements. For instance, in their research on the linkage between skills and 
welfare/labour market outcomes Oesch (2003), Emmenegger (2009) and Gebel and 
Gieshecke (2011) collapse the dimension of task complexity with the skill variable 
(Oesch 2003: 18, Emmenegger 2009: 408, Gebel and Giesecke 2011: 21). The literature 
 60 
 
assumes that workers are trained to acquire specific skills and then hired because they 
need to perform complex and autonomous tasks. As the performance of this kind of task 
requires stable and committed workers (Marsden 1996), specific skilled workers are 
protected from the casualisation of work. However, the assumptions of the political 
economy literature are inaccurate: First, the transition from training to permanent 
employment also depends on external conditions (for example labour market 
deregulation or unemployment), which can alter the strategies through which employers 
achieve their goal to retain specific skilled workers. This perspective leads to the 
formulation of a proposition in antithesis to Proposition 2. Second, formal skills do not 
always reflect the content and the structure of work, leading to the inclusion of variables 
other than skills to capture the organisation of work.  
 
Regarding the transition from training to permanent employment, Marsden’s work on 
“extended entry tournaments” is particularly relevant. Marsden (2010) argues that high 
levels of competition among workers with comparable qualifications and experience 
can lead to extended entry tournaments: Given the oversupply, workers accept low 
standards even for relatively long periods, hoping to be hired in a permanent position in 
the next round.  While Marsden (2010) focuses on extended entry tournaments in new 
and creative professions characterised by unstructured internal labour markets, he 
acknowledges that employers can also use tournaments in more traditional sectors and 
occupations if the institutions regulating entry to internal labour markets erode (p. 1). If 
the obligations to permanent hiring are lifted, employers do not need to offer well-paid 
permanent contracts for hiring and retaining the required skilled workforce, especially 
when the skill supply is higher than the demand (Korpi and Tåhlin 2010).  
 
As the German system of vocational training is bargained between social partners and 
the government, the trainee positions do not always correspond to the actual demand for 
skilled workers in the company. During the eighties, for instance, dual vocational 
training was even used as an anti-cyclical policy instrument in conditions of high 
unemployment (Streeck 1997: 247). As employers sometimes have trained workers 
above their needs, skilled workers, especially right after their training, have often 
worked in positions which do not reflect their skills (for example on the assembly line) 
(Franz and Zimmermann 1999). Working first in an unskilled position is considered a 
normal step for career progression and young Facharbeiter simply wait until a skilled 
 61 
 
position becomes vacant. If hired permanently, young skilled workers are covered by 
the same agreement and enjoy the same benefits as their colleagues even though they 
work in unskilled positions. However, if the employment protection legislation for 
temporary workers is relaxed, employers might offer young workers temporary 
contracts, which are more convenient as temporary workers have no rights to company-
level agreements, can be easily dismissed if there is no demand for new Facharbeiter 
and, overall, are easier to control. The risk for employers to lose their investment in 
training is at a minimum as young Facharbeiter might see temporary work as a 
necessary – and possibly short- transition period to a permanent position.  
 
These observations lead to an alternative proposition to Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 3: In German core manufacturing sectors, specific-skilled workers have 
become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time. 
 
The observation that skilled workers are employed in unskilled positions leads to the 
second critique of the political economy literature, which is, that there is not a perfect 
correspondence between formal qualifications and work organisation (Grugulis and 
Lloyd 2010: 94 f.). Lam found that the work organisation of British and Japanese 
engineering varied across countries even though the formal qualifications are the same 
(Lam 2002). The other way round, by comparing aerospace engineers and workers at 
the automotive final assembly in the UK and in Italy, Stewart et al. (2010) found that 
both groups of workers in both countries were experiencing a similar reduction in work 
autonomy despite their different qualifications. These findings suggest that factors 
related to skill specificity and to work organisation should be analysed separately rather 
than collapsed into one dimension. This is particularly important in the case of German 
core manufacturing sectors as the work organisation in German core manufacturing 
sectors has been found to be standardised and repetitive despite the high skill levels of 
the workforce (Springer 1999, Lacher 2006).  
 
The routine nature of work has been argued to favour the employment of temporary 
work. Workers are more interchangeable if jobs are characterised by repetitive and low-
discretion tasks (Lepak, Takeuchi et al. 2003: 688) because routine jobs can be easily 
learned and their performance does not require great work experience  (Brown and 
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Lauder 2006).
 
In addition, job repetitiveness suits short-term employment relationships 
because it negatively affects commitment (Baba and Jamal 1991), productive 
cooperation among workers (Drago and Garvey 1998) and employees’ health in the 
long run (Nainzadeh, Malantic-Lin et al. 1999). Thus, temporary workers have been 
found to occupy more routine and repetitive job positions while multi-tasking and 
complex jobs are attached to career ladders and compensated through higher wages 
(Osterman 1987, Egger and Grossmann 2005). For instance, in her qualitative study of a 
service firm, Smith (1994) found that temporary workers did not require the same 
“customer-specific” knowledge as they were assigned to the most unskilled and routine 
tasks (Smith 1994: 294). Furthermore, the Eurofound report (1998) on working 
conditions in the European Union found that temporary workers are more likely to 
occupy repetitive job positions (Letourneux 1998). From the existing research the 
following propositions can be derived:  
 
Proposition 4a: In German core manufacturing sectors, job routine has an independent 
effect from specific skills on the probability of being on a temporary contract.  
 
Proposition 4b: In German core manufacturing sectors, workers in highly routine job 
positions are more likely to be on a temporary contract than workers in non-routine job 
positions. 
 
Institutions can be expected to mediate the relationship between job routine and the 
incidence of temporary work. Research on precarious work in low-end services has 
shown that industrial relations are particularly important for regulating wages, working 
conditions and the use of temporary contracts when job characteristics do not require a 
stable employment relationship.  Existing literature on this issue is mainly comparative: 
The findings of the Russell Sage Project on Low-Wage Work in six Western countries 
have shown that the type of work contract and working conditions for workers in low-
end services and manufacturing varied across countries, according to the industrial 
relations institutions. Countries with weak labour market regulation and labour 
representation, such as the US and the UK had the highest rates of precarious work 
(Appelbaum and Schmitt 2009, Gautiè and Schmitt 2010).  Similarly, drawing on data 
from the Global Call Center Project, Shire et al. (2009, 2009) found that institutional 
differences across countries constrain employers’ use of contingent work even though in 
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some cases employers could exploit legal loopholes. If the use of temporary work is 
strictly regulated, employers would hire workers on permanent contracts even though 
the job does not require a stable workforce. However, if the labour market regulation is 
weakened in order to allow the employment of temporary workers, employers might 
increasingly try to occupy routine job positions with these workers. The following 
proposition can be derived:  
 
Proposition 5: In German core manufacturing sectors, workers in highly routine job 
positions have become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time. 
 
 
3 Methodology  
 
The present paper uses mixed methods and the empirics rely both on quantitative and 
qualitative analysis.  
 
 
4.1 Quantitative analysis  
 
The quantitative analysis is based on the Workers’ Survey from the German Federal 
Institute for Vocational Training and Education (BiBB). Five waves are taken into 
consideration: 1985/86, 1991/92, 1998/99, 2005/06 and 2011/12. The first wave in 1979 
has been excluded from the analysis as it does not include any information about 
temporary contracts. The surveys do not follow either the same individuals or the same 
companies over time. However, the sample is representative for the population in every 
survey year.   
 
The study population is restricted to the blue-collar workforce in core manufacturing 
sectors, which are: chemicals, steel, forging, machine tool building, automotives, white 
goods, electronics, fine mechanics, ship and aeroplane building. The analysis considers 
only the active German population (at least 10 working hours a week) aged between 15 
and 64, and trainees have been excluded. The sample restriction follows the 
recommendation of BiBB researchers (Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann 2013) apart 
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from the inclusion of Eastern Germany in the sample,
19
 where the use of temporary 
work is more widespread and the plants set up after the reunification are characterised 
by more Tayloristic forms of work organisation than in Western Germany. 
20
 
The number of observations for each wave is:  
 
 n. observations 
1985/86 3,037 
1991/92 4,016 
1998/99 2,368 
2005/06 1,247 
2011/12 1,042 
 
Model and method 
The analysis of the dataset has been conducted using the STATA software.  The 
analysis starts with descriptive statistics exploring the distribution of skills and job 
routine and the temporary work among the German bluecollar workforce in core 
manufacturing sectors. The descriptive statistics use sample weights.  
 
After this, I conduct a pooled logistic regression analysis with robust standard errors. 
My dependent variable, which is the probability of being on a temporary contract, is 
dichotomous (1=temporary contract; 0=permanent contract). The logistic regression 
analysis tests a simple model and three interactive logistic models, which aim at testing 
the conditional effect respectively of skill specificity and job routine on the probability 
of being on a temporary contract given increasing labour market deregulation over time. 
Model II and III contain only one interaction term each for testing the propositions 2, 3 
and 5. Model IV is the full interacted model, which includes all the interaction terms 
and the constituent terms, as prescribed by Brambor et al. (2006). This model furthers 
the analysis of the effect of the interaction between skills, work organisation and 
institutional erosion on the probability of being on a temporary contract. It allows 
examining, for instance, the marginal effect of job routine at theoretically relevant 
values of skill specificity and time. All models include control variables such as age, 
                                                 
19 The inclusion of Eastern Germany is not recommended for ensuring better comparability across 
waves.  
20  The logistic regression has been run also without Eastern Germany in the sample and the results do 
not change (see Tables A12 –A16 in the Appendix).  
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gender, local unemployment rate, the location of the workplace in Eastern Germany, the 
firm size and sectoral dummies. 
 
The simple model and the interactive models look as follows:  
 
(I) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+β3skill specificityit+ 
β4 timeit+ εit 
 
(II) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+β3skill specificityit+ 
β4 timeit + β5 timeit*skill specificityit+ εit 
 
(III) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+β3skill specificityit+ 
β4 timeit + β5 timet*routineit+ εit 
 
(IV) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+β3skill specificityit+ 
β4 timeit + β5 timet*routineit+ β6 timeit*skill specificityit + β7 skill 
specificityit*routineit+ β8 timeit*skill specificityit*routineit + εit 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix contains descriptive statistics for all variables. Before 
performing the regression analysis, I have conducted multicollinearity tests for my 
independent variables and produced a correlation table
21
, which are both reported in the 
first section of the Appendix (Table A2 and A3).  The multicollinearity test shows that 
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are lower than 10 and the tolerance value higher 
than .1, which constitute the threshold values by rule of thumb.  The correlation table 
also confirms that there is no multicollinearity between the variables as the correlation 
values are below .8 (Franke 2010). In addition, the direction of correlation between 
specific skills, job routine and time with the probability of being on a temporary 
contract confirms the direction of correlation suggested in the hypotheses.  
 
Variable description 
My dependent variable is Employment on a temporary contract. It is a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if the worker is on a temporary contract and value 0 if the worker is 
on a permanent contract. 
                                                 
21 Given that the variables are both dichotomous and continuous, I used the command polychoric. See 
UCLA (2014).  
 66 
 
 
I operationalise my independent variables as follows. First, the variable Skill specificity 
refers to the workers who have their last vocational training degree in an occupation 
which traditionally belongs to core manufacturing sectors. The ISCO88 codes of the 
occupations are between 10 and 15 and between 19 and 32. The corresponding 
occupations in the wave 1985/86, which precedes the publication of the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations, take code values between 1210 and 1541 and 
between 1910 and 3237.  
 
Second, the variable Job routine has been operationalised through the survey question 
“How often do you repeat the same work procedure?” The answers’ scale changes 
across waves, as the table below shows:   
 
Table 1: Comparison of answers’ scales for the question on routinisation  
 
Value 1985/86 - 1998/99 2005/06 - 2011/12 
1 almost always often 
2 often sometimes 
3 now and then rarely 
4 rarely never 
5 almost never  
 
 
In order to create a variable across waves the categories 1 and 2 for the first three waves 
were merged.  The variable has been dummy-coded across waves: It has value 1 when 
respondents report that they always or often repeat the same work procedure while it 
takes value=0 for the other survey answers. This measurement reflects the findings of 
Springer (1999) and Lacher (2006) as well as the interview findings in this paper (see 
section 6), which describe how work tasks in core manufacturing sectors are actually 
routine despite the traditional image of sectors characterised by complex work 
organisation. However, there are two possible objections to this measurement. First, the 
question of whether the workpace is dictated by a machine has also often been used as a 
measure of job routine in manufacturing (Braverman 1974; Baron and Bielby 1982; 
Bailey 1993) but the survey does not include it. However, it could also be argued that 
the measurement in this paper is rightly broader as workers in industrial services (such 
as logistics) are likely to have a repetitive job even though the pace is not dictated by a 
machine such as for the workers on the assembly line.  Second, the measure of job 
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routine is a perception of workers which could be argued to be endogenous to the type 
of contract. This linkage would however be counter-intuitive because temporary 
workers should find their work less repetitive as they can be reasonably assumed to 
work in the same job positions for shorter time periods. Following this reasoning, old 
workers should be more likely to find their job routinised: Indeed, across all waves 54% 
workers between 15 and 25 declared that their work was highly routinised against 60% 
among workers between 55 and 64.  
 
Third, labour market deregulation has been operationalised through the time variable 
because the dataset does not provide information on the presence and strength of 
industrial relations at workplace level.
 22
 However, the weakening of industrial relations, 
the relaxation of labour market regulation, and their effect on workers’ outcomes in 
Germany have been widely studied in the literature (Promberger 2006; Seifert and 
Brehmer 2008; Dörre 2013). Therefore, additional confirmation through statistical 
analyses regarding how institutional changes in the arena of industrial relations 
contribute to the marketisation of the employment relationship in Germany is not 
strictly necessary. Furthermore, the case study findings illustrate in detail how national 
labour market reforms and workplace concession bargaining influence the use of 
contingent work, tracing the causal mechanism linking the weakening legislative and 
negotiated employment protection with the probability of being on a temporary 
contract.  
 
Time has been coded as a continuous variable taking the values from 1 to 5 in order to 
facilitate the interpretation of the interaction terms and to save degrees of freedom. 
Indeed, the use of dummy waves would have required the inclusion of eight interaction 
terms between job routine and skill specificity and four wave dummies (excluding the 
wave dummy used as reference category). In order to make sure that the effect of time 
follows a positive trend, the logistic regression has first been run with the wave 
dummies instead of the continuous variable Time, confirming that the direction of the 
                                                 
22 A multi-level analysis for disentangling the effect of reforms at national level and of individual-level 
variables could not be conducted because it requires at least 20 clusters, while the dataset has a limited 
number of observations and of survey waves for this type of analysis. Gebel and Giesecke (2011) perform 
a multi-level logistic regression for testing the effect of labour market reforms on the workforce. 
However, their dataset allowed nesting the individual observations in each of the fifteen EU countries 
included in the analysis at different time points.  
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time effect does not change the direction between the waves, and showing a positive 
trend since 1992 (see Table A 10 in the Appendix).  
 
The logistic regression also includes the following control variables: Age, which is 
grouped in five categories 15-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64; Company size, which is 
constituted of three categories (n. employees<10; 10≤ n. employees≤500; n. employees 
>500); Eastern Germany, which is a dummy variable taking value equal to 1 if the 
respondents work in a Federal State belonging to the former German Democratic 
Republic); the dummy variable Gender, which takes value 1 if the respondent is female; 
Local unemployment rate, which reports the unemployment rate by Federal State for 
each wave year as reported in the official statistics of the Federal Ministry of Labour.   
 
Further variables used in the analysis are not included in the regression either because 
they are redundant – such as the variables Occupational group and Highest 
qualification - or they are not present in all waves, such as the variables 
Overqualification, Overskilling and Task dummies. However, the variables are included 
in the descriptive analysis at the beginning of the empirical section because they offer 
valuable information on the distribution of skills and tasks within the population. These 
variables are: Highest qualification, which entails the four categories “no formal 
qualification”, “vocational training”, “qualification as master craftsmen, technicians and 
senior clerks”, and “tertiary education”;  Occupational group, which refers to the job 
position of the respondents rather than to their formal qualification and includes the 
three categories “unskilled”, “skilled” and “master craftsmen/technicians/senior clerks”; 
the dummy variable Overqualification which takes value 1 if workers feel that their job 
could be done by someone with lower qualifications and value 0 if their job could be 
done by someone with different or lower qualifications; the dummy variable 
Overskilling which takes value 1 if workers feel that their skills are appropriate for their 
job and value 0 if the skills are not; the dummy variables on various tasks, which take 
value 1 if the respondent often performs a specific task and take value 0 if the 
respondent performs the specific task only sometimes or never.  
 
Section 1 in the Appendix reports additional information on the variables such as the 
original survey questions, the variables’ values, and the procedure used for building the 
variables.  
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Limitations of the dataset 
As already mentioned, the dataset does not contain any information on the presence of 
industrial relations at workplace level, which is an important control variable as it has 
been found to be relevant in different studies (i.a. Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993, Lepak 
and Snell 1999). Indeed, it could be argued that labour market deregulation and the 
pressure to engage in concession bargaining have no (or milder) effects on the use of 
temporary work in establishments covered by sectoral agreements and with workplace 
labour representation. Furthermore, it could be argued that skills and job routine do not 
have independent effects in companies with developed internal labour markets and 
workers’ representation in the workplace because works councils ensure a 
correspondence between specific skilled workers and complex job positions.  
 
In order to overcome this limitation, two strategies have been used. On the one hand, 
the case study findings following the regression analysis (see section 6) illustrate how 
labour market deregulation and works councils affected the use of temporary work in 
large automotive and machine tool plants with workplace representation. On the other 
hand, the same logistic regression was run only for companies with more than 500 
employees as a robustness check, which corresponds to 40% of the sample (see Table 
A17-A21 in Section 3 in the Appendix). According to Baccaro and Benassi (2014), 
companies with more than 500 employees have higher average coverage rates of both 
sectoral collective agreements and works councils than the average rates for the whole 
population of companies in German core manufacturing sectors. The calculations are 
based on the data of the Establishment Panel of the Federal Institute of Employment 
Research (IAB), which is a company survey conducted every year since 1993 and is 
representative of the German firms’ population. The table below shows that the 
coverage of sectoral collective agreements for companies with more than 500 
employees in core manufacturing sectors is declining but still over 75% and the 
coverage of works councils is almost total.  
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Table 2: Coverage rates of collective bargaining and works councils (1995-2010) 
 
 
a
refers to 1994  
Calculations based on the IAB Establishment Panel  from Baccaro and Benassi (2014). 
 
 
4.2 Qualitative analysis  
 
The case study findings complement the quantitative analysis because they illustrate the 
reasons for the change over time, which cannot be tested directly through the 
quantitative analysis. In particular, the case studies help to map out the effect of labour 
market reforms and collective bargaining on the relationship between skills and 
employment contracts.  
 
The case study findings rely on semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted either 
by phone or in person between January 2011 and April 2013. The interview partners 
were human resource managers, union representatives and works councillors in five 
automotive plants and two machine tool building plants. The interview partners also 
included union officials who had extensively worked on the issue of contingent work 
within the German metal union IG Metall either in the headquarters or in local union 
offices. The interviews have been conducted in German and the quotes in the paper 
have been translated by the author. A full list of the interviews is provided in the 
reference list.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sectoral collective agreements WCs coverage 
 all companies >500 employees all companies >500 employees 
1995 59.3 93,9 15.3
a 
99,2 
2000 47.8 82,9 10.7 98,8 
2005 36.5 83,9 7.74 98,2 
2010 26.2 76,9 8.74 99,2 
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5 From words to numbers: An analysis of skills, job routine and temporary work 
 
 
5.1 Skills and job routine in the German workforce  
 
The qualifications of the German bluecollar workforce have increased since the 
eighties, as Table 3 illustrates. The rate of workers without qualifications almost halved 
from 17 % in 1986 to 9.4% in 2012. The rate of the workforce with a vocational training 
degree remained stable between 74 and 78% of the workforce.  The rate of workers with 
a qualification as master craftsman, technician and senior clerk has increased from 
around 3% in 1986 to 10% in 1998 and it has stayed at the same level since then. Table 
3 also shows that vocational training in a metal profession is still relevant: Across all 
waves, between 66 and 74% of workers with vocational training had a dual vocational 
training degree in a metal or electronic profession.  
 
Table 3: Skill composition of the blue-collar workforce (1986-2012) 
 1986 1992 1998 2006 2012 
Highest qualification ( % on the whole workforce)
 a
 
No qualification 17.12 13.56 14.61 8.89 9.45 
Vocational training 78.59 76.48 74.55 78.91 78.68 
Qualification as master craftsman or technician 3.48 8.86 10.01 9.8 10.35 
Tertiary education 0.81 1.11 0.83 2.4 1.52 
Vocational training in a sector-relevant profession( % on the whole workforce) 
b
 
Specific-skilled workers 68.72 74.09 66.54 66.08 74.52 
a 
n.observations=10,678  
b
n.observations=10,420 
 
 
While the bluecollar workforce has high qualification levels, not all job positions are 
characterised by a complex organisation of work.  Table 4 shows that the average levels 
of job routine are high overall within the workforce. Furthermore, even though workers 
with specific skills are less likely to find their job highly routine than workers without 
specific qualifications, the rate of specific-skilled workers in routine job positions is 
around 50% since 1998, which represents an increase if compared to 41% in 1986.  
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Table 4: Job routine within the whole workforce and specific skilled workers (1986-2012) 
 1986 1992 1998 2006 2012 
Among the whole workforce (%)
a 50.39 50.88 57.92 58.08 54.82 
Among specific skilled workers (%)
b 43.38 45.87 50.54 50.51 49.68 
Among workers without specific skills (%) 65.95 66.07 72.61 73.15 69.87 
a 
n.observations=10,678  
b
n.observations=10,420 
 
 
The German bluecollar workforce has high formal qualifications as suggested in the 
literature about the German traditional model. However, a large proportion of job 
positions, also among specific-skilled workers, are highly routine instead of being 
characterised by autonomy and complex tasks. Thus, despite high skill levels, the work 
organisation presents characteristics which allow the employment of temporary 
workers. 
 
 
5.2 Temporary workers: Qualifications and tasks 
 
Table 5 shows that temporary work has been increasing overall from almost 5% in 1986 
to 11% in 2012 within the whole workforce. Temporary contracts are concentrated in 
unskilled positions, where their rates tripled between 1986 and 2012, going from 5.5% 
to 24%.  In addition, in skilled job positions, temporary contracts increased from 4.6% 
in 1985 to almost 8% in 2012. The difference between the rates in 1986 and 2012 
greatly varies across groups:  Temporary contracts among unskilled workers increased 
by 18 percentage points between 1986 and 2012 and by 3 percentage points among 
skilled workers, while they declined by 3% among master craftsmen and technicians. 
Table 6 also shows that temporary work among workers with specific skills has also 
been increasing over time, and particularly among young workers (it increased by 24% 
between 1986 and 2012).  
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Table 5: Temporary work by occupational group (1986-2012) 
 1986 1992 1998 2006 2012 
Rate difference  
(1986-2012) 
Unskilled (%) 5.48 9.77 15.5 12.88 23.71 +18.23 
Skilled (%) 4.56 5.29 5.13 7.51 7.83 +3.27 
Master craftsmen or technicians (%) 3.78 2.28 1.69 0.66 0.4 -3.38 
Total workforce (%) 4.92 6.22 8.26 8.25 11.15 +6.23 
n. observations = 10,615 
 
 
Table 6: Temporary contracts among specific skilled workers (1986, 2012) 
 1986 1992 1998 2006 2012 
Rate difference  
(1986-2012) 
Among specific skilled workers (%) 
 4.56 4.74 6.12 8.06 7.05 +2.49 
Among specific-skilled workers by age (%) 
15-25 9.32 6.83 18.29 37.7 33.33 +24.01 
45-65 6.63 5.19 9.55 15.32 14.44 +7.81 
n.observations=10,420 
 
 
The first rows of Table 7 show that there is no difference between temporary and 
permanent workers regarding the proportion of those with a vocational training degree: 
Excluding the wave 1998,
23
 the rates of workers with a general vocational training for 
both permanent and temporary workers is above 74% across all waves. The second part 
of the table refers to workers with a specific vocational training degree. In the waves 
1985/86 and 2005/06, the independent sample t-test shows there is no significant 
difference between permanent and temporary workers. However, in the remaining 
waves the percentage rates of workers on temporary contracts are significantly lower 
than those of permanent workers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 The independent sample t-test shows that the rate of permanent workers with a vocational training 
degree is significantly higher than the rate of temporary workers.  
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Table 7: Qualification by type of contract (1986-2012) 
 1986 1992 1998 2006 2012 
Workers with vocational training (%)
a
 
Permanent workers 78.45 75.89 76.06* 78.58 74.38 
Temporary workers 78.95 74.55 64.32 80.56 76.85 
T-test 0.11 0.39 3.63* -0.48 -0.56 
Workers with specific skills (%)
b
 
Permanent workers 68.68 74.74 68.31 66.37 77.21 
Temporary workers 66.24 64.00 46.83 62.77 51.85 
T-test 0.32 7.58* 5.83* 1.06 4.34* 
a
n.observations=10,233 
b
n.observations=10,420 
* p<.001 
 
 
The differences between temporary and permanent workers are clearer regarding the 
routine nature of their work. Table 8 shows that temporary workers are more likely to 
work in routine job positions across all waves, and the independent sample t-test 
confirms that the difference between permanent and temporary workers is significant in 
all waves. Furthermore, the last two survey waves allow further investigation about the 
tasks temporary workers perform, showing that temporary workers are concentrated in 
production and in industrial services. The comparison in Table 9 between temporary 
and permanent workers suggests that supervision of machinery (in 2006), maintenance, 
goods supply, production planning, product development, training and working with a 
computer are tasks which are more typical for permanent workers than for temporary 
workers. For logistics, quality checks, production of goods and security there is no 
relevant difference in terms of composition between permanent and temporary workers.  
 
Table 8: Routine job positions by type of contract (1986-2012) 
 1986 1992 1998 2006 2012 
Permanent workers (%) 57.43 54.2 56.61 57.08 54.89 
Temporary workers (%) 61.52 62.19 72.54 70.39 68.30 
T-test -1.95* -1.55* -4.31* -1.70* -2.96* 
n.observations=10,233 
*p <.05 
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Table 9: Comparison of tasks by type of contract (1986-2012) 
 
2006 t-test 2012 t-test 
perms temps  perms temps  
Production 53.7 62 1.2 53.6 53.3 -1.0 
Quality check 74.3 75 0.7 75.5 68.5 -1.6 
Supervision of machinery 55.1 43.5 -2.7* 56.5 48.1 -1.7 
Maintenance 42.1 26.9 -4.2* 38. 28.7 -2.8* 
Goods supply  8.5 3.7 -2.9* 9.8 2.8 -2.2* 
Logistics 30.1  25 -1.6 30.7 33.3 .11 
Production planning 27 17.6 -3.8* 31.3 15.7 -5.0* 
Product development 8.9 6.5 -2.0* 9.0 1.9 -5.1* 
Training others 14.3 5.6 -4.0* 15.5 2.8 -5.8* 
Security 23.7 25.9 0.4 22.3 24.1 -1.1 
IT 55.9 37 -4.8* 63.0 43.3 -5.7* 
n.observations=3,086 
* p<.05 
 
 
However, the employment of temporary workers in routine job positions does not 
necessarily reflect the skills of temporary workers, who are less likely to hold a sector-
specific vocational training degree than permanent workers but the vast majority of 
whom still have general vocational training degrees. Indeed, Table 10 shows that 
temporary workers are more likely to feel overqualified and overskilled than permanent 
workers, and the independent sample t-tests confirm that this difference is significant. 
Furthermore, it reports that both perceptions of overqualification and overskilling levels 
among permanent workers have been increasing. This trend suggests that the high skill 
levels reported above might not be necessary and some tasks could be performed by 
workers with lower qualifications and experience.    
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Table 10: Overqualification and overskilling by type of contract (1986-2012) 
 permanent workers temporary workers t-test 
Overqualification (%)
a
 
1986 24.9 35.2 -2.4* 
1992 26 32 -2.3* 
1998  43 62.5 -4.9* 
Overskilling (%)
b
 
1998 5.9 13.3 -3.2* 
2006  15 23 -2.3* 
2012 11.2 21.3 -3.3* 
a 
n. observations=8,492 
b 
n. observations=6,031 
*p<.05 
 
 
5.3 Logistic regression analysis  
 
Table 11 contains the results of the logistic regression analysis. Model I is a simple 
regression model, which aims at testing the relationship between skill specificity and 
job routine and the probability of being on a temporary contract (Proposition 1, 4a&b). 
Model II and III and IV are logistic interactive models testing the conditional 
propositions 2, 3 and 5, which expect the effect of skill specificity and job routine on 
the probability of being on a temporary contract to change over time. The logistic 
regressions with robust standard errors have been run using the STATA commands logit 
and robust. The log odds are reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
 
 
Table 11: Logistic regression table  
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
VARIABLES No 
interaction 
Interaction  
specific 
skills*time 
Interaction  
routine*time 
Full interacted 
model 
     
Specific skills -0.509*** -0.0985 -0.509*** -0.383 
 (0.0990) (0.228) (0.0990) (0.405) 
Job routine 0.412*** 0.411*** 0.243 0.0428 
 (0.0890) (0.0891) (0.215) (0.418) 
Time trend 0.268*** 0.361*** 0.231*** 0.235* 
 (0.0377) (0.0585) (0.0573) (0.121) 
Specific skills*time  -0.143**  -0.00451 
  (0.0712)  (0.135) 
Job routine*time   0.0612 0.166 
   (0.0703) (0.136) 
Job routine*specific skills    0.379 
    (0.488) 
Job routine*specific 
skills*time 
   -0.187 
(0.160) 
     
Local unemployment rate 0.0367** 0.0371** 0.0367** 0.0373** 
 (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
Male respondent -0.215* -0.206 -0.213* -0.198 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) 
Reference category: age 15-25 
 
    
26-35 -1.037*** -1.037*** -1.037*** -1.037*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
36-45 -1.504*** -1.504*** -1.506*** -1.505*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
46-55 -1.566*** -1.569*** -1.568*** -1.571*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.140) 
56-65 -1.624*** -1.624*** -1.630*** -1.627*** 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) 
     
Reference category for firm size:<10 employees 
 
10≤ employees ≤500 0.406*** 0.409*** 0.407*** 0.409*** 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.116) 
>500 employees 0.153 0.165 0.156 0.169 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) 
Eastern Germany 0.823*** 0.833*** 0.826*** 0.836*** 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) 
Sectoral dummies Yes (non significant) 
     
Constant -2.791*** -3.083*** -2.694*** -2.820*** 
 (0.322) (0.361) (0.341) (0.468) 
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
Pseudo R2 
426.42 
0.000 
0.0838 
431.93 
0.000 
0.0846 
429.06 
0.000 
0.0839 
437.93 
0.000 
0.0851 
Observations 9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 78 
 
The results of Model I are the following: The firm size and working in Eastern Germany 
are factors which are positively correlated with the probability of being on a temporary 
contract. Male and old workers, instead, are less likely to be on a temporary contract 
than female and young workers. The time variable also shows that workers have 
become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time.  In line with the first 
proposition, having a sector-specific vocational training degree is negatively correlated 
with the probability of being on a temporary contract. Reflecting the expectations of  
propositions 4a and 4b, job routine has an independent effect from the variable “skill 
specificity” and is positively correlated with the probability of being on a temporary 
contract.  
 
Models II and III contain the interaction terms respectively between time and skill 
specificity and between time and job routine. With the exception of the gender variable, 
which loses significance in Model II, the coefficients of the control variables do not 
change.  The variables specific skills, job routine and the interaction term routine*time 
are not significant.
24
 However, neither the interaction terms nor the constituent terms 
can be interpreted from the table and they require further statistical analysis (Ai and 
Norton 2003, Norton, Wang et al. 2004, Brambor, Clark et al. 2006). Indeed, by using 
interactive models “the analyst is not concerned with model parameters per se; he or she 
is primarily interested in the marginal effect of X on Y for substantively meaningful 
values of the conditioning variable Z” (Brambor, Clark et al. 2006: 12).25                                                                                                  
 
Following the command routine recommended by Brambor et al (2006) and Williams 
(2012), the command margins is used to estimate the marginal effects of skill specificity 
and routine given each value of the time variable. In this paper, only the plot graphs are 
reported, which give a clear representation of the interaction term, but the tables with 
the values of the marginal effect, the standard errors and the confidence intervals are 
                                                 
24 It can be noted that the standard errors of both constituent terms and interaction terms are higher than 
in the simple model. This is not a signal of multicollinearity, it just means that the data does not contain 
enough information to estimate coefficient. However, the aim of the multiplicative term is to analyse the 
marginal effect of one factor on the independent variable. Therefore the standard errors of the marginal 
effects are actually the relevant ones (see Brambor et al. 2006). The tables A4-A9 in the Appendix show 
the standard errors, which are all small.  
25
 Norton et al. (2004) also contend that the significance of interaction terms particularly in non-linear 
models is not telling as the interaction might be still significant for most observations. Indeed, The 
Figures A1-A4 in the second section of the Appendix shows that the interaction job routine*time is 
significant for most observations even though the parameter in the table is not (see similarly Norton, 
Wang et al. 2004). 
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reported in the Appendix (TableA4 and TableA5). Figure 1 reports the plot for the 
marginal effect of skill specificity on the probability of being on a temporary contract 
over time (1=1985…5=2012). The line shows that the marginal effect is significant 
since 1992 and negative, which means that the negative effect of skill specificity on the 
probability of being on a temporary contract has been increasing over time. Figure 2 
reports the plot of the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a 
temporary contract, which shows that the positive marginal effect of job routine has 
been increasing over time.   
 
 
Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects of skill specificity with 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects of job routine with 95% confidence intervals 
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 p
r(
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t)
1 2 3 4 5
Time
Average Marginal Effects of job routinisation
 
 
 80 
 
Predicted probabilities give a slightly different, and more intuitive, representation of the 
relationship between specific skills and time and between job routine and time. While 
Figure1 and 2 represent the overtime variation of marginal effects of specific skills and 
of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary contract, the predicted 
probabilities show how the probability of being on a temporary contract has varied over 
time for workers with specific skills or in routine job positions. Figure 3 shows that the 
probability of being on a temporary contract has become higher for workers without 
specific skills than for workers with specific skills. However, it also shows that both 
categories of workers have become more likely to be on a temporary contract. Figure 4 
reports that the probability of being on a temporary contract for workers in routine job 
positions has increased over time and to a greater extent than the probability for workers 
who are not employed in routine job positions. The table with the probability values, the 
standard errors and the confidence intervals are included in the Appendix (Tables A6 
and A7).  
 
 
Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of skill specificity with 95% confidence interval 
 
 
skill specificity = 0 
 
skill specificity = 1  
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of job routine with 95% confidence interval 
 
 
 job routine = 0 
 
 job routinie= 1  
 
 
 
Model IV includes two additional interaction terms: the term job routine*specific skills 
allows the analysis of the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a 
temporary contract conditional on workers’ skills. The term job routine*specific 
skills*time is used for the analysis of how the marginal effect of job routine on the 
probability of being on a temporary contract changes over time for specific-skilled 
workers. Figure 5 shows that the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of 
being on a temporary contract declines when workers are specific-skilled. Figure 6 
shows how the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary 
contract changes over time among specific-skilled workers. The trend has been 
increasing since 1992 even though it is not significant for the last wave. 
26
 
 
                                                 
26 Additional tables analysing the interaction terms are in Section 2 of the Appendix (Table A8 and A9).  
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Figure 5: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different values of skill specificity with 95% 
confidence intervals 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Average Marginal Effects of job routine among specific skilled workers at different time points 
with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
 
 
Further logistic regressions have been run as robustness checks, which can be found in 
the third section of the Appendix. First, the simple model has been run with wave 
dummies instead of the continuous variable “time” in order to show that the direction of 
the effect of time on the probability of being on a temporary contract does not change 
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but there is a positive trend since 1992 (see Table A10). Second, the regression has been 
run with standard errors clustered by sector and by Federal State in case the 
observations within the sector or the Federal State were correlated – for instance, 
through common technology, or labour market regulation at regional level. Table A11 
in the Appendix reports the simple model, showing that the significance level and the 
coefficients of skill specificity and job routine do not change. Third, the regression has 
been run without Eastern Germany, as the exclusion of Eastern Germany from the 
sample was recommended by BiBB researchers (Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann 
2013). The Tables A12-A16 in the Appendix show that the results do not change 
compared to the analysis conducted on the sample including Eastern Germany.   
 
Fourth, the logistic regression has been run only on companies with more than 500 
employees, which have almost 100% coverage of works councils and a sectoral 
bargaining coverage going from 93.9% in 1995 to 76.9% in 2010 (see Baccaro and 
Benassi 2014). In this way, the analysis checks whether the results have been biased by 
missing the control variable “industrial relations”. Indeed, it could be argued that labour 
market deregulation and the pressure to engage in concession bargaining have no (or 
milder) effects on the use of temporary work in establishments covered by sectoral 
agreements and with workplace labour representation. Furthermore, it could be argued 
that skills and job routine do not have independent effects in companies with developed 
internal labour markets and workplace representation because works councils ensure a 
correspondence between specific skilled workers and complex job positions. However, 
Table A17 in the Appendix, which contains both the simple model and the interactive 
model, shows that both coefficients of the variables “job routine” and “time” are 
positive and significant. The analysis of the interactions terms “job routine*time”and 
“job routine*time*specific skills” gives similar results as the analysis conducted on the 
whole sample (see Table A19 and A21). In contrast, the coefficient of the variable 
“specific skills” is non-significant even when the logistic regression is run without the 
variable “job routine” (see Model I in Table A17). The interaction term “specific 
skills*time” is non-significant either, as shown in Table A18. The non-significant effect 
of skill specificity might be due to the ability of bigger companies to recruit specific-
skilled workers even on temporary contracts. Table A20 suggests that the marginal 
effect of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary contract is bigger among 
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workers without specific skills than among workers with specific skills but the result is 
not significant when the variable specific skills takes value 1.  
 
To sum up, this section has shown that, first, the bluecollar workforce have maintained a 
high level of skills over time but, at the same time, high (and even increasing) rates of 
workers, including skilled workers, report that they work in routine job positions. 
Second, workers with specific skills are less likely to be on temporary contracts 
compared to workers without specific skills – and rates of increase have been lower for 
this group; however, both groups have experienced an increase in temporary contracts 
over time, showing that skill specificity does not protect workers from casualisation. 
Third, workers in routine jobs are more likely to be on a temporary contract, and this 
relationship is independent from skill specificity. Furthermore, even among specific 
skilled workers, the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a 
temporary contract has been increasing over time.  
 
The empirical analysis, therefore, has confirmed some of the expectations of the VoC 
and dualisation literature that employees with specific skills are less likely to be on 
temporary contracts than workers without a specific dual vocational training. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence has shown that the negative association between 
specific skills and temporary contract and the positive association between job routine 
and temporary contracts have strengthened over time. These findings still leave two 
main questions open. First, the reasons for the continuing association between specific 
skills and temporary contract are still in need of clarification as the literature has 
assumed that employers need a stable and specific-skilled workforce because of the 
complex work organisation. However, this constitutes only a partial explanation because 
the analysis has shown that specific-skilled workers are also (increasingly) employed in 
routine jobs, even though to a lower extent than workers without specific vocational 
training. Second, the analysis has shown trends over time in the associations between 
the main variables, but it cannot explain the reasons for these trends.  
 
The qualitative analysis in the following section allows for a more detailed explanation 
because it further explores the relationship between skills and work organisation and 
shows how weakening institutional constraints influenced employers’ use of contingent 
work.  
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6 Case study findings 
 
This section is based on interviews with human resource managers, works councillors 
and union representatives in large automotive and machine tool building plants, all 
above 1,000 employees (see the methodology section for further details).  
 
 
6.1 To what extent is a stable specific-skilled workforce needed?  
 
The interviews both with employers and employees suggested that the literature has 
overestimated the relevance of specific skills for production in German core 
manufacturing sectors. They report that there are broad segments in core manufacturing 
sectors where “specific” skills, either firm-specific or sector-specific, are not – and have 
never been - essential. Particularly in direct production, the training time required for 
working efficiently is very short. A works councillor, who had been working in the 
body shop of a big automotive plant for thirty years, suggested that for complex tasks 
such as welding “even” one day is necessary but two or three hours of training are 
sufficient for working on the assembly line (WC-1 11.09.2012). For these jobs, both 
temporary and permanent workers might have a vocational training degree but not 
necessarily in a metal or electronic profession.  
 
Furthermore, interview partners pointed out that the work organisation in some 
production segments favours the employment of temporary workers. The 
standardisation and the (increasingly) routinised nature of work reduce the necessity for 
complex and specific knowledge of work processes. Indeed, temporary workers are 
often employed in job positions characterised by easy and repetitive tasks. The 
following two quotes, which stem respectively from a works councillor and an IG 
Metall official in Berlin-Brandenburg, clearly illustrate these points: 
 
“Nowadays the work processes are so standardised that anyone with a vocational training as electrician 
could repair the circuits either for Ford or for BMW, it is the same. Today everyone is available and 
disposable at any time” (WC-2 19.04.2012) 
 
 “We used to have group work […] but now we have again the assembly line, because every job position 
was fragmented to such an extent that you only perform one work task, you only need one activity. 
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[However,] you will have many production areas where complex knowledge through experience 
[Erfahrungswissen] is present and needs to be present and you will not be able to employ agency 
workers” (IG Metall official 06.07.2011) 
 
The interviewees also reported that the temporary workforce is often as skilled as the 
standard workforce; especially in the case of agency workers, employers can just 
“order” workers with the required qualifications (MGMT 07.08.2012; WC 20.04.2012). 
Thus, temporary workers can be employed everywhere if they have the appropriate 
qualification as Facharbeiter. Furthermore, temporary workers are sometimes 
employed in the same positions for months and even for years. In those cases, they 
accept working on temporary contracts, hoping to be hired permanently – as one works 
councillor said, “this wish is always in their minds” (WC assistant 25.04.2012). A 
works councillor in an automotive plant suggests, Facharbeiter qualifications are no 
longer exclusive to the “core” workforce:  
   
“it [the phenomenon of temporary work] has become a real labour market, where workers have all the 
qualifications you need. It might be that it [the use of temporary workers] does not work in some job 
positions. Still, today it is not a problem after a certain training time to employ them [temporary 
workers], it’s no big deal. Regarding toolmaking, the toolmakers used to say: 'We are not replaceable'.27 
But now you can get it [the work done] everywhere in the world. You can do it everywhere” (WC-2 
19.04.2012) 
 
As temporary workers are not necessarily less qualified than the permanent workforce, 
the concentration of temporary workers in positions characterised by routine tasks, 
especially in direct production, is not entirely justified by the level of education of 
temporary workers, as reported by human resource managers and works councillors 
(MGMT 07.08.2012; WC-2 19.04.2012; IG Metall official 25.11.2011). Interviews 
suggest that this is mainly due to internal labour market rules enforced by works 
councils. A human resource manager explained that temporary workers could be 
employed as skilled workers
28
 but they are employed in unskilled positions because 
permanent skilled employees, who are employed in unskilled positions, are advanced in 
the career ladder as soon as there is a vacancy for a Facharbeiter (MGMT 31.08.2012). 
Thus, works councils let temporary contracts be used for unskilled positions even 
                                                 
27 The works councillor used to be a tool maker and he often referred to this profession as the paramount 
example of the core Facharbeiter during the interview.  
28 As in the case of BMW in Leipzig, where one third of the skilled workforce is constituted of agency 
workers.  
 87 
 
though some works councillors reported that the management also wanted to employ 
temporary work in skilled positions. The works councillor of a Bavarian automotive 
plant reported the discussion with the management when they bargained about 
temporary work:  
 
“The management wants to do it [use temp work] also in the production segments of Facharbeiter. But 
we say both as works council and as union that these are key competences – if we cannot handle that our 
equipment works, it does not matter whether we have agency workers in the direct production or not [in 
the sense: cost reduction will not save us from failing as a company]”(WC 17.07.2012) 
 
Works councillors and union representatives stressed the role of labour for enforcing 
internal labour market rules such as the provision of vocational training and the 
permanent hiring of trainees. An IG Metall union official who works very closely with a 
German automotive MNC illustrated this mechanism:  
 
“If a company such as XX could break out of the vocational training system, they would probably do it 
and would hire only semi-skilled…But obviously there is an obligation for XX to train people, to hire 
Facharbeiter and to pay their qualification in an appropriate way. IG Metall provides that XX does not 
break out” (IG Metall official 24.09.2012) 
 
 
6.2 The role of weakening beneficial constraints for employers’ strategies 
 
The previous section has shown that both labour and employers have a different 
perspective regarding the association between specific skills and stable employment 
than that suggested by the VoC and dualisation literature: Thanks to the routine nature 
of work in some job positions, specific skills are not so “specific” to require a stable and 
experienced workforce; furthermore, labour power better explains why contingent 
workers are mainly employed in unskilled job positions. Starting from the latter 
observation, this section shows that the erosion of institutional constraints led to the 
expansion of contingent work.  
 
Works councils and union representatives identified the main cause for the growth of 
contingent work in labour market deregulation – in particular, the liberalisation of the 
use of fixed-term and agency work which started in the mid-nineties and culminated 
with the Hartz reforms (MGMT 07.08.2012; IG Metall official 18.04.2012; WC 
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25.04.2012; IG Metall official 25.11.2011).
29
 A works councillor claimed that “thanks 
to the legislation employers can take decisions on their own on certain issues 
[temporary work]”, despite the presence of works councils in the workplace. Another 
works councillor reported that:   
 
“Until the last ten years the Facharbeiter thought that they were irreplaceable. Since the labour market 
has been deregulated, this has dramatically changed”  (WC-1 19.04.2012) 
 
The slow erosion of internal labour markets could also take place in companies with 
strong industrial relations at workplace because works councils were under pressure of 
cost-cutting and the threat of outsourcing, and therefore implicitly accepted the cost 
reduction through temporary work (IG Metall official 06.07.2011; WC 17.07.2012).
30
 
In some plants, the management did not even really bargain on the introduction of 
temporary workers since the labour market regulation did not pose any limits to the use 
of temporary work (WC 20.04.2012; IG Metall official 25.11.2011). Thus, employers 
increasingly employed new hires on temporary rather than permanent contracts starting 
from the margins of the career ladder of internal labour markets.  
 
An IG Metall official suggested that the expansion of temporary work after the Hartz 
reforms is an unofficial way to “break out” from the traditional vocational training 
system as employers cannot do it officially for political reasons, at least at the 
automotive plant he was closely working with. Instead of training (and then retaining) 
Facharbeiter who do a “very silly job at the assembly line” and “some pro forma 
teamwork”, they would hire semi-skilled workers on temporary contracts (IG Metall 
official 25.01.2012). While this statement would need to be supported by further 
evidence, employers have, indeed, reduced their commitment to vocational training in 
metal professions and the dual vocational training has become more selective, moving 
away from the collectivist system which used to provide “abundant skills” to the 
workforce (Thelen and Busemeyer 2012, IG Metall 2013). While the obligation to 
permanent hiring represented an incentive for employers to invest in training their 
workforce in order to increase their productivity, employers now seem to be reducing 
                                                 
29 Benassi and Dorigatti (2014) illustrate in detail the perception of unions and works councils 
concerning the role of deregulation for the increase of agency work.  
30 See for a detailed analysis Benassi 2013.  
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the number of training positions and skilled workers to the minimum and to be hiring 
other workers on temporary contracts.   
 
Not only external hires in unskilled positions but also trainees are increasingly affected 
by the use of temporary contracts. IG Metall and the German Trade Union 
Confederation report that even trainees have been increasingly offered temporary 
contracts at the end of their dual vocational training. In this way, employers can only 
decide to dismiss young Facharbeiter when there is a crisis and when there are no 
vacancies in skilled positions  (IG Metall Jugend 13.08.2010, IG Metall 23.07.2012, 
DGB Bundesvorstand 2009). As a result, IG Metall conducted a campaign between 
2009 and 2012 aimed at (re)regulating the hiring of trainees. In May 2012 IG Metall 
signed a collective agreement which guarantees at least a one-year contract to all 
trainees and obliges employers to bargain with the works council over the number of 
permanent hirings either before the start of the vocational training or at least six months 
before its end (IG Metall 23.05.2012).  
 
In those plants where the interviews were conducted, both managers and works 
councillors declared that trainees were hired permanently even though not necessarily 
straight away in job positions reflecting their qualifications as Facharbeiter. However, 
the stability of vocational training as a recruiting path might be due to the plants’ 
characteristics as they were all bigger than 1,000 employees and characterised by very 
strong works councils, which still manage to ensure the permanent hiring of trainees. 
 
While the literature has emphasised the necessity of a stable specific workforce for the 
efficiency and success of the German production model, the interview findings have 
shown that, first, many job positions, even though they might have been occupied by 
skilled workers, do not require specific qualifications. Second, temporary workers can 
be easily employed because of the routine nature of work; furthermore, they can even be 
employed in more complex skilled positions because they are qualified and willing to 
stay. Third, labour market deregulation and the increasing pressure of works councils 
for concession bargaining have weakened the institutional constraints supporting the 
traditional German production model. As a consequence, contingent work spread and 
young skilled workers are increasingly affected by casualisation even though specific 
skilled workers are still advanced in their career ladder. The findings suggest that there 
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is a broad scope for employers’ cost-cutting strategies even within the core 
manufacturing workforce.  
 
 
7 Discussion of findings  
 
By taking the German manufacturing sector as a critical case study, the present paper 
has investigated the conditions under which contingent work could grow in core sectors 
of CMEs. Existing literature has controversial expectations regarding the extent to and 
the mechanisms through which contingent work can spread. The VoC literature and the 
dualisation literature expect that core workers are not going to be affected by the 
casualisation of work because employers have an interest in retaining these workers 
(Hall and Soskice 2001, Amable 2003, Hassel 2014). While this literature is mainly 
based on macro-level analyses, qualitative studies at workplace level have shown that 
the relationship between stable employment and skills needs to be supported by 
institutions and by a certain type of work organisation (Streeck 1991, Lloyd and Payne 
2006, Lloyd, Warhurst et al. 2013). This evidence is compatible with political economy 
analyses at the macro-level arguing that the casualisation of work can also affect core 
workers if institutional protections erode (Streeck 2009, Baccaro and Benassi 2014).  
 
The present paper bridges the gap between the research strands at the macro- and micro-
level and provides micro-level evidence to the debate about trajectories of change in 
CMEs. To this end, it has illustrated trends over time in work casualisation through 
longitudinal individual-level data and workplace case studies, focusing on the 
relationship between skills, work organisation and stable employment. The paper finds 
that specific-skilled workers are less likely to be on a temporary contract than workers 
without a specific dual vocational training and this gap increases over time.  However, 
specific skilled workers in core manufacturing sectors have also increasingly been 
affected by casualisation thanks to labour market deregulation and the routine nature of 
work. This section sums up and discusses the findings in the order in which the 
propositions were presented. 
 
The first proposition contends that workers with specific skills are less likely to be on  
temporary contracts than workers without these skills (Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001, 
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Hall and Soskice 2001).  While the quantitative analysis has confirmed this, the case-
study findings have shown that specific-skilled workers are hired on permanent 
contracts not only because employers are interested in retaining them, as suggested by 
the VoC literature (Hall and Soskice 2001), but also because labour representatives push 
for the permanent hiring of trainees after the vocational training.  
 
The second and third propositions have different expectations regarding the relationship 
between skills and stable employment when the labour market is deregulated and labour 
power declines. While the second proposition expects specific-skilled workers to be 
protected from the casualisation of work (Emmenegger, Häusermann et al. 2012b, 
Thelen 2012, Hassel 2014), the third proposition argues that specific-skilled workers 
will become more likely to be on a temporary contract if the legislative and negotiated 
employment protections erode (Marsden 2010). The empirical analysis has found 
evidence which is compatible with both propositions. On the one hand, the difference 
between the probability of being on a temporary contract for workers with specific skills 
and for workers without specific skills has increased over time. This finding supports 
one of the main points of the dualisation literature, that phenomena such as temporary 
employment or unemployment are unevenly distributed in the workforce and that the 
segmentation within the workforce has been increasing (Emmenegger, Häusermann et 
al. 2012b). On the other hand, specific skilled workers have also become more likely to 
be on a temporary contract since the eighties. German unions, also in core 
manufacturing sectors, report that temporary contracts are increasingly used in the 
transition between vocational training and permanent employment. In this way, if there 
are no vacancies in the Facharbeiter segments, employers can dismiss the trainees or, at 
least, keep the costs of hiring skilled workers in unskilled positions low. The descriptive 
statistics clearly show that the rates of temporary work among workers with a 
vocational training degree in a sector-relevant occupation have particularly increased 
among young workers since 1986.  
 
The qualitative case studies explain these mixed findings through industrial relations 
institutions, which are still holding up, to some extent. On the one hand, employers’ 
interest in a stable and specific skilled workforce does not fully explain why sector-
relevant vocational training still protects workers from work casualisation to a certain 
extent. These outcomes can also be explained through the resilience of industrial 
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relations institutions: Labour actively intervened to negotiate provisions regarding the 
permanent hiring of young specific skilled workers, and works councils in the case 
studies still managed to ensure the permanent hiring of trainees. On the other hand, case 
study findings have shown that labour market reforms weakening the employment 
protection for temporary workers, even though often defined as “reforms at the 
margins” (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007), actually have consequences for the core 
workforce as well in the long run even if to a lower extent than for workers without 
specific skills. 
 
Proposition 4a contends that work organisation and skills should be considered 
separately in the analysis of the incidence of contingent work (Lam 2002, Grugulis and 
Lloyd 2010: 94 f., Stewart, Danford et al. 2010), while proposition 4b expects job 
routine, which characterises the Tayloristic manufacturing production, to have a 
positive effect on the probability of being on a temporary contract. The empirical 
analysis has confirmed proposition 4a, as work organisation and skill specificity have 
independent effects on the probability of being on a temporary contract. Furthermore, 
the rising rates of overqualification and overskilling among the workforce between 1986 
and 2012 suggests that there is not a perfect correspondence between a routine work 
organisation and an increasingly qualified workforce. In line with proposition 4b, 
empirical evidence has confirmed that temporary workers are concentrated in routine 
job positions. However, this is not necessarily related to the skills of temporary workers 
as the descriptive statistics show that in 2012 over 80% of temporary workers had a 
vocational training degree and 52% a specific vocational training degree. Furthermore, 
they have been found to feel more overqualified and overskilled than permanent 
workers. The (increasing) concentration of temporary workers in routine job positions is 
also due to the presence of industrial relations at workplace level, as discussed below.  
 
The fifth and last proposition expects workers in highly routine job positions to be more 
likely to be on a temporary contracts over time. Indeed, the evidence shows that 
employers have increasingly employed temporary workers in routine positions since the 
end of the nineties. As the labour market was deregulated and works councils were 
under pressure because of the threat of outsourcing and of plant closure, employers 
started cutting labour costs in unskilled positions first, which are the most routine 
positions. This is also due to companies’ internal labour market rules which give 
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permanent workers priority for advancement if there are vacancies in Facharbeiter 
segments. Thus, temporary workers, also with a sector-relevant vocational training 
degree, are employed in unskilled positions. An interview partner even suggested that 
the broad use of temporary workers in unskilled positions represents an instrument for 
avoiding the training and the permanent hiring of skilled workers in oversupply. 
However, the interviews have reported that using temporary work in skilled positions 
would not be problematic, also thanks to the routine work organisation. Indeed, 
contingent work has also been slowly spreading into skilled positions and job routine 
has a positive and over time increasing marginal effect (even though weak) on the 
probability of being on a temporary contract of workers with specific skills.  
 
The findings have shown that temporary contracts have been spreading in core 
manufacturing sectors especially among workers without sector-relevant vocational 
training. However, specific skilled workers have also been affected by work 
casualisation. These outcomes can be explained through the routine nature of work, 
which facilitates the employment of temporary contracts; and through industrial 
relations institutions, as works councils are still able to ensure the permanent hiring of 
skilled workers even though it has been partly impaired by labour market deregulation.  
 
The next section concludes by highlighting the theoretical implications of these findings 
and the limitations of the study and direction of further research.  
 
 
8 Conclusion 
This paper has contributed to the debate about the casualisation of work in the core of 
CMEs by providing new evidence based on longitudinal micro-level data and on case-
study findings in the German manufacturing sector. The theoretical contribution of this 
paper is twofold. First, it has illustrated at the micro-level how the interplay between 
skills, work organisation and institutions leads to stable employment and, most of all, 
how workers’ outcomes can change over time when negotiated and legal employment 
protections erode.  By so doing, the paper conciliates different expectations derived 
from the existing literature. The paper has confirmed the expectations of the VoC and 
dualisation literature that specific-skilled workers are less likely to be on a temporary 
contract than workers without specific training and the gap has increased over time 
 94 
 
(Hall and Soskice 2001; Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014). However, employers’ interests in a 
stable workforce have been overestimated as the (increasing) levels of job routinisation 
in core manufacturing sectors facilitate the employment of temporary workers.  Thus, 
the role of industrial relations is crucial for ensuring stable employment: While works 
councils still manage to advance skilled workers along the career ladder, labour market 
deregulation has eroded their ability to control external hiring and the transition of 
trainees to permanent employment. These findings strengthen the argument about the 
centrality of industrial relations, rather than only employers’ interests, in determining 
workers’ outcomes (Doellgast 2012; Lloyd, Warhurst et al. 2013). In relation to 
Streeck’s argument (1991; 1992), the findings suggest that, even in the Golden Age of 
the traditional German model, the constraining role of institutions was probably more 
important than the complexity of work organisation, as large segments of (even skilled) 
job positions were routine even then although to a lower extent. This observation is 
compatible with past research criticising the image of the work organisation in German 
core manufacturing sectors as homogenously complex and generally requiring skilled 
work (Jürgens 1997; Roth 1997; Jürgens 2004).  
 
Second, this paper contributes to the broader debate about trajectories of change in 
coordinated political economies. While some scholars have argued that coordinated 
economies such as Germany have maintained a stable coordinated manufacturing core 
(Thelen 2012, Hassel 2014), other scholars oppose the idea of a dual equilibrium and 
contend instead that CMEs – just like LMEs – have been going down a common path 
towards liberalisation, which will not spare the core in the long run even though it 
proceeds at a slower pace (Streeck 2009, Baccaro and Howell 2011, Baccaro and 
Benassi 2014). By using individual level data, the present paper has shown how 
liberalisation has affected the whole workforce and exposed all workers to the 
casualisation of work even though its effect depends on their skills. Furthermore, the 
detailed empirical analysis has shown that employers’ cost-cutting and flexibilisation 
strategies have also become increasingly relevant in core sectors, affecting both 
unskilled and skilled workforce segments. 
 
The paper leaves three questions open. First, the paper remains ambiguous regarding the 
extent to which employers need specific skills. Indeed, the paper is limited to stating 
that employers’ interests in stable employment have been overestimated in the 
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literature. On the one hand, the paper has questioned the assumption that specific skilled 
workers are hired after their dual vocational training because companies actually require 
their skills. High overqualification and overskilling levels and the interview findings 
suggest that specific skilled workers are not hired permanently for their actual job 
requirements but rather also because of works councils and union representatives 
pushing for it. Thus, once institutional protections are weaker, temporary workers can 
be hired instead, even though they might be less skilled and have less experience. This 
suggests that employers are interested in reducing the provision of training and the 
hiring of specific-skilled workers. Indeed, Thelen and Busemeyer (2012) show that 
employers have started reducing their commitment to the provision of training (Thelen 
and Busemeyer 2012). On the other hand, the interview findings suggest that employers 
also hire temporary workers with a sector-specific degree, who are willing to work for 
the company, even for longer periods, hoping to be permanently hired. This implies that 
employers still need a specific-skilled workforce – although to a lower extent than 
expected by the literature - and temporary workers serve the same purposes and are 
cheaper at the same time. This paper is limited to illustrating these temporary staffing 
strategies as different options employers have for bypassing the link between specific 
skills and temporary employment. However, research on (changing) employer 
preferences regarding the provision of training and the hiring of specific-skilled workers 
is needed.    
 
The second question is related to this latter point as the paper does not estimate whether 
employers face costs when they depart from the traditional production model. The 
original argument about beneficial constraints expects that employers might risk 
decreasing productivity or worsening product quality. The findings suggest that 
employers could casualise employment to a greater extent than the literature expected 
without incurring in any costs. However, further research in this direction is needed.  
 
Third, job routine is most likely to be just one of the factors which favours the 
expansion of contingent work. The standardisation of technologies across the industry 
and changes in the required knowledge - such as narrowing from broad to more specific 
competencies - are likely to have taken place and to have contributed to further 
facilitating the employment of temporary workers. These developments should be 
researched through qualitative empirical work in the workplace. 
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Paper 2 
 
 
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION: 
AGENCY WORK IN THE GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper compares the segmentation between standard workers and agency workers, 
based on four case studies of German automotive plants. The plants differed in terms of 
the proportion of agency workers in the whole workforce, the length of their 
assignment, their function and their wage level compared to standard workers. The 
paper contributes to improve the understanding of labour role in determining workplace 
segmentation: the variation is explained through workplace bargaining, whose outcomes 
were shaped by the interplay between differences in labour power and labour 
commitment to a homogeneous workforce. The findings show that labour power is 
necessary to regulate segmentation in the workplace, which relies both on workplace 
industrial relations and external conditions such as the support of the national union, the 
socio-economic context of the plant and the timing of company-level agreements in 
regard to labour market reforms. However, labour power is not sufficient for achieving 
encompassing agreements for contingent workers as labour commitment to a 
homogenous workforce, which varies across workplaces, makes a fundamental 
difference.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The proportion of the workforce on contingent employment contracts has increased over 
the last twenty years and is expected to rise further in all advanced political economies 
(Kalleberg 2009; Giaccone 2011; International Labour Organisation 2013; Stone 2013). 
One group of scholars has taken a macro-approach to analysing  this phenomenon, 
highlighting the causes such as technological change (Smith 1997: 332 f.), the 
tertiarisation and financialisation of national economies (Dörre 2001; Koch 2013) and 
labour market liberalisation (Kalleberg 2009: 3). Other scholars have adopted a micro-
level approach, looking at why and how companies use contingent workers at company-
level (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993; Kalleberg 2003; Kalleberg, Reynolds et al. 2003).   
 
Within the latter literature strand, industrial relations researchers have dedicated 
particular attention to how industrial relations institutions influence the use of 
contingent workers at workplace level (i.a. Olsen and Kalleberg 2004: Shire, Schönauer 
et al. 2009). The present paper seeks to further develop the understanding of the role of 
labour in determining workplace arrangements for contingent workers. To this aim, it 
analyses the causes of cross-plant variation in the segmentation pattern between 
standard workers and contingent workers based on four case studies of German 
automotive plants. The German automotive industry is a critical case for studying 
labour market segmentation. Even though the industrial relations institutions of the 
German “coordinated market economy” (CME) (Hall and Soskice 2001) have been 
eroding and labour market inequalities have increased (i.a. Bosch and Kalina 2008), 
some literature argues  that core manufacturing sectors still rely on a stable specific-
skilled workforce and on labour-management coalitions at workplace (Herrigel 2010; 
Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). However, agency work has been dramatically 
increasing in German core manufacturing sectors in recent years.  
 
The use of contingent work in core sectors requires an explanation, confirming that 
there is still need for research on “how strategic HR decisions in using temporary 
workers are formed within firms and which factors shape them” (Pulignano and 
Doerflinger 2013: 4149). In particular, this paper aims to explain how labour power and 
labour strategy at workplace level interact to shape different segmentation patterns. Past 
literature on union strategies towards contingent work has looked mainly at the sectoral 
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and at the national level (Heery and Adler 2004), while research on labour responses to 
employers’ segmentation strategies at workplace level has mainly focused on the role of 
sectoral and workplace institutions of collective voice for explaining different outcomes 
for contingent workers (Gooderham and Nordhaug 1997; Doellgast, Batt et al. 2009).  
 
This study provides an original contribution to the literature because it shows that the 
interaction between the two factors was fundamental for understanding different 
segmentation patterns in the case studies; furthermore, it provides evidence that the 
labour responses to contingent work at workplace level are influenced by factors 
external to the company as much as by internal industrial relations institutions (similarly 
as in the studies about unions’ involvement in workplace change by Locke 1992; Frost 
2000; Pulignano and Stewart 2012). The findings show that power was necessary to 
labour for regulating segmentation at workplace but it was not sufficient for bargaining 
encompassing agreements for contingent workers. To this aim, labour commitment to a 
homogenous workforce, which varies across workplaces even though the same sectoral 
union is involved, was a fundamental condition. Labour power is found to rely both on 
workplace industrial relations and external conditions such as the support of the national 
union, the socio-economic context of the plant and the timing of company-level 
agreements in regard to labour market reforms. Labour commitment to a homogenous 
workforce is found to depend on their political proximity with the management and also 
to shift according to labour ability to influence employers’ segmentation strategies. 
 
The plants chosen in this study use agency work but they differ in terms of the 
proportion of agency workers employed in the whole workforce, the length of their 
assignment, their function and their wage level compared to standard workers in the 
post-crisis period between 2010 and 2012. The empirical analysis is based on interviews 
with local unionists, works councillors, human resource managers and experts in the 
automotive sector conducted between January 2011 and March 2013 and on the analysis 
of company-level agreements, internal union publications, press statements, and 
interviews of works councillors published in union magazines and in the local press. 
The time frame of the case studies is between 2000 and 2012.  
 
The paper unfolds as follows. The next two sections discuss the literature on labour 
market segmentation with a particular focus on the role of labour. The fourth section 
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illustrates the methodology and contains a detailed description of the plant 
characteristics. The fifth section presents the cases. The sixth section compares and 
discusses the cases. Section seven concludes.  
 
 
2 The determinants of segmentation: From production requirements to workplace 
politics 
 
The segmentation literature contends that standard workers belong to a company’s 
Internal Labour Market (ILM), which is characterised by career ladders, training 
programs and wage scales based on tasks, qualification and/or seniority. Workers in 
ILMs are skilled and perform the core functions of the company and therefore 
employers are interested in retaining them. Contingent workers, instead, are employed 
in peripheral, secondary labour markets, which companies use to cope with flexibility 
needs such as demand peaks. Thus, the literature considers primary and secondary 
labour markets as separate market segments dedicated to different functions (Doeringer 
and Piore 1971; Berger and Piore 1980; Osterman 1994).  
 
The early segmentation literature pointed out the role of product markets, technology 
and skills for explaining the segmentation between internal and external labour markets 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Berger and Piore 1980). The volatility and the conditions of 
the product markets have been supposed to determine the use and size of peripheral 
labour markets. Companies which are in seasonal industries or exposed to 
(international) competitive markets are subject to volatility of demand and cost pressure 
and thus they need a large, flexible periphery (Berger and Piore 1980; Kalleberg, 
Reynolds et al. 2003).  In addition, a declining or stagnating demand in product markets 
might impair the financial conditions of companies, which find it difficult to develop a 
long-term staffing strategy in times of economic uncertainty (Rubery 1994: 48). 
Segmentation also depends on the type of product market: In high quality markets, 
companies are less exposed to price competition and can employ a stable and qualified 
workforce, which is required by the complex technology and work organisation typical 
of high-quality production (Sorge and Streeck 1987; Youndt, Snell et al. 1996; 
Appelbaum 2000). Related to this, the extent to which companies (need to) invest in 
training their workforce can also explain the size of the periphery. For instance, Baron 
et al. (1986) found from a sample of 100 Californian establishments that the intensity of 
 100 
 
firm-specific training was correlated with the probability of belonging to the ILM.  In 
their research on a public utility with over 6,000 employees, Cappelli and Cascio (1991) 
found that positions attached to a career ladder and with higher wage premiums were 
assigned to workers with organisation-specific skills. 
 
Most of the early segmentation literature did not really integrate the role of labour in 
their analysis. A critical body of research neglected the role of unions, focusing 
exclusively on employers’ use of segmentation in order to increase their control over 
their employees (Reich, Gordon et al. 1973; Stone 1974). Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
and Osterman (1987) acknowledged the role of labour but they did not analyse the 
bargaining dynamics between labour and management, limiting their discussion of 
industrial relations institutions to the observation that they influence the use of 
contingent work.  
 
In response to this gap in the literature, Rubery (1978) and Elbaum (1983) contended 
that the segmentation literature should integrate labour as strategic actor in the analysis. 
Unions have the power and the interest to bargain ILM arrangements in order to limit 
competition among workers and to maintain control over skill supply and workers’ 
knowledge. Thus, ILM arrangements are considered primarily the result of a bargaining 
process between labour and management. The extent to which labour can influence the 
ILM arrangements and, in particular, the pattern of workforce segmentation depends on 
the power resources available and on the strategies of labour actors. The next section 
will discuss the literature which has focused on these two factors.   
 
 
3 Bargaining segmentation: Labour power and strategies  
 
 
3.1 Internal and external sources of labour power 
 
Scholars explaining unions’ role in influencing workplace restructuring and, in 
particular, segmentation patterns at workplace level have highlighted different power 
sources unions can draw on. Here they will be discussed, distinguishing between 
internal and external sources of power. 
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Some scholars identified workplace industrial relations - such as union density, the 
presence of collective agreements and of collective voice institutions - as fundamental 
internal labour power resources. Among others, Frost (2000) identified the mobilisation 
potential of the workforce, the access to information and to different levels of decision-
making as explanatory factors for unions’ influence in workplace restructuring. Scholars 
found that internal power resources also matter when it comes to bargaining company-
level arrangements for contingent workers. By comparing British and Norwegian 
workplaces, Gooderham and Nordhaug (1997) found that, thanks to their 
institutionalised bargaining rights, Norwegian unions were more successful at limiting 
the use of temporary workers than British unions. In their research on telecom ex-
incumbents in ten Western countries, Doellgast, Sarmiento and Benassi (2013) found 
that different national industrial relations institutions determine the extent to which 
unions can cover the workforce employed by staff agencies, subsidiaries and 
subcontractors.  
 
In addition to internal power resources, the literature looking at unions’ involvement in 
workplace restructuring examined the role of external sources of labour power. Some 
scholars pointed out the ability of local unions to build coalitions with national unions, 
local communities and social movements  (Frost 2000; Lévesque and Murray 2005; 
Doellgast 2008). Locke (1992) and Pulignano and Stewart (2012) highlighted the role 
of local external authorities for explaining different unions’ bargaining leverage in 
workplace restructuring. Meardi et al. (2009) pointed out the constraining role of 
external conditions on unions’ influence on workplace restructuring such as local labour 
market conditions (e.g. unemployment) and legislation regarding flexibility.  
 
Similarly, the literature on labour's role in workplace segmentation acknowledged that 
external factors – for example labour market deregulation, unemployment, international 
market competition, union decline – influence the workplace balance of power, 
constraining the ability of unions to affect workplace arrangements for contingent 
workers (Osterman 1992; Grimshaw and Rubery 1998; Cappelli 2001).  For instance, in 
their study of four large organisations in the UK, Grimshaw et al. (2001) found that the 
liberalisation of the use of temporary work and the decline of collective bargaining had 
a direct impact also at the workplace level as it shifted the power from labour to 
employers, leading to non-transparent pay structures and fragmented career ladders.  
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However, the segmentation literature mainly focused on how employers take advantage 
of the conditions external to the company rather than on labour power and strategies 
(see also the edited book by Rubery and Wilkinson 1994). The limited attention paid to 
the role of local external conditions – and their interplay with internal power resources - 
in explaining labour responses to contingent work at workplace level represent the first 
research gap this paper will contribute to filling in. The next section will illustrate the 
second gap in the segmentation literature, the lacking integration of labour power and 
strategies for explaining the role of labour in determining workplace segmentation.  
 
 
3.2 Labour strategies 
 
A broad body of research has focused on labour strategies towards contingent workers 
at sectoral and national level, arguing that labour can make strategic decisions about the 
inclusion (or not) of contingent workers in its bargaining domain. The insider-outsider 
perspective contends that unions tend to protect their core members, who are permanent 
workers in full-time positions, and support the use of temporary work without trying to 
regulate wages and working conditions of peripheral workers. By entering a coalition 
with the management, labour representatives use contingent workers as a volatility and 
cost buffer in order to protect wages and working conditions for their core members 
(Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Hassel 2014). In contrast,  the revitalisation literature has 
argued that unions with declining membership and institutional resources are likely to 
include peripheral workers (Baccaro, Hamann et al. 2003; Heery and Adler 2004; 
Turner 2009).  Furthermore, Hyman (1996; 2001) contends that unions’ ideologies (for 
example working class oriented or business unions) influence how unions define their 
representation domain, which might be more or less exclusive. Indeed, Heery and 
Abbott (2000) found that unions’approaches towards non-standard workers (exclusion, 
servicing, partnership, dialogue and mobilisation) reflect the union identities identified 
by Hyman (2001).  
 
This literature on labour strategies towards contingent workers has presented unions’ 
preferences as monolithic, neglecting local differences (see also Pulignano and 
Doerflinger 2013 for a similar remark). In contrast, the literature on unions’ responses 
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to workplace restructuring has illustrated how union strategies are formulated according 
to management strategies and according to the socio-economic context and the 
workplace industrial relations structure (Doellgast 2010; Pulignano and Stewart 2013). 
Bacon and Blyton (2004) and Murray, Dufour et al. (2010) also found that unions’ 
ideologies and collective identities contribute to explain unions’ responses to 
employment restructuring. However, the literature on unions’ responses to contingent 
work at workplace level has not yet developed a framework for explaining different 
degrees of labour engagement and inclusiveness towards contingent workers. An 
exception is the article by MacKenzie (2009), who showed that in the Irish telecom 
sector union engagement with contingent workers also depended on the extent to which 
an unregulated supply of labour represents a risk for labour power. Recently, Pulignano 
and Doerflinger (2013) found that societal differences, to which union identities are 
closely tied, explained the differences in the labour approach to agency work between 
Belgian and German automotive plants and in the resulting regulation (Pulignano and 
Doerflinger 2013).  
 
This paper seeks to further develop the understanding of the role of labour in the 
segmentation between standard workers and contingent workers at workplace level. In 
particular, it aims to explain differences in labour power and labour strategy at 
workplace level – as well as how these factors interact to shape different segmentation 
patterns. The paper argues that labour power is necessary to regulate the segmentation 
patterns between contingent workers and permanent workers. Labour power derives 
from the interplay between workplace industrial relations and external conditions such 
as the support of the national union, the socio-economic context of the plant and the 
timing of company-level agreements in regard to labour market reforms. However, 
labour power is not sufficient for achieving encompassing agreements for contingent 
workers and needs to be associated with labour commitment to a homogenous 
workforce. Even though the same national union is involved, labour commitment is 
found to vary across workplaces: labour acceptance of segmentation depends on the 
political closeness between management and labour, but it can also shift depending on 
whether labour is powerful enough to not fear segmentation as a threat to its bargaining 
power and to the permanent workforce (similar to MacKenzie 2009).  
 
This paper mainly contributes to the segmentation literature by including both internal 
and external sources of power and showing how they interact with labour strategies. It 
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also contributes to the literature on unions’ strategies towards contingent workers by 
showing that labour attitudes towards these workers can differ depending on the labour-
management dynamics at plant-level and on external constraints.  
 
 
4 Methodology 
 
This paper explains the variation in the segmentation between standard and agency 
workers in four automotive plants of German MNCs: BMW in Leipzig, BMW in 
Munich, Volkswagen (VW) in Wolfsburg, and Ford in Cologne. This section explains 
the motivation behind the selection of case studies, presents the characteristics of the 
case-study plants and illustrates the method of data collection.  
 
 
4.1 Why the German automotive industry? 
 
The German automotive industry
 
represents a critical case for studying the use of 
agency work.
 
The German automotive industry, especially large companies, is still 
considered prototypical for the German model of Diversified Quality Production, based 
on a stable and specific-skilled workforce and on strong industrial relations, which 
ensure high wages and good working conditions. The German system of industrial 
relations is traditionally characterised by a system of dual representation: Strong 
sectoral unions bargain encompassing collective wage agreements for the whole sector 
while works councils bargain at workplace level over qualitative issues such as work 
rules and working time thanks to strong codetermination rights. The Work Constitution 
Act (Betriebsverfassung)  gives works councils strong codetermination rights but it also 
prevents them from exerting collective pressure on management and commits them both 
to the firm’s and to workers’ interests (Müller-Jentsch 1995: 14; Hyman 2001: 120). 
Thus, works councils can potentially pursue a company-oriented logic. However, they 
were rather considered union arms in the company (Jürgens 1984) because high union 
density among works councillors and encompassing collective agreement controlled 
centrifugal tendencies.  
 
This system of industrial relations has eroded at the national level as national collective 
bargaining coverage and union density have been declining among the workforce and 
 105 
 
among works councils. In the automotive industry, union density is still high – around 
70% - and average union density among works councils reached 88% in the elections of 
2010 (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011: 18; 25). However, the automotive sector has 
experienced the proliferation of opening clauses at workplace level, which started 
spreading in Germany in the mid-nineties under the credible threat of disinvestment and 
high unemployment rates. Through these so-called Pacts for Employment and 
Competitiveness (PECs), works councils have been made jointly responsible for the 
competitiveness of the production site; thus, they agreed on concessions regarding 
working time, work reorganisation, early retirements and wage cuts or freezes, and 
could amend sectoral agreements for the first time (Rehder 2003; Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski 2006). However, industrial relations in the automotive sector are still 
considered stable due to high union density, even though local works councils have 
gained more decision-making power. The dominant view in the literature is that labour 
and management form productivity coalitions at workplace level, which still support the 
traditional features of the German production model such as high wages and stable 
employment (Herrigel 2010; Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014).  
 
Despite this relative stability in industrial relations, the automotive sector has been 
affected by the growth of agency work since the so called Hartz reforms in 2003, which 
deregulated the use of contingent contracts. The limitation on the duration of 
assignment was abolished, and companies were allowed to re-hire the same agency 
worker through a fixed-term contract without justifying the reasons for the time 
limitation. The requirement to recruit agency workers on a permanent contract after a 
certain period of time was also lifted (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011: 25). The equal pay 
principle was amended by collective agreements setting wages and working conditions 
for agency workers below the metal agreement. In 2009 the wage gap between agency 
and metal workers was between 30 and 40% (Weinkopf 2009b).  Only in 2012 the 
metal union IG Metall achieved an agreement for setting wage bonuses, which was 
designed to (partly) compensate for this difference.   
 
Despite this progressive re-regulation and the high agency fees, the interviews revealed 
that agency work has many cost advantages compared to standard work. Firstly, agency 
workers are not covered by company-level agreements. In big automotive companies, 
these agreements include benefits (for example retirement contributions) and bonuses 
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which are well above the sectoral collective agreement. Secondly, employers do not 
have to bear the costs of holidays or sick leave, as the agency sends a replacement. 
Third, employers do not have to bear dismissal costs for agency workers and, fourthly, 
they do not need to bargain with works councils over the termination of their contracts. 
 
 
4.2 Data collection 
 
The time frame for the case studies is between 2000 and 2012. The data concerning the 
status quo in the plants refers to the post-crisis period between 2010 and 2012. Findings 
are primarily based on 20 interviews with local unionists, works councillors, human 
resource managers and experts in the automotive sector. Both the employee 
representatives and the management have been interviewed in each plant, excluding 
BMW-L where the management twice refused my interview request. The interviews 
were conducted between January 2011 and March 2013 either face-to-face or by phone. 
The interviews have been conducted in German and the quotes in the paper have been 
translated by the author.  
 
In addition to the interviews, the empirical analysis relies also on company reports, 
company-level agreements, internal union publications, interviews of works councillors 
published in union magazines and in the local press, newspapers articles, and the reports 
of the European Industrial Relations Observatory. This material is used both for 
integrating the information collected through the interviews but also, when possible, to 
triangulate the interview findings. This was necessary because workforce segmentation 
is a controversial issue to talk about, both for labour representatives and employers.  
 
 
4.3 The cases  
 
The four auto plants included in this study were selected because they differed in their 
organisation of agency work and, at the same time, permit controlling for some of the 
potential efficiency-driven explanations mentioned in section 3. The case studies 
focused on the areas of direct production (for example the assembly line) and indirect 
production (for instance maintenance, repairs and quality checks). Focusing on the blue-
collar workforce allowed me to hold constant a number of factors that have been found 
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to influence segmentation patterns, including the type of work and the structure of the 
work process (see Lautsch 2002). Both these factors have reached a high level of 
standardization in the German car industry (Jürgens 2008).  
 
Plant characteristics  
BMW in Munich, Ford in Cologne and VW in Wolfsburg are well-established plants in 
Western Germany and also the company headquarters - Ford Cologne is the 
headquarters of Ford-Europe. In contrast, BMW in Leipzig is a newer ‘greenfield’ plant, 
which opened in 2007 in Eastern Germany. All plants are very large but their size 
differs: BMW-L has 6,000 workers on site, BMW-M has 30,000, Ford has over 17,000 
and VW has around 50,000. The plants are described according to the factors mentioned 
in section 2, which the literature expects to influence the use of peripheral workers at 
company-level: the characteristics of the product market, the company’s financial 
conditions, the product quality, the investment in skills and the industrial relations.  
 
Regarding the type of product, BMW is a luxury car producer. The plant in Munich 
produces BMW-3 and 4, which are larger and slightly more expensive models than the 
BMW-1, which is produced in the Leipzig plant.  In contrast, VW and Ford are usually 
classified as mass producers (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011: 3). The VW plant is 
dedicated to the Golf and to the larger car models Tiguan and Touran while the Ford 
plant in Cologne produces Fiestas. In all plants, the products are available in several 
variants and are all built to order, indicating that the companies face similar pressures 
regarding the ability to react quickly to customers’ demand.  
 
Differences in the type of product are not reflected in companies’ commitment to 
investing in human capital. BMW, both in Leipzig and in Munich, has the lowest rate of 
trainees (around 2.5%), with 150 and 800 trainees respectively per plant, while VW has 
approximately 2,000 trainees, who constitute around 4% of its workforce. Ford has 600 
trainees (3.4%).
31
  
 
Even though luxury car producers should be theoretically less exposed to cost pressure 
because their market niche is less price-elastic (Sorge and Streeck 1987), it has recently 
                                                 
31
 The findings derive from the interviews and are triangulated with the information found on the plants’ 
websites.  
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been argued that car manufacturers in high–end segments also have to now consider 
both quality and price in order to compete in export markets (Holweg 2008; Herrigel 
2014). All companies considered here are heavily reliant on exports and compete on 
international markets; therefore, they are exposed to a similar cost pressure. Between 
January and September 2012 BMW sold only 15% of its cars in Germany and VW sold 
13% in the same period (VW 2013; BMW 2013). According to a Ford manager, the 
Ford plant in Cologne similarly exports 90% of its cars to other European countries 
(MGMT 31.08.2012).  
 
The financial conditions of the companies differ. BMW and VW registered record 
profits in 2011 and 2012, while Ford – especially in Europe – experienced declining 
profits in both years. Considering the time frame covered by case studies, BMW’s share 
of global car production experienced an overall trend up from 2.04% in 2000 to 3.27% 
in 2012, registering a decline to 2.4% only in 2010. Between 2001 and 2005, VW’s 
global market share dropped from 11.95% to 10.52% and then started increasing again, 
reaching 13.6% in 2012. Ford, instead, has experienced a decline in its market share 
from 9.8% in 2001 to 4.9% in 2012 (Statista 2013). Ford’s market share has also 
declined in Europe since 2007, which is the destination of 90% cars at Ford Cologne 
(Ford 2013).   
 
All companies have strong industrial relations institutions, with works councils and high 
unionisation rates. However, again, there are some differences between the plants. The 
BMW plant in Leipzig has the lowest union density among the case studies, at 65%; 
while the plant in Munich has among the highest, at 90%. At company level, where 
collective bargaining takes place, the BMW general works council has a unionisation 
rate of 90% (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011: 26). The unionisation rate at Ford is 85%, 
while it stands at 87% in the general works council. VW has a union density around 
95%, which is as high as the unionisation rate of the works council.  
 
The organisation of agency work 
The dimensions chosen for comparing the form of segmentation across cases reflect the 
definition of primary vs. secondary labour markets, which highlight the different 
functions and the job characteristics between the two labour market segments (similarly 
see Osterman 1987). I compare four dimensions: 1) the proportion of agency workers 
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used; 2) the typical length of assignment; 3) the kinds of jobs performed by agency 
workers; and 4) the extent of wage differentiation/inequality between agency and 
permanent workers.  
 
At both BMW plants, agency workers can be employed for three or four years in the 
same job position, and have been paid according to the collective metal agreement since 
2009. However, these plants differ in the proportion of agency workers they employ and 
what positions they are employed in. BMW-L uses the largest proportion of agency 
workers (30%); and they perform the same jobs as permanent workers at all levels, both 
in direct and in indirect production. They are used to increase the company’s ability to 
quickly react to changes in consumer demand but also to save labour costs (WC 
20.04.2012). BMW-M, by contrast, has a more defined division between internal and 
external labour markets, because agency workers are employed mainly in direct 
production. At the assembly line, they constitute around 20% of the workforce. In 
addition to labour costs and flexibility issues, a workplace union representative 
mentioned that agency work is used to relieve the core workforce from the heaviest 
tasks (Union rep 11.09.2012). 
 
VW Wolfsburg is also characterised by a large periphery, which is, however, even more 
stable than that at BMW, as agency workers are hired through internal staff agencies 
(Wolfsburg –WOB- AG and Autovision). Agency workers can be employed for even 
six or seven years in the same job position and have only been paid according to the 
metal agreement since 2011. From January 2013, agency workers have received 80% of 
standard pay for the first three months, after the fourth month they receive 90% and 
after the tenth month they are paid the same as their VW colleagues. An HR manager 
openly appreciated the economic value of agency workers, as they are not covered by 
the VW company-level agreement, and the company does not have to pay severance 
pay in case of dismissal (MGMT 09.07.2012). Furthermore, agency work is used as a 
screening tool, and the management wants it to become a recruiting route parallel to 
traditional vocational training (IG Metall official 25.01.2012).  
 
Ford in Cologne has a smaller proportion of agency workers (around 5%), who are 
mainly employed on the assembly line. They are typically hired for short periods and 
employed in case of peaks in demand, replacement of workers on leave, or staff 
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shortages due to the start of production of a new vehicle model. Since 2003, agency 
workers have been covered by the sectoral metal agreement (MGMT 07.08.2012).  
 
This paper attempts to explain why similar plants in the same industry and country 
adopted approaches to agency work with different implications for workers. These 
“models” of segmentation ranged from BMW-L, which can be characterised as the 
worst model from a labour perspective, to Ford, which is the best practice in terms of 
the size and the function of agency work, and of protection for agency workers. BMW-
L has the highest proportion of agency workers, who are employed for long periods and 
perform similar tasks to those of the core workforce. They have been covered by the 
metal agreement since 2009, which narrows the gap between standard workers and 
contingent workers. Ford has a “traditional” segmentation model characterised by a 
small and volatile periphery employed for the easiest tasks; the model is characterised 
by significant wage parity across worker groups, based on a collective agreement that 
has been in place since 2003.  BMW-M and VW are “mid-way cases” as they both have 
a large and stable workforce component of agency workers, who are mainly assigned to 
the assembly line. The main difference between these two plants is that agency workers 
at BMW are employed through external staff agencies while VW has two internal staff 
agencies; thus, agency workers at VW practically share the same employer as the stable 
core workforce, but not the same conditions. Furthermore, while agency workers at 
BMW have been covered by the metal collective agreement since 2009, agency workers 
in Autovision and WOB AG have been covered by the equal pay rule
32
 only since 2011, 
which fully applies only after nine months. In the discussion section the four case study 
plants will be matched differently in order to highlight different dimensions of interests, 
controlling for other factors. 
 
The table below sums up the plant characteristics and the use of agency work at plant 
level. It is important to note that there is not a perfect correspondence between the plant 
characteristics and the plant-level use of agency work. This strengthens the motivation 
of the analysis to look at the micro-political bargaining processes underlying workforce 
segmentation at workplace level. For instance, Ford is the company with the most 
critical economic situation and also a mass car producer, but still has the lowest 
                                                 
32
 VW does not apply the metal agreement but rather has an in-house agreement. Also the internal staff 
agencies are covered by inhouse agreements, which is different from the VW one.  
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percentage of agency workers, who have been paid according to the metal agreement 
for longest. Instead, BMW, which is a luxury car producer and has experienced an 
expansion of its market share, has a plant with the highest proportion of agency 
workers. Despite the highest union density and codetermination rights, and favourable 
economic conditions, VW was the last plant to achieve an equal pay agreement.  
 
Table 12: Summary table of plants’ characteristics 
  BMW-L BMW-M Ford VW 
Position of 
the site 
within the 
company 
 Greenfield site General 
headquarter 
European 
headquarter 
General 
headquarter 
Size  6,000 workers 
but only 3,800 
are employed 
by BMW while 
the others work 
for 
subcontractors 
30,000 
employees 
(9,000 in 
production) 
17,300  
(4,000 in 
production) 
50,000 workers 
(20,000 in 
production) 
Export 
orientation 
 85%  90%  87%  
Product 
quality 
 Luxury producer Mass Mass 
Market 
share 
 Increasing between 2001 and 
2009. After a drop in 2010 the 
market share increased to over the 
level of 2008.  
Declining since 
2001/in Europe 
since 2007 
Declining 
between 2011 
and 2005. 
Increasing until 
2013 
Commitment 
to training  
%trainees on 
the whole 
workforce 
2.5% 2.6% 3.4% 4% 
Strength of 
IR 
Union 
density 
65% 90% 85% 95% 
Presence of 
WC 
Yes Yes Yes yes 
Unionisation 
of  general 
WCs 
90% 87% 94% 
Agency work % on the 
workforce 
30% overall 
 
30-40% in 
direct 
production 
3-5% in direct 
production 
20% in direct 
production 
 112 
 
Staff 
agencies 
i.a. Randstadt i.a. Manpower i.a. Adecco Internal 
agencies: 
Autovision, 
WOB AG 
Length of 
assignment  
Even years Even years Months Even years 
Tasks All levels, also 
in qualified 
positions 
Easiest tasks 
(assembly line, 
logistics) 
Easiest tasks 
(assembly line) 
Easiest tasks 
(assembly line, 
logistics) 
Rationale Flexibility 
buffer, cost 
compression 
Flexibility 
buffer, cost 
compression, 
heavy tasks 
Flexibility 
buffer, 
substitution of 
workers on 
leave 
Flexibility 
buffer, cost 
compression 
 
 
5 Embedded politics in German establishments 
 
This section of the paper shows that employers’ segmentation strategies are strongly 
shaped by collective agreements bargained between management and works council. 
The differences in these agreements are explained by the interplay between labour 
power – rooted in internal industrial relations and external conditions - and labour 
strategy at the workplace level.  
 
 
5.1 BMW in Leipzig: Uncontrolled and blurring segmentation 
 
BMW-L presents the least favourable outcomes regarding workforce segmentation, 
which can be attributed to external conditions such as the unfavourable socio-economic 
context and the uneven support from the metal union; and to internal factors such as 
relatively low union density and short bargaining tradition with the management due to 
the greenfield status of the plant. The conditions of agency workers at BMW-L could be 
improved thanks to increased activism of the works council in Leipzig and to the 
support from the BMW works council in Munich.  
 
BMW-L was set up in an extremely unfavourable political and economic context for 
labour. Before taking the decision of setting up a plant in Leipzig, the site was 
benchmarked with other sites in Eastern Europe, putting initial constraints on the 
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personnel costs (WC 10.09.2012). Furthermore, in Leipzig and in Saxony the 
unemployment rate was around 17-18% at the beginning of 2000s, when the 
negotiations between labour, management and the local authorities about the plants 
started (it is now almost 8 percentage points lower) (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 2000: 
170; Stadt Leipzig 2013). High unemployment was a challenge for the local 
government, which supported the use of agency work in order to get more people into 
employment (WC 20.04.2012); in addition, Wolfgang Theeser, who was at the time the 
Mayor of Leipzig, was also member of the Hartz Commission and therefore in favour of 
new job-creating instruments.   
 
Even though BMW had been planning to open a new plant in Eastern Germany before 
the Hartz reforms, the company changed its human resource strategy for the new plant 
once the reforms were passed. Indeed, a works councillor reported:  
 
“… [the local administration] thought, it would get more people into employment…and immediately the 
BMW concept of staff planning took a new turn. When it became clear that the legislator would liberalise 
agency work, they [BMW management] immediately said: ‘Ok, we’ll reduce the stable core workforce; 
we’ll hire only the minimum number of permanent workers because this threshold is linked to the funding 
of the European Union’…And this minimum was 2,700. And BMW has filled all jobs above that number 
with agency workers [N.B. one third more]…when the company grew, they tried to maintain this rate” 
(WC 20.04.2012) 
 
Furthermore, BMW Leipzig has an on-site supplier park, which employs 2,200 workers.  
 
The Hartz reforms and the general consensus that employment should be boosted at any 
cost limited the works council’s bargaining power. When the works councillor was 
asked whether the works council was given the opportunity to bargain over the 
conditions for opening up the plants, he answered as follows:  
 
“No, we tried, but we could only sit at the same table and try to convince our bargaining partner on a 
voluntary basis. [the management said]: ‘yes, works council, you are right but we’ll do it our way 
now’…And the management also said: ‘we are completely free according to the law, it doesn’t limit 
agency work, there is even a collective agreement, even the trade union collaborated, 
33
dear works 
council. We are absolutely legitimate’” (WC 20.04.2012) 
 
                                                 
33
 The works council refers to the bargaining round between the DGB bargaining body and the agency 
employers’ associations.  
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Despite strong linkages with IG Metall, the union did not offer immediate support to the 
works council. The works councillor thought that IG Metall “looked the other way for 
too long” regarding the issue of agency work; thus, he rather took the initiative to make 
the issue public. Indeed, BMW Leipizig has been strongly present in the media and in 
internal union material and  later became the symbol of employers’ exploitation of 
agency workers during the IG Metall campaign for agency workers, which was started 
in 2007  (Frankfurter Rundschau 29.03.2012; Spiegel Online 29.03.2012; Zeit Online 
29.11.2013; IG Metall 2012). The BMW-L works councillor stated that:  
 
“The instruments to put the management under pressure should be built up in different forms through the 
public opinion, through the unions and so on. From a legal perspective, given the law, in Germany 
everything is legitimate”  (WC 20.04.2012) 
 
Besides going “public” with the issue of agency work, the works council also brought 
the HR management at BMW-L to the local labour court in 2011 as soon as the German 
Temporary Employment Act was amended. The new law states that agency work can be 
used only “temporarily” (vorübergehend), which is an extremely ambiguous 
formulation but it excludes, at least, the permanent employment of agency workers. The 
works council set up five court cases against the management. By doing this, it wanted 
to put the management under pressure in order to get an agreement limiting the use of 
agency work even before the labour court reached its final decision. At the time of the 
interview, the management had won the first case but the works council did not want to 
stop the other four cases because  there was an ongoing bargaining round in Munich on 
the issue and therefore did not want to release the legal and mediatic pressure (WC 
20.04.2012; Focus Online 23.03.2012).  
 
An agreement for limiting the use of agency work was achieved in Munich in 
November 2012 and was then also extended to the plant in Leipzig. Before that, the 
works council in Munich had bargained an equal pay agreement in 2009, which also 
covered BMW-L. As the politics underlying the agreements is related to labour-
management dynamics in Munich, it is illustrated in the following section.  
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5.2 BMW in Munich: Late attempts to regulate segmentation 
 
The segmentation at BMW-M has been slowly regulated over time. Both internal 
conditions and external conditions have been favourable to labour even though the 
management has threatened the works council with outsourcing production. While the 
works council prevented segmentation through subcontracting and service agreements, 
it did not regulate agency work initially. It became more active at regulating the 
phenomenon only when its size increased and could constitute a threat to bargaining 
power at company-level. Given the difficulty of finding a compromise with the 
management, the works council had to mobilise the support of IG Metall for building up 
more confrontation potential and achieving a company-level agreement.  
 
The local workforce in Munich has never been under pressure of high unemployment. 
In Bavaria, unemployment rates have always been low – around 5% in 2000 and 3.7% 
in 2012. Munich has similarly low rates (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 2000: 170; 
Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2012a: 182; Stadt München 2013). Even so, the BMW 
Munich plant was put under pressure by the management, who pushed for outsourcing 
parts of the production since the 1990s. It proved impossible to avoid the outsourcing of 
some business units such as electronics and some parts of seat production. Furthermore, 
in 2007, the works council bargained a dual-tier wage system, which initially put new 
hires on a lower pay scale. However, the works council managed to prevent onsite 
subcontracting and wage segmentation between workers in so-called industrial services 
(for example the canteen, and logistics) and those in production. It also kept the seat 
assembly in-house by organising protest meetings and blocking production (Union rep 
11.09.2012).  
 
Before the Hartz reforms, the BMW works council had not tried to regulate agency 
work and rather accepted its use to a certain extent. After a brief attempt at employing 
Facharbeiter at the assembly line, the company mainly employed unskilled and agency 
workers. When the permanent workforce did not want to perform heavy tasks, agency 
workers were used, and they were also employed as a means of facilitating team 
rotation. Agency workers were also hired, to a large extent – in the body-making unit 
there were occasionally up to 16-20% – when planned technological innovations were 
expected to displace a large number of job positions. In this way, the management and 
 116 
 
the works council prevented the transfer of workers from one business unit (for example 
body-making) to another (for example the press shop) so that the original teams could 
be maintained. Such transfers are common when the management makes workers 
redundant (WC-1 11.09.2012). 
 
However, the Hartz reforms represented a turning point, as the use of agency workers 
intensified and, since then, assembly-line workers are mainly hired externally. 
Furthermore, as the Hartz reforms abrogated the equal pay principle, the works council 
realised that an increasing segment of the workforce was paid much less than the 
permanent workforce – according to a works councillor, assembly-line workers were 
paid in 2007 €5.65 per hour compared to the €12-14 per hour of the permanent 
workforce (Union rep 11.09.2012).  As a reaction to the increase of cheap workforce 
within the company, the works council started pushing for an agreement regulating the 
phenomenon, which had to be extended to all other BMW plants. During the interviews, 
the works councillors seemed confident of their power to influence the company’s 
management. Manfred Schoch – the head of the general works council – was considered 
a key figure in this process as he has a close relationship with the management, even 
though he does not advertise his power (WC 10.09.2012). A newspaper article seems to 
confirm this picture of Manfred Schoch:  
 
“He wants to be left undisturbed in his empire – and he also lets live. At BMW social partnership means: 
No open  criticism of the management. The principle of invisible power – Schoch has been living up to it 
quite well for years” (authors' translation from Süddeutsche Zeitung 17.02.2013) 34 
 
In a recent interview for the weekly magazine “Wirtschaftswoche”, Schoch highlighted 
the common interest of the works council and the management to find a model for the 
use of agency work, which allows the company “to survive difficult crises in the long 
term, without dismissing core workers to a large extent and without getting into the 
red”. According to Schoch, the works council was suggesting a “win-win situation” 
both for the management and the employees (not necessarily for the agency workers) 
(Wirtschaftswoche 30.06.2012). 
 
Despite the closeness of the works council to the management, a works councillor also 
reported that management and works councils “are two different businesses (Läden), we 
                                                 
34 See also Focus Magazin (29.11.2010) and T-Online (30.11.2010).  
 117 
 
know each other well, we treat each other with respect but that’s all there is to it (dann 
ist das auch vorbei) and this is what we want” (WC 10.09.2012). Indeed, the power of 
the works council does not derive only from the social partnership with the management 
but also from the close connection with IG Metall. The works councillors recognised 
that unions can have more influence on management because they can mobilise workers 
and present politically sensitive issues to public scrutiny as they are not committed to 
the company’s interests (WC 10.09.2012; Union rep 11.09.2012). The works 
councillors agreed during the interviews that the union is stronger than the works 
council, and thus more effective on certain issues. A works councillor explained: “as 
works councillors we can be blackmailed (…) because the company says: ‘Either you 
come to an agreement on agency work or we outsource the whole assembly line’” 
(Union rep 11.09.2012). The intervention of IG Metall was fundamental regarding the 
issue of agency work. The management had refused to negotiate an agreement on equal 
pay for agency workers until IG Metall threatened to park a truck in front of the 
experience museum “BMW Welt”, with a sign reading: ‘This is the slave temple of 
agency work’. The management knew that this could severely damage the brand’s 
reputation and agreed to open bargaining procedures.  
 
As a result, all BMW plants are covered by the same company-level agreement 
concluded in 2009, which has been centrally negotiated by the BMW works council in 
Munich and provides that agency workers are paid according to the metal agreement. 
Over the years the works council has occasionally conducted bargaining on the hiring of 
agency workers, and in September 2012 it negotiated 3,000 permanent positions for 
agency workers across all plants, in exchange for increased flexibility of working-time 
accounts for the core workforce (FAZ 27.09.2012). In November 2012 the company 
agreed on a quota of 12% to be achieved by 2015. However, the BMW works 
councillors are pessimistic that BMW will fulfil the agreed requirement (Die 
Tageszeitung 17.02.2014).  
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5.3 Volkswagen in Wolfsburg: Institutionalised segmentation 
 
At VW in Wolfsburg, agency workers are employed by internal staff agencies, which 
have been increasingly regulated through collective agreements. The setting up of the 
internal agencies took place when the external conditions were unfavourable to labour: 
The unemployment rate was high and the works council was under political pressure 
from local authorities and under the threat of outsourcing.  Still, as the workplace 
industrial relations at VW are very strong, the works council achieved a progressive 
regulation of agency work via the institutionalisation of segmentation at company level. 
This accommodating strategy is typical of the VW works councils and reflects the 
political closeness between labour and management, based on strong industrial 
relations. 
 
Since the 1990s, the VW plant in Wolfsburg has been undergoing cost-cutting 
measures, which have taken a unique form in that plant. On the one hand, between the 
mid-1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, VW management pushed for outsourcing 
components and other non-core business units given the economic troubles of the 
company (WC 25.04.2012; Schulten 1997a). On the other hand, the VW plant is in an 
economically disadvantaged region, with unemployment rates higher than average, 
especially in the nineties and early 2000s. At the end of the 1990s the unemployment 
rate was between 9 and 13% in Lower Saxony and it reached almost 18% in 1996 in 
Wolfsburg. The unemployment rate dropped gradually until 2011 – it is now 6.6% in 
the region and 1% lower in Wolfsburg (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 2000: 170; 
Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2012a: 182; Stadt Wolfsburg 2012: 4).  
 
In order to reduce local unemployment and to maintain the production site, several 
measures were undertaken since the end of the nineties, which were always bargained 
with the works council. The pressure to adopt job-creating measures at the plant was 
particularly strong because the state of Lower Saxony has a blocking stake (around 
20%) in VW. Furthermore, Peter Hartz, the head of the Hartz Commission, was also the 
Human Resources Executive at VW between 1993 and 2005. At the end of the 1990s, 
he started the project Auto 5000 which aimed at creating 5,000 new jobs for 5,000 
DM/month. The workers of Auto 5000 were not covered by in-house collective 
agreements, and their agreement set lower wages and longer working hours than for 
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VW employees. Moreover, the agreement expected workers to repair production faults 
(if they were responsible for them) during unpaid overtime hours (Sperling 2006). The 
works council also agreed on the constitution of the Service Factory, which employed 
workers in logistics, catering and security and was covered by a company-level 
agreement with lower pay grades (WC 25.04.2012; Schulten 1997a). Furthermore, the 
VW works council bargained a collective service agreement for Autostadt, the theme 
park opened at the beginning of the 2000s, and agreed on the introduction of a two-tier 
wage system in 2004 (Dribbusch 2004).  
 
In the bargaining round in 1997, the VW management tried to push for setting up 
internal staff agencies; the works council refused but agreed on the employment of 
temporary workers on a 10% lower wage (WC assistant 25.04.2012; Schulten 1997b; 
Zagelmeyer 1997). A few years later, at the beginning of the 2000s, the internal staff 
agencies Autovision and Wolfsburg AG (WOB AG) were founded and presented as “a 
gift to the city of Wolfsburg” in order to halve the unemployment rate (MGMT 
09.07.2012). After the Hartz reform, the use of agency work increased to a considerable 
extent and the proportion of agency workers in direct production achieved a rate of 
20%, even though VW has a collectively agreed quota of 5% in the workforce as a 
whole (MGMT 09.07.2012; IG Metall official 25.01.2012; WC 25.04.2012).  
 
The workers of the two internal staff agencies were covered since 2003 by a less 
favourable collective agreement than the one for VW employees. However, during 
every bargaining round, which takes place after the central bargaining round at VW, 
additional payments were bargained for the agency workers who were employed at VW 
and its subsidiaries in order to (almost) close the gap between agency workers and 
standard workers (IG Metall Niedersachsen 17.12.2013; WC 25.04.2012; IG Metall 
Niedersachsen August 2009). 
 
In November 2012 the Charter of Agency Work was signed, which included measures 
on pay, the transition from agency contract to permanent contract at VW and training. 
First, after nine months of employment at VW, agency workers have the right to the 
same basic pay as VW core employees. Second, the works council negotiated special 
training provision for agency workers at VW, which runs parallel to the traditional 
vocational training.  The HR manager involved in the bargaining round reported that he 
 120 
 
“could not state the difference” between a traditional Ausbildung and this new form of 
training. Their market value will not be comparable, however, as agency workers with 
these qualifications will continue to be paid less than Facharbeiter (MGMT 
04.04.2013). Third, the agreement requires that agency workers are offered a permanent 
job position after 36 months of employment at VW – a year longer than the 24 months 
set by the last IG Metall agreement.  
 
There are distinct recruitment paths between agency workers, who are treated as 
unskilled workers, and skilled workers who did their vocational training at VW.  The 
hiring of agency workers depends on the economic situation, while the transition from a 
training position to a permanent position is required regardless of the economic 
situation. According to an HR manager, IG Metall and the works council pushed for the 
hiring of agency workers after three years – but always on the basis of individual 
performance and economic conditions (MGMT 04.04.2013). A works councillor 
himself distinguished between hiring trainees and agency workers:  
 
“I cannot draw any parallels. That would be fatal. On one side, there are skilled people, who are hired and 
trained.  On the other hand... there are the occasional economic dips, when VW is economically doing 
well.’ ‘If the day after tomorrow the model Golf A were to be produced and didn’t do as well on the 
market as expected, we would have a problem with hiring 5,000 agency workers. Everything depends on 
the economic conditions of VW.”(WC 25.04.2012) 
 
The works council recognises that the recent achievements in the bargaining round were 
facilitated by the good economic conditions of the company. However, it also is very 
confident of its bargaining power both thank to its strong connection to IG Metall, 
which dominates the works council, and to its close cooperation with the management. 
The Head of Management, Martin Winterkorn, is also a member of IG Metall. This 
triangular actors’ constellation at VW between the works council, the management and 
IG Metall sets its own agenda independently from the national union. A works 
councillor in Wolfsburg said that “…in principle VW is always a few steps ahead [of 
the national union]” (WC 25.04.2012). 
 
The works council does not interpret internal workforce segmentation as a sign of 
weakness. Rather, the model of the internal staff agencies is regarded as ideal because 
the works council is in a better position to keep agency work under control. Overall, at 
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VW in Wolfsburg, the workforce segmentation seems politically accepted by the works 
council, which also agreed on other segmentation measures beyond Autovision and 
WOB AG, as mentioned above. Further evidence of this stance is the presence of onsite 
subcontractors which are not covered by the same collective agreement as VW’s direct 
employees. An IG Metall official in Wolfsburg explains that there is “no overview of 
subcontracting, there are an incredible number” so that “the only person who knows 
[how many onsite subcontractors] is the gate keeper who can recognise who has a VW 
badge or not” (IG Metall official 24.09.2012).  
 
The works councils’ acceptance of the workforce segmentation through the projects 
Auto5000 and the Service Factory raised controversies within the IG Metall and the 
other automotive works councils too. For instance, a works council at BMW defined the 
Service Factory as “unacceptable” (WC 10.09.2012); Stephan Krull, who was a member 
of the VW works council  in Wolfsburg and of the IG Metall bargaining commission 
until 2006, wrote several articles criticising the “modernisation” concept behind the 
project Auto5000 (Krull 2007a; 2007b). The power constellation at VW is as 
controversial. The power of the VW works council was admired by other works 
councillors at Ford and BMW. However, the relationship between the management and 
the works council was also seen as controversial. The Ford works councils commented 
that “the world looks very different at VW because the headquarters is in Wolfsburg”, 
while having the headquarters in the US makes it easier for the Ford works council to 
keep the necessary (political) distance (WC-1 19.04.2012). A BMW works councillor 
specified that the difference between the VW and the BMW works council is that “they 
[at BMW] are not on first-name terms with each other” as is the case in Wolfsburg. 
Exactly the same critical expression regarding the political closeness of labour and 
management at VW was used by an anonymous union official in an article in the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (Süddeutsche Zeitung 19.05.2010).   
 
In addition, the newspaper  article already quoted in relation to BMW reports a similar 
impression:  
 
“The representative of workers does not only go to big events and motor shows together with the 
management board – he also speaks as if he were one of them. A few days ago, Osterloh [the Head of the 
general works council] explained that … [briefly: VW achieved its production goals and needs a new 
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production strategy until 2022]. Statements which usually come from a CEO” (author’s translation from 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 17.02.2013).    
 
 
5.4 Ford: Limited segmentation  
 
The use of agency work at the Ford plant in Cologne is limited and well regulated. The 
main explanatory factor is that works councils bargained an agreement setting strict 
quotas and equal pay before the Hartz reforms were passed. In addition, the works 
council has shown itself to be committed to and successful in maintaining a complex 
and encompassing internal labour market, which can be also explained through the 
presence of the top management in the US. The distinction between the general and the 
local management gives works council more freedom to bargain over the work 
organisation and prevents the formation of a close political front between the works 
council and the local management.  
 
Even though the unemployment rate in North-Rhine Westphalia even reached peaks of 
16-18% between 1995 and 2004 and was around 8% in 2012, it was not mentioned in 
the interviews as a factor building pressure on the works council (Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit 2000: 170; Stadt Köln 2004: 124; Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2012a: 182; Stadt 
Köln 2012: 10). This is probably because North Rhine Westphalia hosts many 
companies other than Ford, which is not the most important employer in the region. The 
pressure to agree on concession came mainly from outsourcing which has been taking 
place at Ford since the 1990s, as a works councillor describes here:  
 
“[the management said] this is not our core business, our core business is building cars […] But all the 
rest, where we get the seats, the blinkers or the wheels, who is in charge of repairing….it does not matter! 
If my machine stops working, I call the maintenance and they will repair it. Why should I have permanent 
Facharbeiter? … If we [the works council] had listened to the management five years ago, a decision 
would also have been taken to close the machine tool building and the maintenance unit” (WC-2 
19.04.2012) 
 
Still, the works council agreed on concessions in exchange for job security. In 1997 the 
works councils agreed on a reduction of “payments above collectively agreed wages” 
(übertarifliche Leistungen) and of overtime bonuses as well as on increased flexibility 
of working time (Schulten 1997c). In 2006, the works council accepted further pay cuts, 
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introduced a two-tier system for entrants and apprentices, and incorporated overtime 
into the system of working time accounts. In exchange, the management agreed not to 
dismiss any workers, initially until 2011 and later extended until 2021 (Stettes 2006; IG 
Metall Köln-Leverkusen 2014; Ford 10.06.2014). Furthermore, at the beginning of the 
2000s, a supplier park was created, which takes the components to the assembly line of 
the Ford plant through a tunnel. However, the works councils managed to keep “the 
most interesting jobs in-house”, to maintain industrial services under the same 
agreement and to avoid on-site subcontracting (WC-1 19.04.2012). Regarding the latter, 
the works council put in extra-effort, making sure that onsite subcontracting was not 
used as a substitution for agency work and forced the management to turn 
subcontractors into agency contracts, which could be better regulated:  
 
“We had a look at the subcontracting contracts and we asked: ‘Are these really subcontractors or are they 
‘hidden’ agency contracts?’…in this way, we got an additional 560-580 agency work contracts… they 
became visible. If I tell you: ‘I have my subcontracting contract with the company Schwitz and Müller’, 
‘Oh, nice, how much?’ ‘4 Million….’ Yeah, but you still do not know how many employees hide behind 
this contract. This is now more transparent” (WC-1 19.04.2012)35
 
 
The works council indeed regulated the use of agency work through a company-level 
agreement signed in 2003. According to the management, it was important for the 
works council not to have two types of workforce in the company so they at least agreed 
to have the same pay level (MGMT 07.08.2012). First, agency workers are to be paid in 
accordance with the rates laid down in the sectoral agreement for the metalworking 
industry. The Ford company-level agreements covering pensions, bonuses and other 
fringe benefits do not apply to agency workers. Second, agency workers (and also 
temporary workers) should be given priority at the end of their assignment if there are 
vacancies for permanent positions. Third, the agreement sets a relatively low quota of 
3%, which includes both agency and temporary work and applies only to direct 
production as no temporary workers are allowed in indirect production.  The quota was 
negotiated with a view to allowing the use of agency work only as replacement for 
workers on leave or in case of production peaks. It can be extended by 5% (to a 
maximum of 8%) during the period when a new vehicle model is being brought in and 
                                                 
35 The reliability of the information that the Ford plant does not have onsite subcontracting while the VW 
plant does has been confirmed by an article in Automotive Logistics (17.02.2014).  
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the old model is still in production. When two production lines are running parallel in 
this way, the company temporarily needs more staff.  
 
A works councillor is convinced that they would probably not have been able to achieve 
such an agreement after agency work was made ‘socially acceptable’ (salonfähig) 
thanks to the bargaining round between the DGB and the agencies’ associations (WC-1 
19.04.2012). The works council tackled the issue as soon as it “saw the problem 
coming” (Ford works councillor in Müller 2011). The early and active effort to regulate 
agency work reflects the commitment of the works council to maintain a dynamic 
internal labour market even at the cost of changing work arrangements for the stable 
core workforce. As mentioned above, the works council forbade on-site subcontracting 
and the use of agency work in indirect business units: This strategy was aimed at 
maintaining the integration of indirect activities such as repairing, maintenance and 
quality checks into direct production and at ensuring the promotion of young skilled 
workers employed at the assembly line to more specialised production units. The career 
ladder would be disrupted if the employment of temporary workers was allowed to any 
great extent, especially in indirect production.  
 
It is striking that, while the works council agreed to cut costs on the pre-existing and 
future stable workforce, agency work was not used as a ‘bargaining chip’. Indeed, a 
works councillor believes that there would be room to bargain for the acquisition of 
benefits for the core workforce in exchange for more and cheaper agency workers:  
 
“If I went to a company and said: ‘What do you think, the core workforce gets extra bonuses and you can 
use as many agency workers as you want’, we would all get €10,000. That’s obvious” (WC-2 
19.04.2012) 
 
However, another works councillor reports that the managerial proposals to change the 
arrangements regarding agency work do not impress him:  
 
“It is natural that some people from the finance department think that the company should pay agency 
workers the same lump sum that other companies pay them… I can live with that” (WC-1 19.04.2012) 
 
Thus, the Ford works council maintained its commitment even in the last bargaining 
round conducted under difficult economic conditions for the company. The works 
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council managed to achieve a job security agreement until 2021, agreeing on a three-
shift system in the motor building plant and on a flexible shift system in direct 
production. The agreements on the use of temporary work remained untouched (IG 
Metall Köln-Leverkusen 2014).  
 
The commitment to maintaining a complex and internal labour market is favoured by 
the political and geographical distance with the top management. According to a works 
councillor, Ford is different to BMW and VW because “the Headquarters is far away 
and the big boss doesn’t come all the time to see [what we are doing]”. This gives the 
works council more freedom to bargain with the local management regarding the 
organisation of work and management of the workforce as long as the company “makes 
the ends meet” (WC-2 19.04.2012). Furthermore, the differentiation between the top 
management in the US and the local German management prevents the formation of a 
united front between labour and management in the company. A works councillor 
explained that the works council exploits the pressure put in place by the top 
management on the local management to increase productivity and competitiveness. 
This pressure gives the works council the ability to set the conditions with the local 
management under which the productivity objectives are to be achieved  (WC-1 
19.04.2012). 
 
This section has illustrated the bargaining processes underlying different segmentation 
patterns between standard and agency workers across plants. Each case study 
highlighted the sources of labour power constraining labour's ability to bargain over 
segmentation: the sources of power were internal, such as the strength of workplace 
industrial relations; and also external, such as the unemployment rate, the political 
pressure of local authorities and the timing of the agreement on agency work in respect 
to the national labour market reforms. Works councils were found to be committed to a 
homogenous workforce to different extents, depending on their political proximity to 
the management and also on their ability to influence employers’ segmentation 
strategies. The next section compares and discusses the cases.  
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6 Discussion of findings  
 
This paper has explained the role of labour concerning the variation in the segmentation 
between standard and agency workers across four plants: BMW Leipzig, BMW 
Munich, Ford in Cologne and VW in Wolfsburg. At BMW in Leipzig 30% of the 
workforce consists of agency workers who work permanently in the plant and are 
employed also in skilled positions. In Munich 20% of the workforce in direct 
production consists of agency workers. While in both BMW plants an equal pay 
agreement has been in force since 2009, a loose and high quota of 12% to be achieved 
in 2015 was bargained in 2013 and there is not an automatic mechanism for the 
permanent hiring of agency workers yet. The Ford plant has a small periphery of agency 
workers, which is well regulated by means of quotas, equal pay and transition rules. At 
VW Wolfsburg, agency workers are hired through two internal staffing agencies, there 
are rules for progressively achieving equal pay, a loose quota of 5%, and transition rules 
were agreed upon between 2011 and 2012, which make the permanent hiring 
compulsory after 36 months of assignment. BMW-L represents an extreme case in 
terms of the segmentation between standard workers and agency workers. Ford, on the 
other side, is the plant where the employment and the working conditions of agency 
workers are best regulated. BMW-M and VW are mid-way cases with a large periphery 
of agency workers, which has been progressively and partly regulated over time.  
 
The comparison between BMW-L and the other plants highlights the influence of both 
workplace industrial relations and external conditions on labour's ability to regulate 
agency work. BMW-L and BMW-M offer a within-company comparison, which 
highlights the relevance of external and internal sources of power: Even though both 
plants belong to the same company and are characterised by similar production, BMW-
L is a greenfield site with lower union density while BMW-M is the headquarters and 
has a long tradition of bargaining with management. Furthermore, the high 
unemployment rate and the political pressure of local authorities in Leipzig when the 
plant was set up did not leave any room for bargaining to the works council and 
favoured the use of agency work for one third of the workforce, both in direct and in 
indirect production. In contrast, at BMW-M agency work is used only in direct 
production and the works council managed to progressively regulate the phenomenon 
and extend the agreements to other plants including BMW-L, even though it required 
the external intervention of IG Metall.  
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The comparison between BMW-L and VW highlights the importance of internal 
sources of power given similar external conditions: Both plants are in areas with high 
unemployment rates, and the HR strategies were formulated on the basis of the Hartz 
project to boost employment through agency work. These conditions favoured the 
creation of a model integrating agency work as a stable component of the workforce in 
both plants. However, the VW works council has more internal power resources 
available given the high union density and a strong tradition of collective bargaining 
with management. Thanks to its bargaining leverage at workplace level, the VW works 
council can progressively regulate the use of agency work, achieving a controlled 
segmentation model. Differently, BMW-L had to increase its bargaining leverage, 
building up conflict through external resources, by using local and national media and 
by bringing the management to the local labour court. Nevertheless, all agreements 
were achieved centrally by the works council in Munich.  
 
The comparison between Ford and the BMW-M and VW plants clearly illustrates the 
key role of external sources of power given the comparable strength of industrial 
relations in the workplace. As the Ford works council bargained the agreement before 
the Hartz reforms were passed, the works council has an even better regulation of 
agency work than the VW plant in Wolfsburg, which enjoys more power at workplace 
level. Despite the high unionisation and the traditions of social partnership and 
collective bargaining, the BMW-M works council and the VW works council could not 
filter out, but rather only moderate, the pressure for liberalisation due to labour market 
deregulation at national level.  
 
Works councils were found to draw on different power resources in each case, which 
derived both from internal and external sources, and these power resources were found 
to be necessary for achieving some regulation regarding agency work. Still, labour 
commitment to a homogeneous workforce constituted a fundamental condition to the 
bargaining of encompassing agreements for contingent workers. BMW-L did not have 
enough power resources to bargain, so the works council’s strategy is not relevant to 
explain the outcomes. However, the works councils at VW and BMW-M could draw on 
different power resources but were not committed to a homogeneous workforce even 
though the strategy of the BMW-M works council relatively shifted towards more 
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inclusiveness. Finally, the Ford works council was powerful and had an inclusive 
strategy towards contingent workers, achieving the most comprehensive agreement.  
The following comparison between VW, BMW-M and Ford shows that works councils 
varied in their commitment to a homogenous workforce and this variation was 
associated with the political proximity between works councils and management and on 
the works councils' ability to influence employers’ segmentation strategies.  
 
The VW works council in Wolfsburg agreed on other controversial “segmentation 
experiments” such as Auto5000 and the Service Factory and had the closest relationship 
with the management among the three plants. Furthermore, there is little distinction 
between the politics of IG Metall in Wolfsburg and the VW works council, which also 
contributes to the proximity between labour and management. Indeed, the union control 
over the works council traditionally represents a counterbalance to the company-
oriented logic of the latter as the union agenda is usually independent from the works 
council’s one (Müller-Jentsch 1995).  
 
The BMW-M works council also has a cooperative relationship with the management 
but still differs from VW in Wolfsburg. The BMW-M works council has shown more 
commitment to a homogeneous workforce by forbidding onsite subcontracting and 
differentiated agreements for industrial services. Furthermore, works councillors 
perceived more political distance between them and the management than at VW and 
found some “segmentation initiatives” at VW politically controversial. However, the 
works council has also accepted the use of agency work in direct production since the 
nineties, even though at lower rates than in the post-Hartz period. Furthermore, the 
Head of the Works Council is very close to the management, and its statements 
regarding agency work do not reveal a solidaristic attitude towards agency workers. 
Thus, the changing attitude of the works council for regulating agency work seems to be 
due more to a less favourable balance of power rather than to a greater political distance 
between management and works council compared to the VW plant. The shifting 
strategy of the works council is due to its growing awareness that its ability to control 
employers’ segmentation strategies, which might threaten its power, is limited. Indeed, 
the works council at BMW-M still needed the mobilisation potential of the local IG 
Metall to achieve an agreement on agency work and has not been successful so far in 
limiting the use of agency work.  
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The Ford works council offers a clearer example of a different attitude towards the 
segmentation of the workforce compared to BMW-M and VW. Its efforts to maintain a 
homogeneous workforce were revealed by the measures undertaken to avoid onsite 
subcontracting and by explicitly limiting the use of agency work to direct production 
and only if the temporary vacancies could not be covered through staff re-allocation. 
The commitment to an encompassing internal labour market probably also led the 
works council to regulate temporary work as soon as the discussion about labour market 
reforms started. This commitment to a homogeneous workforce was favoured by the 
geographical distance of the top management, which gave the works council more 
freedom for bargaining; and also by the opportunity to exploit fractures between the US 
management and the local management to achieve its bargaining goals rather than 
entering a coalition of interests with the local management.  
 
The table below summarises the findings: 
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Table 13: Summary of findings  
  BMW-L BMW-M Ford VW 
Strength of IR Union density 65% 90% 85% 95% 
Unionisation of 
WCs 
90% 87% 94% 
External 
factors 
Unemployment 
(beginning 
2000s) 
18% 5% 9% 12-18% 
Hartz reforms HR strategy 
developed on 
the basis of 
the Hartz 
reforms 
Regulation of 
agency work 
post-Hartz 
Regulation of 
agency work 
pre-Hartz 
‘Hartz model’ 
before the 
reform 
External 
power 
resources  
Union support 
perceived as 
late; Media 
pressure, legal 
procedures 
against the 
MGMT 
IG Metall 
intervention 
during the 
bargaining 
round 
Not required Not required 
WC strategy Attitude to 
segmentation 
- Partial 
acceptance 
Refusal  Acceptance 
WC – 
Management - 
Union 
- Close 
cooperation 
between the 
Head of 
Works 
Council and 
MGMT/IG 
Metall as 
external actor  
Distanced 
cooperation 
between 
works council 
and 
MGMT/IG 
Metall as 
external actor 
Close 
cooperation 
WC-MGMT-
IG Metall  
Combination of strategy and 
power 
Confrontatio
nal strategy, 
relying on 
external 
resources 
Cooperative 
and  reactive 
strategy, 
partly relying 
on external 
resources 
Cooperative 
and proactive 
strategy, 
relying on 
internal 
resources 
Cooperative 
and reactive 
strategy, 
relying on 
internal 
resources 
Regulation Quotas 12% on the whole workforce 
to be achieved by 2015 
3% in direct 
production, 
not in indirect 
production 
5%  on the 
whole 
workforce 
Equal pay Yes (2009) Yes (2003) Yes (2011) 
Transition to 
permanent 
position 
Not yet (IG Metall agreement 
applies) 
Yes (2003) 
and  IG 
Metall 
agreement 
Yes (2012) 
but longer 
than in IG 
Metall 
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applies agreement 
Agency work % on the 
workforce 
30% overall 
 
30-40% in 
direct 
production 
3-5% in direct 
production 
20% in direct 
production 
Staff agencies i.a. Randstadt i.a. 
Manpower 
i.a. Adecco Internal 
agencies: 
Autovision, 
WOB AG 
Tasks All levels, 
also in 
qualified 
positions 
Easiest tasks Easiest tasks Easiest tasks 
Segmentation 
model 
 Uncontrolled 
segmentation 
Semi-
controlled 
segmentation 
Limited 
segmentation  
Institutionalis
ed 
segmentation 
 
 
Overall, the cases can be fully explained by considering the interaction between labour 
power –rooted in internal and external sources – and labour attitudes towards workforce 
segmentation. The findings have different implications for theory. They further the 
evidence provided by existing studies on labour market segmentation confirming that 
the presence of strong industrial relations at the workplace can make all the difference 
when plants are experiencing similar pressures from the external context, as suggested 
by the comparison between BMW-L and VW-Wolfsburg (Doellgast 2008; Doellgast 
2010; Gautiè and Schmitt 2010). However, they also show that, even though workplace 
bargaining institutions are instrumental, it has become increasingly difficult for them to 
filter the external pressure for the progressive marketisation of labour relations (as also 
noted by Hancké 2000; Doellgast and Greer 2007; Holst 2013). Similar to the literature 
on workplace restructuring (Locke 1992; Frost 2000; Pulignano and Stewart 2012), the 
present paper shows that the socio-economic and political context of the company/plant 
constrains labour strategies in regard to workers’ segmentation at workplace level.  
 
The emphasis on the hostile external environment casts new light on the nature of 
workplace cross-class coalitions, through which labour actors contribute to the 
marginalisation of contingent workers (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). As 
external factors dramatically constrained labour bargaining power, it seems too 
simplistic to explain the segmentation between standard workers and agency workers 
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through works councils’ pro-insider preferences – the case of BMW-L is paradigmatic 
in this regard.  
 
Furthermore, the findings suggest a more nuanced and differentiated picture than the 
insider-outsider literature and the revitalisation literature offer. First, works councils 
might shift their strategies when they are unable to control employers’ use of agency 
work, as the BMW-M works council did. Therefore, it is important to consider the 
interplay between strategies and power for explaining labour's role in determining 
segmentation in the workplace (MacKenzie 2009; Pulignano and Doerflinger 2013). 
Second, the works councils’ attitude towards segmentation has been found to vary 
across cases, and these differences were found to be decisive for explaining a proactive 
strategy of the works council, aimed at achieving encompassing agreements for agency 
workers. Works councils' commitments to a homogeneous workforce was associated 
with different degrees of political closeness to the management, confirming the findings 
of Nienhüser (2005) that less cooperative works councils bargain more in regard to 
workplace regulations.  
 
Finally, the findings have also shown that labour can use external sources of power to 
regulate segmentation at workplace level, strengthening the point that the segmentation 
literature should look at the wider context of the plant for understanding labour’s role in 
workplace segmentation as suggested by the studies on unions in workplace 
restructuring by Locke (1992), Lévesque and Murray (2005) and Pulignano and Stewart 
(2012). In particular, the findings have shown that works councils can partly re-build 
their power in the workplace by using external resources.  
 
 
7 Conclusion: Limitations and further research  
This paper has investigated the role of labour in defining different segmentation models 
between standard workers and contingent workers. Overall, the paper argues that, in the 
case studies, labour power – rooted in internal industrial relations and conditions 
external to the company – was necessary for labour to regulate agency work, at least to 
some extent. However, labour power needed to be combined with works councils’ 
commitment to a homogeneous workforce for achieving encompassing agreements. 
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Given the limited number of case studies, the present paper cannot make general claims 
about the interplay between labour power and strategies. However, Benassi and Vlandas 
(2013) have found a similar causal path in their fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) on union strategies towards agency workers across 15 European 
countries: Their findings suggest that a certain level of bargaining power combined with 
a working-class orientation of national unions represent INUS conditions
36
 to inclusive 
agreements for agency workers. 
 
Further research is not only needed for improving the generalisability of the findings but 
also for building a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding the role of 
labour in determining segmentation patterns at workplace level. This paper points 
towards this research direction
 
by bringing the insights of the literature on unions’ 
involvement in workplace change (Eaton 1990; Frost 2000) into the segmentation 
literature (Grimshaw, Ward et al. 2001; Rubery 2007).   
 
Finally, the paper has also provided new evidence to a growing body of research, which 
only recently started looking at the effect of liberalisation at national level on 
employment relations in the workplace (Doellgast 2009; Lillie 2012; Greer, Schulten et 
al. 2013). In line with this literature, the present paper has suggested that labour and 
management dynamics are now particularly affected by external liberalisation pressures 
and invites future research on workplace industrial relations to take them into account.    
 
                                                 
36
 INUS conditions are “Insufficient but Necessary parts of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but 
Sufficient” (Mackie 1965).  
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Paper 3 
 
 
 
STRAIGHT TO THE CORE – EXPLAINING UNION RESPONSES TO 
THE CASUALISATION OF WORK. THE IG METALL CAMPAIGN 
FOR AGENCY WORKERS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The existing literature provides different accounts on the strategies of unions regarding 
marginal workers. It has been argued that under increasing labour market segmentation 
unions have either to prioritise their core constituencies and to seek compromises with 
management; or to adopt inclusive strategies towards peripheral workers to 
counterbalance eroding bargaining power. This paper shows that both strategies 
represent equally viable options to protect the interests of unions’ core members. The 
strategic choice depends on the (perceived) competition between core and peripheral 
employees related to employers’ personnel strategies; this affects the possible alignment 
of interests between unions’ core members on the one hand, and either management or 
peripheral employees on the other. Our historical analysis of union strategies towards 
agency workers in the German metal sector illustrates this mechanism, and identifies 
institutional change towards liberalisation as the trigger for aggressive segmentation 
strategies by employers and for inclusive union strategies. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Temporary, precarious and low-wage work has been growing in Western political 
economies over the last thirty years (Houseman and Osawa 2003; Gautiè and Schmitt 
2010). This phenomenon has challenged the ability of traditional class actors such as 
trade unions to represent workers (Gumbrell-McCormick 2011). A broad body of 
literature has pointed out the factors which make the union representation of contingent 
workers difficult, such as the heterogeneity and vulnerability of these workers and their 
dispersion along the value chain (i.a. MacKenzie 2009; Doellgast 2012; Holtgrewe and 
Doellgast 2012). Still, a controversial research issue remains the willingness of unions 
to engage in the representation of contingent workers.  
 
The dualisation literature claims that unions contribute to the labour market 
marginalisation of contingent workers. Under increasing economic pressure, unions are 
supposed to use contingent workers as a buffer in order to protect their core 
constituencies from market fluctuations and cost-cutting pressure (Palier and Thelen 
2010; Hassel 2014). Theories of union revitalisation argue that unions increasingly seek 
to recruit contingent workers and bargain on their behalf. Their inclusion has been 
interpreted as a reaction to an increasingly hostile environment for labour. In order to 
regain bargaining power, unions strengthen their recruiting and mobilisation efforts 
(Frege and Kelly 2004; Greer 2008a; Turner 2009). 
 
While these contradictory perspectives have often been set up as a debate (Clegg, 
Graziano et al. 2010), some authors have framed them as a dilemma unions face in dual 
labour markets (Goldthorpe 1984; Olsen 2005). Goldthorpe (1984) argued that both 
inclusion and exclusion are viable strategies for unions to maintain their labour market 
power: Confronted with employers' segmentation strategies, unions can “strive to 
uphold class orientation, which must entail as far as possible opposing dualism” or they 
can “accept dualism and fall back on the defense of the specific sectional interests of 
their enrolled members, in the hope that these interests may be then as much protected 
as undermined by dualism through the “shock absorber” function that the secondary-
workforce performs” (p. 339). 
 
 136 
 
Still, little research exists on the conditions under which unions decide to undertake the 
one or the other strategy. Ultimately, this decision relates to the issues of how unions 
define their boundaries and constituencies. This paper argues that the inclusion of 
peripheral workers into unions depends on the changing perception of potential 
alignment of interests between the union and its core members, on one hand, and either 
management or peripheral employees, on the other. Segmentation can provide mutual 
benefits to employers and core workers because it allows cutting productions costs, 
while protecting the core workforce. Thus, unions and employers may potentially enter 
a coalition of interests that excludes marginal workers. Alternatively, however, 
segmentation may also threaten core workers through increasing competition with the 
peripheral workforce. This makes the interests of core union members more 
interdependent with peripheral workers, while those of core workers and management 
progressively diverge. This study identifies institutional change towards liberalisation in 
the labour market as an important condition for unions’ strategic re-orientation, as it 
reconfigures the constraints and opportunities for actors. Labour market liberalisation 
lifts constraints to employer discretion (Baccaro and Howell 2011: 527), who can adopt 
more aggressive segmentation strategies threatening unions’ power and collectively 
agreed standards for the core workforce.  
 
This paper illustrates this argument through a historical analysis of how the German 
metalworkers' union IG Metall has approached the issue of agency workers. This form 
of contingent work has become quantitatively and qualitatively important in Germany 
during the last ten years, reaching the peak of almost one million workers in 2011 - one 
fifth of which are concentrated in metal occupations (Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2013: 
8-12). The case of IG Metall is critical because German unions, especially in export 
manufacturing sectors, are often argued to focus on their core constituencies (Palier and 
Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). However, since 2007, IG Metall has been running a 
campaign aimed at recruiting agency workers and promoting their equal treatment and 
pay. Moreover, agency work was a central issue in the most recent bargaining rounds, 
which reduced the wage gap between agency and standard workers and set rules for 
their permanent hiring. 
 
The progressive opening of IG Metall boundaries to contingent workers points to a re-
definition of union’s constituencies. This paper will show that the catalyst for this 
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strategic re-orientation was institutional change conducted through the reform of the 
Temporary Employment Act in 2003 which deregulated the use of agency work. The 
union’s inclusion of agency workers was a reaction to the resulting threat to the working 
conditions of union members posed by employers’ increasing use of “peripheral” 
workers. The findings demonstrate that actors' perceptions regarding the impact of 
institutional change are important for their strategic responses – in this case, how unions 
draw their organisational boundaries.  
 
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section discusses the literature on the definition 
of union representation domain and the third section illustrates the framework used to 
analyse changing union strategies towards contingent workers. After the fourth section 
on the methodology, the fifth section illustrates how employers’ strategies changed after 
the Hartz reforms. The sixth section  follows the evolving IG Metall  strategies towards 
agency workers from the Seventies until 2012. The seventh section discusses the 
findings and concludes.    
 
 
2 Constructing union boundaries in segmented labour markets: employee 
identities, interests and institutions in Germany 
 
Goldthorpe (1984) illustrates the dilemma unions face in segmented labour markets 
regarding whether to focus on their core constituencies or organise and represent the 
peripheral workforce in order to maintain their labour market power (p. 349). This 
dilemma regards the issue of how unions set their boundaries. Unions define their 
representation domain according to principles of inclusion, which constitute also 
elements of distinction and exclusion of other workers (Hyman 1996: 55). Different 
factors influence union boundaries, including product markets (Commons 1909), skills 
and tasks (Cappelli and Sherer 1989), identities (Herrigel 1993; Hyman 2001) and 
national institutions of labour markets and industrial relations (Streeck 1993; 
Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999). This paper investigates the interplay between union 
identities and institutions on the definition of union boundaries (see also Hyman 2001; 
Frege and Kelly 2003).  
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Unions have developed on the basis of salient individual and collective identities among 
employees (Herrigel 1993; Streeck 1993), following the unions’ “perception of special 
interests within the general interest of (labour) as a class” (Schmitter and Streeck 1999: 
55). The prevalence of one identity over another is associated with particular types of 
organisational form. For instance, a working-class identity relies on an understanding of 
contrasting interests between labour and capital, and is associated with industrial 
unionism. Industrial unions vertically organise workers and pursue solidaristic policies 
for reducing status and occupational differences; one of their leading principles is 
“equal pay for equal work” (Jackson 2009: 72). By contrast, enterprise unions emerge 
when the identity of the workers is attached to their company and its economic success, 
and the unions are mainly focused on the companies’ core workforce. Thus, they 
cooperate with the management in order to pursue their common interests within the 
company (Streeck 1993: 42ff.). Unions never perfectly reflect one form of unionism – 
such as the above mentioned industrial and enterprise unionism or the craft unions; 
rather, they are caught in a tension among these types and the form they take varies 
according to changes in the external environment and the issues at stake (Hyman 2001: 
1-5). 
 
Unions’ organisational domain is also shaped by institutions. Institutions define the 
structure of opportunities and constraints in which union organisations formulate their 
strategic choices and interact with other actors, such as employers and the state. 
Institutions “influence the success of different forms of union organisation,” favoring 
the persistence of one over the other (Jackson 2009: 72). Institutions and identities have 
historically developed together and mutually influence each other. Institutions do not 
just favor particular types of interests, but are themselves the product of actors’ 
interactions and struggles that have shaped their existing identities. Conversely, 
institutions are a context where unions formulate their interests and channel the 
expectations of their members – in other words, where unions form their identities as 
organisations. Given their close interconnection, institutional change affects the 
prevalence of one union identity over the other, and, ultimately, also unions’ 
representation domain.  
 
The weakening of industrial unionism and the erosion of the solidaristic wage policies 
in Germany illustrates this connection between institutional change and identity. 
 139 
 
German unions and collective bargaining institutions have historically represented 
workers vertically within an industry and supported a homogenous wage distribution. 
However, the German labour movement has always been characterised by a tension 
between its industrial and enterprise identity (Streeck 1993) as a result of the dual 
system of interest representation that encompasses both industrial unions organised 
across broad industrial sectors and works councils with codetermination rights at 
company-level. In the 1970s and 1980s, capillary union presence enabled the control 
over works councils; the unions’ bargaining agenda reflected their working-class 
identity, which aimed at sharing productivity increases across sectors, reducing inter-
establishment and inter-sectoral wage dispersion (Müller-Jentsch 1995; Streeck 1997).  
 
Since the 1990s, these industrial relations institutions have become less inclusive and 
inequality has risen. Union density and bargaining coverage have declined, collective 
bargaining institutions have become increasingly decentralised and fragmented, and 
contingent work has expanded (Hassel 1999; Artus 2001; Doellgast and Greer 2007). 
Fragmented bargaining and the increasing competitive pressures have opened up 
opportunities for the expression of particularistic interests of company-level or even 
establishment-level worker interests, thus emphasising intra-class conflicts (Rehder 
2003; Doellgast 2009).  
 
The dualisation literature has argued that these developments reflect company-level 
cooperation between employers and core workers (represented by their works councils), 
which relies on their common interest of enhancing the company’s competitiveness. 
These cross-class coalitions support cost-cutting and flexibility measures, but limit 
these strategies to the service periphery, while preserving the standards for core workers 
(Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). Thereby, works councils have distanced 
themselves from the broader agenda of industrial unions; instead, works councils in core 
industries have increasingly supported plant-level cooperation and gained political 
weight within the labour movement (Hassel 2014: 65). Reframing the analysis of the 
dualisation literature in the terms of this paper, unions seem to have abandoned a 
broader understanding of working-class solidarity typical of industrial unionism, and 
moved to an enterprise model of interest representation that excludes the peripheral 
workforce.  
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On the other hand, a growing literature emphasising the revitalisation perspective has 
shown that the erosion of industrial relations has opened up new opportunities for 
employers to circumvent collectively agreed standards, undermining unions’ bargaining 
power (Doellgast, Batt et al. 2009). As a consequence, German unions have 
increasingly targeted marginal workforce groups through campaign and bargaining 
initiatives. The inclusion of new workforce groups and the adoption of social-movement 
style strategies aim at revitalising the existing institutions and at rebuilding conflict 
potential towards employers (Greer 2008a; Turner 2009; Vandaele and Leschke 2010). 
In this framework, the interests between management and core unions are conflicting, 
and a cross-class coalition does not represent a viable option because the existing 
institutions do not support the balance of power between the parties. Instead of 
collaborating with the management, unions need to open their boundaries to new 
workforce groups, re-emphasising their identity as industrial unions. 
 
 
3 Analytical framework: Explaining changing strategies towards contingent 
workers  
 
The accounts of unions’ strategies towards peripheral workers in Germany are mixed 
and contradictory, revealing the incompleteness of the present theoretical accounts. 
While the dualisation literature is unable to account for new recruitment strategies 
towards marginal employees, the revitalisation literature falls short in explaining why 
unions continue supporting existing social partnership institutions in times of labour 
decline and accept political compromises with management. 
 
The paper’s framework does not present these strategies as alternatives, but rather as 
equally viable responses to increasing labour market segmentation. This paper 
conceptualises unions’ strategic options in regard to contingent workers on a continuum 
ranging from exclusion, to subordination, and finally to inclusion. Our 
conceptualisation follows Heery’s typology of union strategies towards contingent 
workers. Heery’s framework (2009) encompasses both internal representation, which 
refers to the recruitment of contingent workers into the union, and external 
representation of contingent worker interests into the bargaining agenda at workplace, 
sectoral and national level. An exclusive attitude is associated with policies aimed at 
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removing contingent work from the labour market - either through legislation or 
bargaining – and refusal to organise and support agency workers. Subordinated 
representation implies the acceptance of contingent workers on the labour market and as 
union members, even though the representation of their interests is subordinated to their 
core constituencies. Finally, the attempts to recruit contingent workers and policies 
aiming at their equal pay and treatment reflect the adoption of an inclusive strategy (pp. 
430ff.). 
 
The paper claims that subordinated representation and inclusion are both strategies 
which can help unions to secure their institutional and organisational power resources 
when these are declining. It argues that the strategic choice depends on unions’ 
perception of potential alignment of interests between those of core workers with either 
management or peripheral employees. If the power resources deriving from past 
institutions are still available even in the face of erosion, unions are likely to adopt a 
subordinated model of representation and respond to these pressures by trying to 
strengthen cooperation with management. Even if at the expense of broader working-
class solidarities, the perception of labour movement weakness makes alliances with the 
management more attractive. Unions will not seek to represent new workforce segments 
as long as the negative consequences of eroding bargaining power can be externalised to 
the peripheral workforce. 
 
However, unions’ perceptions regarding the function of the peripheral workforce are 
likely to change with the increase of contingent work. Unions will perceive contingent 
work as a threat to the interests of core employees and as a managerial attempt to 
undermine collectively agreed standards. Under these conditions, unions regard the 
interests of employers and core workers as increasingly diverging, and those of core and 
peripheral workers as interdependent. Thus, unions are likely to abandon their 
cooperative approach with the management and to pursue instead broad working-class 
interests. They enlarge their representation domain and try to increase their bargaining 
leverage through membership mobilisation and campaigning.  
 
Besides the content of union strategies, the level of conflict also signals the shifting 
alliance of interests: Coalition strategies with the management, based on a narrow 
understanding of workers’ interests, tend to be cooperative. Strategies pursuing broad 
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working-class interests are associated with high levels of conflict with the management 
– for example membership mobilisation and campaigns.  
 
In this analysis institutions are crucial because they define the structure of opportunities 
and constraints in which the interest alignment takes place. The liberalisation of 
industrial relations and labour market institutions lifts constraints on employer 
discretion (Baccaro and Howell 2011: 527), allows the growth of contingent work and 
undermines employers' incentives to rely on cooperation with core workers. As 
liberalisation progresses, unions are likely to shift from an enterprise union logic, 
characterised by cooperation with the management, to a more confrontational industrial 
logic. The paper shows that the unions’ perception whether their interests are aligned 
with employers or peripheral workers mediates the causal relationship between 
declining institutional power resources and union strategies.  
 
As section two illustrates, German industrial relations have been eroding over the last 
twenty years. However, this paper identifies in the labour market reforms in 2003– the 
so called Hartz reforms - the trigger of IG Metall’s inclusive strategies towards agency 
workers. While the Hartz reforms have often been interpreted as instrument of 
flexibilisation at the margins, the fifth section (following the fourth section on the 
methodology) shows that they changed employers’ use of agency work, putting the core 
workforce under pressure (see also Eichhorst and Marx 2011). The sixth section 
illustrates how this influenced IG Metall strategies towards agency workers.  
 
 
4 Methods 
 
The empirical analysis relies on multiple data sources. The data on employers’ use of 
agency work rely on research reports of IG Metall and of the Hans Böckler Foundation, 
on works councils’ surveys, and on the statistics of the German Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and of the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB).  
 
The analysis of changing perceptions and strategies within IG Metall covers a forty-year 
period between 1972 and 2012. The empirical evidence on union’s strategies until 
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beginning 2000s mainly relies on secondary literature and on IG Metall internal 
material.  More recent empirical evidence is based on the IG Metall surveys conducted 
on work councillors and union representatives, the resolutions of union congresses, 
position statements and internal magazines. Furthermore, eight semi-structured 
interviews with DGB and IG Metall officials at the national and federal level were 
conducted both by phone and in person between July 2011 and September 2012. Our 
interview partners were identified through snowball sampling and were involved in the 
campaigns and in the bargaining rounds on agency work.  
 
 
5 The Hartz reforms as a turning point for the use of agency work  
 
In 1972 the Temporary Employment Act allowed the use of agency work in Germany, 
which has been progressively deregulated over the last twenty years. The duration of 
assignments was extended from a maximum of three months in 1972 to 24 months in 
2002. While companies were not allowed to re-hire the same agency workers on agency 
contracts, a legal provision introduced a one-time exception in 1997. The principle of 
equal pay was amended in 2002, introducing equal pay only after completing 12 months 
of assignment (Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2013: 5). 
 
The labour market reforms in 2003 represented a turning point for the use of agency 
work as they fully deregulated it. They lifted any limitation to re-hiring agency workers 
on agency contracts and to the duration of their assignment. They lowered dismissal 
protection for agency workers as they allowed the staffing agencies to employ workers 
on contracts of the same duration as their assignment at the hiring company. 
Additionally, since 2003 companies do not need to specify the reason for hiring agency 
workers. The reforms also re-introduced the application of the equal pay principle from 
the first day of assignment unless specified otherwise by collective agreement 
(Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2013: 5). 
 
This exception clause opened up opportunities to circumvent the principle of equal pay. 
To this aim, staff agencies were willing to bargain a collective agreement – which is 
applied now by more than 90% of the agencies–, and negotiations between the 
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employers’ association and the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) started 
immediately after the Hartz reforms were passed (Vitols 2008: 197ff.). The DGB set up 
a special bargaining body, which substituted the sectoral unions in the negotiations with 
the two main agencies’ associations. However, a third agencies’ association started 
bargaining with the Christian Federation of Trade Unions
37
, breaking up the traditional 
monopoly of DGB unions (Dribbusch and Birke 2012: 6). The collective agreement of 
the Christian trade unions set low wages and working conditions. Furthermore, the 
presence of another union and employers’ association weakened the bargaining power 
of DGB unions as it represented for the agencies an exit option from the DGB collective 
agreement. Eventually, the DGB body signed a collective agreement with the two 
biggest employers’ associations, which reflected the poor outcomes of the Christian 
unions’ agreement. As a result, the pay differential between an agency worker and a 
regular employee in the metal sector was between 30 and 40% in 2009 (Weinkopf 
2009b). As hiring companies pay agency fees, the labour costs are higher than the actual 
wages for agency workers. However, low wages and the absence of a flexibility bonus – 
provided for instance by French collective agreements– contribute to maintain the costs 
under the level of standard workers. Moreover, employers do not have to factor in the 
“shadow costs” of dismissal when they hire agency workers (Holst, Nachtwey et al. 
2010: 110; Seifert 2011: 76).  
 
As Figure 1 shows, agency work dramatically increased after the Hartz reforms. While 
agency workers amounted to 328,000 in 2003, their number exceeded 700,000 in 2007. 
Due to the economic crisis in 2008-9, it sharply decreased by 100,000 jobs, but two 
years later it reached the peak of over 900,000. The rate of agency workers on the whole 
workforce more than doubled between 2004 and 2011, rising from 1.3% to 2.9% 
(Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2013: 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 The Christian unions are renowned for undermining DGB collective agreements, and the special body 
of the Christian Unions on agency work has been declared as unable to bargain collective agreements 
since 2003 through the rulings of the Berlin Labour Court and Federal Labour Court in 2011. 
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Figure 7: Development of agency work in Germany (1997-2011) 
 
 
Source: (Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2012b) 
 
 
 
Regarding the sectoral distribution, in 2012 21% of agency workers were employed in 
the metal sector (Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2013: 12), making up 5.3% of the sectoral 
workforce (Gesamtmetall 2012). After the Hartz reforms, the use of agency work has 
not only increased but also changed its original function of filling in short-term gaps in 
the workforce. Employers traditionally hired agency workers in response to seasonal 
production peaks or in substitution for workers on holidays or maternity and sick leave. 
Thus, short contract tenure and fluctuations due to seasonal cycles characterise this use 
of agency work (Seifert and Brehmer 2008: 337). However, data show that contract 
tenure has extended over time: In 2002, 44% of agency workers had a contract longer 
than three months, while ten years later the figure rose to 54% (Bundesagentur  für 
Arbeit 2013: 18). Moreover, seasonal productive cycles cannot explain the increasing 
trend, especially since 2003. 
 
In Germany, agency work has often been presented as a stepping stone in the labour 
market, especially for unemployed people (Hayen 2005: 9; Vitols 2008: 144). However, 
data on the transition from an agency contract to a permanent position do not fully 
support this claim. According to the dataset on individual employment histories of the 
IAB, the transition rate to a permanent contract for individuals who worked in a 
permanent position for 180 days before getting an agency contract is less than 20%, 
while 42% remain employed as agency workers. More than half of individuals 
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employed as agency workers 180 days before the survey date were still hired on an 
agency contract three months later (Crimmann, Ziegler et al. 2009: 86). According to a 
survey conducted among works councils in the metal sector in 2007, 16% of the 
companies had not hired any agency worker on a permanent basis in the previous two 
years, and almost half of the works councils claimed that only 5% of agency workers 
were hired on standard contracts after their assignment (Wassermann and Rudolph 
2007: 12). 
 
The flexibilisation of the employment relationship affects also the new hires. According 
to an IG Metall survey which was conducted among more than 5,000 works councils in 
2010, the majority of new hires had a temporary agency contract in 43% of the 
companies, while they were offered open-end contracts only in 15% of the companies. 
One fifth of the works councils reported that their companies substituted the job 
positions lost during the crisis in 2008-09 through agency contracts (IG Metall 2010). In 
support of this evidence, the Federal Government's 10th Report on Agency Work 
reports that “considering the growth of agency work, it has to be said that these are not 
always new jobs. Particularly in big firms there are trends indicating the substitution of 
stable workers through agency work” (10th Report on Agency Work  IG Metall 2007a: 
16) Also the high percentages of agency workers in some companies suggest that 
standard positions were substituted by agency contracts. Bellmann and Kühl (2007) 
analysed the IAB establishment-level panel data, showing that the use of agency work 
changed: While the percentage of companies using up to 5% of agency workers on the 
total workforce decreased from 65% to 54% between 1998 and 2006, the number of 
companies making an intensive use of agency workers (over 20%) more than doubled, 
increasing from 4.8% to 10.4% (p. 32). 
 
Agency work has been expanding also in workforce segments characterised by middle 
and high skills. Agency workers are still more likely to be employed for easy and 
standardised tasks such as at the assembly line or in logistics (Gesamtmetall 2010). 
However, recent studies have shown that agency workers are hired also in skilled 
positions and even at the engineering level (Bromberg, 2011; Dudenhöffer & Büttner, 
2006: 32ff.). A survey of the metal employers’ association Gesamtmetall confirms that 
in 2010 73% of metal companies had agency workers in production but 21% also 
employed them in Research & Development (Gesamtmetall 2010). Holst et al. (2010) 
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and Benassi (2013) found that agency workers in the automotive industry are hired at 
every qualification level in some companies, and have become a structural component 
of staff because the core workforce, reduced to its minimum, cannot satisfy the 
production requirements for normal demand. In this way, the management has built a 
“security net” for companies, which can quickly reduce personnel costs in case of 
economic downturns (Holst, Nachtwey et al. 2010: 110). 
 
Even though the evidence is fragmented, it suggests a change from a reactive use of 
agency work characterised by ad-hoc assignments to a more strategic use, making 
agency work a structural component of the workforce. The next section shows that the 
increasing use of agency work changed IG Metall’s perceptions of the phenomenon and 
therefore its strategies towards agency workers. 
 
 
6. IG Metall strategies towards agency workers 
 
Relying on Heery’s typology, we distinguish three phases in the strategy of IG Metall 
towards agency workers: exclusion, subordinated bargaining and inclusion. Given its 
dramatic effects on the use of agency work, we identify in the Hartz reforms the 
institutional change which triggered the re-definition of unions’ interests.  
 
 
6.1 First phase (1972-1996): Exclusion  
 
The refusal of agency work altogether characterises the first phase. Immediately after 
the Temporary Employment Act in 1972, the DGB publicly advocated a ban on agency 
work, which was introduced in its statute in 1981 (Hayen 2005: 9). In this phase, the 
initiatives of the unions focussed on lobbying political actors in order to re-introduce the 
ban against this form of employment instead of trying to regulate the sector (Vitols 
2008: 150). In the 1989 congress, IG Metall deliberated not to sign any collective 
agreement with staff agencies because that would have weakened the unions’ opposition 
to that form of “modern slave trade” (IG Metall 1992). This radical opposition to 
agency work had the consequence to leave agency workers unrepresented, as a former 
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IG Metall secretary in North-Rhine Westphalia explained: “For a long time we (the 
unions) have been of the firm opinion that agency work had to be banned and therefore 
we have not taken care of the issue” (Weigand cit. in Mulitze 2006). 
 
Also, IG Metall considered unrealistic to mobilise works councils and the core 
workforce for enforcing the ban at the plant-level given the low impact of agency work 
on the workforce in the hiring companies (Bode, Brose et al. 1994: 365; Aust, Pernicka 
et al. 2007: 243). In this first phase, IG Metall strategy was exclusive and characterised 
by a laissez-faire attitude. Around the mid-1990s, IG Metall realised that politics was 
never going to support the ban, and was instead progressively deregulating its legal 
framework. Thus, the request for the ban was cancelled from the DGB-statute in 1996 
(Wölfle 2008: 39).  
 
 
6.2 Second phase (1997-2006): Subordinated bargaining 
 
Given high unemployment levels at the end of the nineties, DGB unions started 
considering agency work as a useful instrument for re-integrating into the labour market 
marginalised groups such as elderly people or long-term unemployed. The DGB in 
North-Rhine Westphalia set up the staff agency “START”, which aimed at facilitating 
the transition into the labour market of those disadvantaged groups (Vitols 2008: 152). 
At the same time, unions and agencies signed collective agreements aimed at securing 
adequate working conditions to agency workers. Together with other unions, IG Metall 
bargained collective agreements with some major agencies, but the coverage was low 
and the wages of agency workers were below the salary levels of workers directly 
employed by the hiring company (Linne and Vogel 2003: 18; Weinkopf and Vanselow 
2008: 15). 
 
As unions considered agency work an instrument for job creation, they were more 
willing to accept its deregulation (Wölfle 2008: 39). In 2002, also under pressure from 
the Social-Democratic Party (Vitols 2008: 189-193), the DGB agreed to partly 
deregulate agency work under two conditions: equal pay should be applied and union 
bargaining power in the agency sector had to be guaranteed and strengthened by law 
(Aust, Pernicka et al. 2007: 244). The new legal provisions included both requests but 
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they also allowed the amendment of the equal pay principle by collective agreement. 
Still, even though the resulting collective agreement de facto abrogated equal pay, a 
union official at the DGB headquarter reported that the bargaining round was 
considered a success because the agency sector could be partly regulated (DGB official 
05.07.2011). 
 
Around the mid-2000s, most works councils had not engaged with agency workers and 
felt responsible only for the core workforce (Aust, Pernicka et al. 2007: 263). A works 
councils’ survey, which was conducted in 2007 in 80 companies with over 25% of 
agency workers on the workforce, reports that only 12% of the works councils had 
developed initiatives specific for agency workers such as special office hours or extra-
meetings (Wassermann and Rudolph 2007: 18). According to Promberger’s case-study 
analysis at plant level, works councils were not aware to have co-decisional rights 
regarding the motivation and the extent of the use of agency workers. Thus, they did not 
fully exploit their co-determination rights (Promberger 2006: 138ff.). IG Metall was 
also responsible for their lack of preparation because the union did not provide any 
specific training for works councils, “leaving them alone for years”, as a works 
councillor in a metal company said (Wassermann and Rudolph 2007: 9). 
 
There are several reasons for this passive attitude towards agency workers. The 
additional efforts required by their presence exceeded the capacities of many works 
councils. Even though the reform of the Works Constitution Act in 2001 established 
that agency workers could vote for works councils after three months of assignment in 
one firm, the size of works council is still calculated according to the number of 
permanent workers.
38
 This lack of staff resources led works councils to follow a strict 
interpretation of their representative mandate and to leave the issue of agency work to 
the union (Wassermann and Rudolph 2007: 26ff.). Furthermore, works councils were 
not concerned about the presence of agency workers. According to an IG Metall internal 
research project in the district of Berlin-Brandenburg-Saxony, 75% of the interviewed 
works councillors rejected the claim that agency work could undermine the working 
conditions of core workers (IG Metall study reported in Aust, Pernicka et al. 2007: 263). 
 
                                                 
38
 In March 2013 the Federal Labour Court decided in one case that agency workers should be counted in 
for determining the size of the works council. This decision is currently object of a lively debate and has 
not been translated into law yet.  
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Empirical studies conducted in the mid-2000s found that works councils understood 
agency work as an instrument for coping with employers’ flexibility needs without 
undermining the working conditions of core workers. According to the above 
mentioned IG Metall study, the majority of the interviewed works councillors suggested 
that the main function of agency workers was to secure core workers (IG Metall study 
reported in Aust, Pernicka et al. 2007: 263). In the works councils’ survey conducted by 
Wassermann and Rudolph, 43% of the works councillors agreed on using agency work 
as a flexibility buffer while only one out of four shared the DGB position of eliminating 
agency work. Only one out of three works councillors pursued equal pay and equal 
treatment as bargaining aims, and only 8% of the workplace agreements signed in those 
years contained equal pay provisions (Wassermann and Rudolph 2007: 15-24). The 
qualitative studies reported by Weinkopf and Vanselow show that works councils 
signed agreements shifting risks and costs from core to agency workers, strengthening 
the workforce segmentation within the company (Weinkopf and Vanselow 2008: 30). 
According to an evaluation of plant-level agreements of the Hans Böckler Foundation’s 
archive, the majority of these provisions regarded the organisation of work - such as 
holidays and shifts - and flexibility arrangements in terms of overtime and work during 
unsocial working hours. Most of the agreements included a maximum quota for agency 
workers, specifying that they should contribute to secure the standard workforce. They 
generally made reference to sectoral agreements for setting the pay and working 
conditions of agency workers (Zumbeck 2009: 15-40).  
 
In this phase, agency workers were not fully integrated into the IG Metall representative 
structure. The regulation of agency work was delegated to the DGB bargaining group 
and was exclusively focused on agencies, both for setting standards and for creating 
representation structures. IG Metall did not undertake initiatives in hiring companies 
and left the issue to the works councils, which subordinated its regulation to the 
interests of the core workforce and accepted managerial cost-cutting strategies at the 
periphery. Agency workers’ representation can be described as subordinated and the 
first attempts to bargain on their behalf did not raise any major conflicts with 
employers. 
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6.3 Changing perspectives on agency work 
 
After the Hartz reforms, works councillors, core workers, and IG Metall started 
perceiving agency work as an attempt of “conscious creation of cheap workforce” (IG 
Metall 2007a: 23). IG Metall portrayed the use of agency work as a strategy for 
weakening collective agreements and workers’ representation and for circumventing 
dismissal protection. According to the IG Metall former vice-secretary
39
 Detlef Wetzel, 
“while agency work in the past has been an instrument for managing production peaks, 
its character has deeply changed since the Hartz reforms. Agency work is now aimed at 
establishing a permanent low-wage sector inside the firms” (Wetzel in IG Metall 2008a: 
ii). This quote from an IG Metall official from North-Rhine Westphalia illustrates these 
concerns:  
 
“Our core workers feel threatened by agency work – by the instrument of agency work not by the workers 
themselves – because agency workers have nothing to lose while our core workers do, as their working 
conditions have come under pressure. The more agency workers you have (in a company) the more likely 
employers are to think about challenging the collective agreements for the core workforce”.  
(IG Metall official 25.11.2011) 
 
Agency workers are often used as benchmark for measuring the performance of 
permanent employees, because they tend to work harder and at a faster pace in order to 
be hired on a permanent contract. According to a works councillor of a major 
automotive company, “agency workers are lured with the promise of permanent hiring 
so that they outperform stable workers. However, they are not hired. In contrast, core 
workers are questioned as to why they cannot increase their performance to the agency 
workers’ level” (IG Metall 2007b: 6).  
 
The presence of agency work has a disciplining effect on core workers and undermines 
their mobilisation potential. A high presence of agency workers affects the effectiveness 
of labour struggles lowering the impact of strikes on production. Furthermore, stable 
workers who are afraid of being replaced by agency workers are difficult to mobilise. 
Qualitative studies showed that core workers in companies with a high rate of agency 
workers develop a so called “feeling of substitutability” (Dörre in IG Metall 2007a: 8). 
Indeed, more than half of the 5,000 works councils involved in an IG Metall survey 
                                                 
39
 Detlef Wetzel has become the IG Metall General Secretary in 2013.  
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claimed that agency work was used in their companies to substitute standard job 
positions (IG Metall 2008b). 
 
Accordingly, unions agreed on a stronger intervention on the issue (IG Metall 2008b: 
15). At the 21st IG Metall congress, the secretary Bertold Huber stated: 
“Agency workers cannot be treated worse than the core workforce. We cannot allow agency work to keep 
creeping into stable jobs. This threatens our collective agreements and us all in the long run. Where we 
cannot stop agency work, there must be equal pay. For this principle we will stand up - plant by plant. 
This is what we understand as solidarity!” (Huber 2007). 
Even though the government has not been responsive to the requests of re-regulating 
agency work, IG Metall thinks that there is room for action: “We will not wait until the 
legislator acts, instead we’ll strive together with the works councils inside the 
companies for better conditions and better regulation until we achieve the ‘same wage 
for the same work’”, reported an union official from the IG Metall headquarter (IG 
Metall official 18.04.2012). 
 
 
6.4 Third phase (2007-2012): Reorientation and Action 
 
As agency work kept growing, IG Metall started perceiving previous strategies as 
unsuccessful – especially sectoral bargaining because of unions' lack of bargaining 
power in the agency sector. Works councils existed only in the biggest agencies such as 
Adecco and Randstad, and even in those firms the triangular relationship between staff 
agency, hiring company and agency workers made the organisation of agency workers 
difficult, as they could rarely enter in contact with their representatives and their 
colleagues (Vitols 2008: 15; Weinkopf and Vanselow 2008: 26). 
 
Therefore, IG Metall decided to focus its efforts in the hiring companies - where the 
union still had bargaining power -, and to integrate the issue of agency work into IG 
Metall’s activities at sectoral and at company level (Wetzel 2011). Furthermore, the 
union understood that the hiring companies determine working standards over the value 
chain, dictating the conditions for providing services to the staff agencies. Several 
working groups of standard workers, agency workers and union officials were founded 
at regional level in order to promote the unionisation of agency workers and to mobilise 
the works councils in the hiring companies (Weinkopf and Vanselow 2008: 23ff.). 
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In 2004, IG Metall Berlin-Brandenburg started the initiative “Human Agency Work” 
and two years later IG Metall North-Rhine Westphalia launched the campaign “Same 
Work - Same Wage”. While these initiatives were local, the real turning point was the 
21st IG Metall Congress in Lipsia, which approved the launch of a national campaign. 
The 2008 national initiative “Same Work, Same Wage” aimed at recruiting agency 
workers and at integrating them into the traditional structures of representation. The 
campaign raised awareness among works councillors and union officials about agency 
work and their responsibilities towards this category of workers. It also built the 
pressure of public opinion on employers and the government, which were to blame for 
the working conditions of agency workers. The campaign was conflictual, as 
“improvements for agency workers will not be given away, they have to be gained 
through the conflict against employers” (IG Metall 2008a: 20). This strategic choice 
reflects the new orientation of the union since 2009, i.e. recruitment-oriented, 
participation-oriented and conflict-oriented (Wetzel, Weigand et al. 2008). 
 
The new strategy was developed at two levels. First, IG Metall focused on collective 
bargaining at firm and at sectoral level. At firm level, IG Metall provided works 
councils of hiring companies with information about the legal framework and their co-
determination rights in regard to agency work. IG Metall wanted works councils to fully 
exploit their co-determination rights in order to influence the deployment of agency 
workers and to achieve equal treatment agreements (IG Metall 2008a: 30). Works 
councils were also pushed to adopt a pro-active role towards agency workers and to 
organise them. This implied a deep change for works councillors, who had to 
understand themselves as the representatives of agency workers as well, even though 
they are not formally employed by the firm (IG Metall 2009: 15). According to vice-
secretary Wetzel, this required the development of “a political and not juridical concept 
of the firm” (Wetzel 25.09.2008). 
 
Second, IG Metall put efforts into political lobbying for improving legal regulation. 
This strategy was supported by a confrontative media campaign: Agency work was 
represented as an unfair strategy of greedy employers, who make profits by producing 
negative externalities for the whole society and by breaking the social contract 
characterising the economy of post-war Germany. The initiatives included a campaign 
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truck which was sent to different German cities, a postcard action which made visible 
people's support to the initiative, and several bill boards highlighting the wage 
differentials between agency workers and regular employees and the “trap effect” of 
agency contracts. These initiatives publicly blamed employers in order to increase 
unions’ bargaining leverage. 
 
A union officer in Berlin-Brandenburg explained how the work with the works councils 
and the name-and-shame campaign belonged together:  
 
“Many [works councillors] let themselves be put under pressure, often they had already experienced 
layoffs; and hence the mixed calculation: “We can keep our core workers, we are happy to keep this 
reserve, and if something happens, then…”. There still is this little ambiguity. And this is the reason why 
we need to achieve this awareness […]. We had to publicly blame the whole issue as it has been 
experienced in the company, with employers’ abuses [...]. As works councillor, I am either part of the 
scandal or of the solution but I am ready to disclose what’s going on when such a fundamental 
scandalisation is taking place”. (IG Metall official 06.07.2011) 
 
IG Metall considered the outcomes of this campaign very positive, as declared by the 
member of the IG Metall Representative Board Helga Schwitzer (2012). After little 
more than five years, 35,000 agency workers had become members of IG Metall and 
more than 1,200 firms had signed agreements setting better working conditions for 
agency workers. The main contractual results were first achieved in September 2010, 
when the equal pay principle was successfully included in the collective agreement of 
the steel sector. In May 2012 the new collective agreement for the metal and electronics 
industry was signed, which contains two important provisions in regard to agency work. 
First, it strengthens works councils’ co-determination rights in hiring companies by 
defining specific cases in which agency workers can be hired. Second, it sets regulations 
for securing the permanent hiring of agency workers: If company agreements do not 
state otherwise, after 18 months of continuous assignment, metal firms have to take into 
consideration the permanent hiring. After 24 months the hiring is compulsory. The 
unions bargained in the same year a collective agreement with the agencies’ 
associations. It sets branch bonuses for agency workers in metal companies, which aim 
to close the wage gap between agency and core workers. The bonuses start from a level 
of 15% additional salary after six weeks of continuous assignment and increase 
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gradually up until the level of 50% after nine months (IG Metall 21.05.2012; Schwitzer 
2012).  
 
During the crisis the attitude of the union and the works councils towards agency 
workers changed. The so-called “crisis corporatism” between works councils and 
management prevented the dismissal of core workers by using short-time working 
schemes and working time accounts. At the same time, the interests of agency workers 
were marginalised in the union agenda, as the strategy of labour hoarding implied the 
massive layoffs of agency workers (Lehndorff 2012: 89ff.). Even though the union set 
up some counseling services for agency workers and asked to extend short-time work 
arrangements to them as well, they were mainly used by managers and works councils 
as a flexibility buffer.  
 
This strategic change was caused by economic contingencies, which affected the 
structure of opportunities for the interest alignment between labour and management. 
Still, the renewed bargaining efforts towards agency workers in 2012 demonstrate that 
the long-term strategic orientation of IG Metall remains the extension of its 
representation domain to agency workers and the achievement of equal pay. In this 
latter phase, the attitude of the union towards employers was inclusive and overall 
conflictual.  
 
 
7. Conclusions and implications 
 
Given the conflicting accounts of unions’ responses to increasing labour market 
segmentation, this paper has sought to explain how unions define their identity and 
interests vis-à-vis peripheral workers. While past literature has either focused on union 
exclusion or inclusion of the peripheral workforce as alternative scenarios, the 
longitudinal analysis conducted in this paper has considered them as subsequent phases 
of a strategy in constant evolution; this has allowed exploring the conditions under 
which unions choose an exclusive strategy that centers on the enterprise-based interests 
of core employees or an inclusive approach that reflects the ideals of industrial 
unionism. Here the key factor relates to the strategic options unions have for aligning 
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their interests with either peripheral workers or management, which proves critical in 
explaining this strategic choice. These strategic options are, in turn, shaped by changes 
in the institutional setting, which reconfigure constraints and opportunities for actors.  
 
The empirical analysis has shown that the strategies of IG Metall have shifted over the 
last 40 years from exclusion to subordination and finally to inclusion of agency 
workers. In turn, its attitudes towards the management have also shifted away from 
cooperation toward greater confrontation. In the first two phases, IG Metall mainly 
focused on core workers’ interests. First, IG Metall advocated the ban of agency work 
and did not commit to its regulation. Successively, advent of differentiated collective 
bargaining agreements with temporary agencies, the wage gap between agency and 
standard workers increased. Meanwhile, works councils in the larger core companies 
increasingly consented to hiring agency workers as a buffer for protecting the core 
workforce. As agency work was understood as a marginal phenomenon used for 
managing production peaks, IG Metall did not intervene in the workplace cooperation 
between management and works councils, thus neglecting the specific interests of 
agency workers. In other words, IG Metall allowed greater scope for union strategies 
based on the logics of enterprise-centered employees’representation.  
 
The third phase is dominated by the strategic shift of IG Metall, marked by their 
campaign that publicly challenged employers and used the media to increase pressure 
regarding agency workers. The campaign also aimed at recruiting and mobilising 
agency workers, and pushed local unions and works councils to represent their interests, 
shifting their appeals to broad class solidarities. This phase is characterised by a 
conflictual approach towards employers, which indicates diverging interests between 
labour and employers. Even though the economic contingencies of the global crisis led 
to a revival of cross-class coalitions at workplace level, IG Metall tried to extend the 
short-time work arrangements to agency workers and offered them support services; 
since 2012, agency work has become central again for the union bargaining agenda. 
Overall, in this latter phase IG Metall strategies aim at including all workers into its 
bargaining domain, reflecting a shift back toward its identity as an industrial union.  
 
The paper has shown that this strategic change is linked to the perception of possible 
alignment of interests between the actors. This was shaped by the broader context of 
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institutional change. In particular, the Hartz reforms represented a “turning point” for 
employers’ use of agency workers. Unions have increasingly perceived agency work as 
a threat to collective agreements and union bargaining position. As employers’ use of 
contingent work became unacceptable to unions, the interest alignment between labour 
and the management that supported employers’ segmentation strategies in the previous 
phase eroded. The paper argues that the inclusion of agency workers by IG Metall was 
driven by concerns regarding the interests of core employees, which were now 
perceived to be threatened by employers’ segmentation strategies. As liberalisation and 
labour market deregulation undermined even its traditional strongholds, the union 
enlarged its boundaries of representation in an effort to more effectively represent its 
constituencies. Table 14 summarises the findings.  
 
Table 14: Evolution of IG Metall strategies towards agency workers (1972-2012) 
 First phase 
(1972-1996) 
Second phase 
(1997-2006) 
Third phase 
(2006-2012) 
Institutional 
framework 
Introduction of agency 
work but tight regulation 
Moderate liberalisation 
(until 2003) 
Full liberalisation  
Identity Prevalence of class (with 
exclusion of agency 
workers) 
Prevalence of enterprise  Prevalence of class (with 
inclusion of agency 
workers) 
Union perception of 
agency workers' 
function 
Residual Buffer Substitution 
Coalition and 
alignment of interests 
No coalitions Cross-class coalition 
(alignment with the 
management) 
Class coalition 
(alignment with 
peripheral workers) 
Strategy Exclusion and inaction Subordinated bargaining Active inclusion of 
agency workers 
Union boundaries Core workers Core workers  Sectoral (including 
agency workers) 
 
 
This paper contributes to the broader literature on unions’ role in (increasingly) 
segmented labour markets (i.a. Lillie and Greer 2007; Doellgast 2012; Adler, Tapia et 
al. 2013). In particular, the findings question the arguments of the dualisation literature, 
which describes dual labour markets as stable outcome of the institutional compromise 
between management and labour. The (perceived) competition between standard and 
agency workers and the following change in the interest alignment make this emphasis 
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on stability problematic. Liberalisation opens up loopholes employers can exploit for 
circumventing legal and collectively agreed standards, also in the so-called core of 
political economies (Doellgast, Batt et al. 2009; Jaehrling and Méhaut 2012). By doing 
so, in the long run employers challenge the boundaries between core and periphery and 
undermine labour bargaining power. Under these conditions, the alignment of interests 
between unions (and their core workers) and the management is not sustainable. The 
findings suggest that adopting broad working-class solidarities and encompassing 
bargaining goals might be the only possible way to protect core constituencies under the 
liberalisation processes all political economies have recently experienced.  
 
Even though the paper focuses only on one case study, the argument seems to apply to 
other groups of workers, sectors and countries, where unions have engaged with so-
called outsiders in response to core-periphery competition. For instance, in 2007, the 
service union Ver.Di ran a campaign for statutory minimum wages in the postal sector. 
The campaign aimed at reducing the wage differentials between employees of the 
former incumbent and those of newly established competitors which put the German 
Post employees under pressure and instigated a downward spiral in the entire sector 
because employers used these differences strategically to their favor (Brandt and 
Schulten 2008: 84ff.). In Finland, unions bargained on behalf of posted workers in order 
to stop the pressure experienced by their rank-and-file (Lillie 2012: 149); French unions 
have supported pro-outsiders labour market reforms in order to prevent outsiders from 
replacing their core constituencies (Vlandas 2013). While the competition between core 
and peripheral workers has been demonstrated to be a critical variable in the analysis, 
more research is needed to extend this perspective and thereby explain how variation 
across countries or sectors - different institutional contexts, production strategies and 
skill structures are likely to affect employers’ strategies and the competition between 
labour market segments. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The present PhD project has analysed the causes of the growth of contingent work and 
the consequences for labour representation. Over the last twenty years, contingent work 
has expanded in the labour markets of advanced political economies, contributing to the 
growth of precarious jobs and of wage inequality (International Labour Organisation 
2009; Kalleberg 2009). This phenomenon presents new challenges for the organised 
labour, which typically represents workers in a permanent employment relationship 
(Pedersini 2010; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011).  
 
According to the early segmentation literature, contingent work is concentrated in low-
skill, service job positions, which lie beyond the traditional labour representation 
domain. In contrast, permanent employees benefit from representation in the workplace 
and occupy job positions characterised by complex tasks requiring high skills and 
experience (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Osterman 1987). However, given the rapid 
expansion of contingent work in the labour market, some scholars, especially in the US 
and in the UK, had already started to argue in the nineties that this phenomenon 
threatened the existence of the stable employment relationship and represented the end 
of the distinction between core and peripheral labour market segments (Osterman 1996; 
Cappelli 1999a; Grimshaw, Ward et al. 2001).  
 
In contrast, most analyses of the growth of contingent work in coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) (for example Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden) have 
maintained a core-periphery framework. CMEs have more regulated labour markets and 
stronger industrial relations than liberal market economies (LMEs), and the production 
model traditionally relies on stable employment and labour-management coordination 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). Therefore, some scholars have argued that CMEs have been 
undergoing a dualisation process: Contingent work expands in the increasingly 
liberalised service periphery while core manufacturing sectors have maintained the 
traditional characteristics of the coordinated model. According to Emmenegger et al. 
(2012b), “…outsiders do not directly increase the cost of the insider workforce: this 
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means that outsiders do not work in the same jobs for less money, they work in different 
jobs. Hence, two different ‘labor market regimes’ may coexist alongside each other, one 
for the insiders and one for the outsiders, as is reflected in the idea of primary and 
secondary labor markets that are not necessarily merging” (p. 316 f.).  
 
This PhD project began with two initial observations, which are at odds with the 
“dualisation” scenario. First, agency work has been dramatically increasing in the last 
ten years in German manufacturing sectors. German manufacturing represents a least-
likely case for studying the growth of contingent work because Germany is the CME 
par excellence and the export manufacturing sectors represent the core of the traditional 
German model of production, based on a stable specific-skilled workforce and on labour 
management cooperation. Indeed, many scholars have taken Germany as an example of 
a dual market economy which has maintained a coordinated manufacturing core 
supported by a cross-class coalition as both labour and management have a common 
interest in maintaining a stable specific workforce in the core while keeping the 
production costs low thanks to the deregulation of services (Eichhorst 2012; Thelen 
2012; Hassel 2014). Second, the German metal union IG Metall launched a campaign in 
2007 for organising agency workers and bargaining on their behalf. The IG Metall 
campaign of agency work is a critical case to study because social-movement style 
strategies addressed to the marginal workforce are typical of unions with declining 
membership and traditionally weak institutional resources (Baccaro, Hamann et al. 
2003). However, IG Metall has a relatively stable membership base among skilled 
metalworkers and benefits from a social partnership tradition with the management. 
Indeed, the literature has contended that IG Metall exclusively represents the interest of 
the core workforce (Hassel 2007).  
 
Thus, the thesis has looked at why and how contingent work, and agency work in 
particular, has been growing in German core manufacturing sectors to such an extent to 
become a relevant workforce segment for labour to organise and to bargain for. When 
looking at labour’s reaction to the phenomenon of contingent work, this study has also 
examined why workers’ representatives (unions/works councils) pursue different 
strategies towards contingent workers and change them over time, with different 
outcomes. The PhD project has challenged the main approaches to labour market 
segmentation in CMEs, which fall short in explaining the case of the German 
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manufacturing sector. First, the existing literature has overemphasised the distinction 
between a coordinated core and a flexible periphery as well as the stability between 
these two complementary labour market segments. By so doing, it has neglected the 
potential development of competition, and even of substitution, between core and 
periphery, which can undermine the stability of the dual labour market itself and 
prevent cooperation between labour and management. Second, the assumption of a 
stable core relies on the concept of “coordination”, which is central to the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) framework. The VoC literature suggests that employers support 
coordinating institutions (for example unions, collective agreement, or vocational 
training) because they are fundamental for their competitive advantage on international 
markets. This framework, however, neglects the power dynamics between labour and 
management underlying coordinated labour market outcomes. Thus, the dualisation 
literature finds it difficult to acknowledge and explain trends towards the liberalisation 
of the employment relationship in traditionally coordinated sectors.  
 
This study has found that labour market deregulation and eroding industrial relations 
institutions have allowed the expansion of contingent work even among the core 
workforce. The most relevant institutional changes were the national labour market 
reforms deregulating the use of temporary work, and in particular of agency work, and 
the decentralisation of collective bargaining institutions. Interestingly, these institutional 
changes have previously been interpreted as catalysers of dualisation. On the one hand, 
labour market reforms which relax the employment protection for temporary workers 
are usually interpreted as reforms at the margins of the labour market, thus exacerbating 
the divisions between core and periphery (Hassel and Schiller 2010; Palier and Thelen 
2010). In contrast, the present research has found that after the Hartz reforms employers 
can also use contingent workers in core manufacturing sectors and among the specific 
skilled workforce.  
 
On the other hand, the proliferation of opening clauses at workplace level shifted the 
decisional power from unions to works councils, which, following a company-oriented 
logic, supposedly formed cross-class coalitions with the management in the workplace 
(Palier and Thelen 2010; Eichhorst 2012). This process contributed to marginalising 
“peripheral workers” from the labour representation domain. This research 
acknowledges the ambiguous attitude of works councils but it also shows that 
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workplace labour representation, even though strong, has limited room for action 
because of the external pressures for the liberalisation of the employment relationship.   
 
As the institutional limitation on the use of agency work weakened, employers were 
found to make increasing use of contingent work, especially in routinised job positions 
and among young skilled workers. In some cases contingent workers were also 
employed in skilled job positions and for longer periods of time. The growth of 
contingent work challenged labour representation bodies, which were finding it 
increasingly difficult to set high and homogeneous standards for the workforce as 
contingent workers were beyond their bargaining domain. Furthermore, employers also 
used contingent workers to benchmark the cost and productivity of the core workforce, 
questioning the standards set by the union for the permanent workforce.    
 
Thus, the German metal union has progressively regulated contingent work and 
included contingent workers in the union. The union used instruments which usually 
belong to the repertoire of more conflict-oriented or social-movement oriented unions 
such as media campaigns and organising strategies. The choice of this approach 
reflected the difficulty of finding a compromise with the management regarding 
contingent work. In addition, unions wanted to “scandalise” employers’ strategies in the 
face of public opinion in order to distance themselves from the increasing use of 
contingent work. This strategy was successful in setting rules regarding pay, working 
conditions and the transition from temporary to permanent employment; furthermore, 
IG Metall recruited over 35,000 agency workers. By setting standards at sectoral level, 
the IG Metall campaign also helped works councils to regain control over the use of 
contingent work in the workplace, releasing them from pressures for concessions. 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that labour in CMEs will include contingent workers 
in its representation domain when their presence on the labour market starts threatening 
the standards and the future existence of the core workforce. Institutional changes 
liberalising the employment relationship trigger this process because they allow 
employers’ increasing use of contingent work, which slowly erodes the size of the 
traditional core workforce and develops the competition between contingent and 
permanent workers. Overall, the PhD project shows that institutional changes 
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undermining labour cohesiveness and increasing employer discretion affects the whole 
workforce in the long run by facilitating the casualisation of work.  
 
Each paper has contributed to supporting the main argument by providing the pieces of 
evidence illustrated above. The first paper has focused on how employers’ use of 
contingent work in core manufacturing sectors has changed since the eighties, looking 
particularly at the effect of the relaxation of employment protection for temporary 
workers. The second paper has compared the segmentation patterns between standard 
workers and agency workers in four automotive plants, exploring the role of works 
councils in limiting and regulating agency work. The third paper has looked at strategies 
towards agency workers in the German metal union from the eighties until today, 
focusing particularly on the IG Metall campaign for agency workers. The next section 
briefly summarises the content and the theoretical contribution of each paper.  
 
 
1 Summary of the papers  
 
 
1.1 Paper 1: Do specific skills lead to stable employment? The role of weakening 
“beneficial constraints” in German core manufacturing sectors 
 
This paper investigated the relationship between skills, work organisation, and 
contingent employment contracts in German core manufacturing sectors. Despite the 
erosion of industrial relations institutions and the deregulation of the use of temporary 
work, the dualisation literature contends that employers have an interest in retaining 
specific-skilled workers; therefore, contingent work is not expected to affect core 
manufacturing sectors but rather to spread in the service periphery of the German 
political economy (Palier and Thelen 2010; Thelen 2012; Hassel 2014). In contrast, 
other scholars argue that institutional constraints are also fundamental for ensuring 
stable employment among the skilled workforce, and their erosion would also lead to 
the liberalisation of the employment relationship in the core of the German model in the 
long run (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Howell 2011).  
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The paper looked at how the link between stable employment and skill specificity has 
changed under the erosion of legislative and negotiated employment protections. For the 
empirical analysis the paper applied a mixed-method approach. The quantitative 
analysis was based on workers’ surveys of the German Federal Institute of Vocational 
Training and Education between 1986 and 2012.  The qualitative evidence relied on 
interviews with human resource managers and workers’ representatives in German 
automotive and machine tool plants between 2010 and 2013.  
 
The empirical analysis confirmed some expectations of the dualisation literature, as 
contingent contracts are more common among workers who lack industry-specific 
vocational training, and the rate of contingent work among this group relative to those 
with specific skills has increased over time. However, employers’ interests in a stable 
workforce have been overestimated as the (increasing) levels of job routine in core 
manufacturing sectors have been found to facilitate the employment of temporary 
workers.  Thus, the role of industrial relations is crucial for ensuring stable employment: 
While works councils still manage to ensure the advancement of skilled workers along 
the career ladder, labour market deregulation has eroded their ability to control external 
hiring and the transition of trainees to permanent employment. Indeed, findings suggest 
that the jobs held by core skilled workers are increasingly vulnerable to casualisation 
due both to the routine nature of work and labour market deregulation. These findings 
are compatible with the literature focusing on the role of industrial relations and of work 
organisation for supporting the linkage between skills and employment stability 
(Streeck 1991, Jürgens 2004, Marsden 2010, Lloyd, Warhurst et al. 2013). 
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the paper argues that the traditional 
“complementarity” between specific skills and stable employment has been 
overestimated in the literature as employers can use different strategies to bypass it once 
the negotiated and legislative employment protections have been weakened. Second, it 
provides new evidence based on individual-level data regarding how the liberalisation 
of the employment relationship has affected the workforce in core manufacturing 
companies. 
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1.2 Paper 2: The political economy of labour market segmentation: The case of the 
German automotive industry  
 
This paper compared the segmentation between standard workers and agency workers 
across four German automotive plants. In the period between 2010 and 2012 the plants 
differed in terms of the proportion of agency workers in the whole workforce, the length 
of their assignment, their function and their wage level compared to standard workers.  
 
The paper focused on the role of labour in determining different segmentation patterns 
between standard workers and agency workers in the workplace. The literature on union 
strategies towards contingent workers does not appreciate the differences at workplace 
level as it has analysed unions’ preferences and strategies only at national or sectoral 
level (Vandaele and Leschke 2010; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011). In the literature on 
workplace segmentation, labour strategies and their outcomes are mainly explained 
through the presence of power resources within the company (Gooderham and 
Nordhaug 1997; Garcia-Serrano and Malo 2002). This literature has neglected the role 
of different labour attitudes towards workforce segmentation; furthermore, it has not 
considered how conditions external to the company can affect labour strategies and their 
outcomes regarding workforce segmentation (with the exception of Pulignano and 
Doerflinger 2013). 
 
The empirical evidence relied on interviews with human resource managers and 
workers’ representatives at company level conducted between January 2011 and March 
2013; the interview findings were integrated and triangulated through the analysis of 
company reports, company-level agreements, internal union publications, interviews of 
works councillors published in union magazines and in the local press, newspapers 
articles, and the reports of the European Industrial Relations Observatory.  
 
The empirical analysis found that the political and economic context of the plant, the 
timing of company-level agreements in respect to national labour market reforms and 
the (missing) support of the national union influenced the bargaining power of works 
councils’ strategies in regard to agency work. Labour power – rooted both in internal 
industrial relations and in those conditions external to the plant – was found necessary 
for achieving some regulation of agency work. However, labour power was not 
sufficient for encompassing agreements covering agency workers. Labour commitment 
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to a homogeneous workforce, which varied across workplaces even though the same 
union was involved, made a fundamental difference.  
 
The present study provided an original contribution to the literature because it 
illustrated how strategies and power interact at workplace level, showing that their 
interplay  was fundamental for understanding different segmentation patterns in the case 
studies; furthermore, it provided evidence that the labour responses to contingent work 
at workplace level are influenced by factors external to the company as much as by 
internal industrial relations institutions (similar to the studies about unions’ involvement 
in workplace change by Locke 1992; Frost 2000 and Pulignano and Stewart 2012).  
 
 
1.3 Paper 3: Straight to the core — Explaining union responses to the casualisation of 
work: The IG Metall campaign for agency workers 
 
This paper explained why the German metal union has recently started organising 
agency workers and including them into its bargaining domain. Existing literature 
provides different accounts on unions’ strategies regarding marginal workers in a 
context of declining industrial relations institutions. On the one hand, a group of 
scholars contend that unions prioritise their core constituencies and seek compromises 
with management (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). On the other hand, a body of 
research has shown that unions adopt inclusive strategies towards peripheral workers to 
counterbalance eroding bargaining power (Frege and Kelly 2003; Turner 2009).   
 
Still, there has been little research into the conditions under which unions decide to 
undertake one or the other strategy. To this aim, the paper conducted a historical 
analysis of the strategy of the German metal union towards agency workers from 1970s 
until 2012. The findings illustrated that exclusion and inclusion are subsequent phases 
of a strategy in constant evolution and identified institutional change towards labour 
market liberalisation as an important condition for unions’ strategic re-orientation 
because it allows employers to adopt aggressive segmentation strategies threatening the 
collectively agreed standards for the core workforce.  
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The paper has argued that both inclusion and exclusion of marginal workers are equally 
viable strategies for unions in increasingly segmented labour markets. The strategic 
choice depends on the (perceived) competition between core and peripheral employees 
related to employers’ personnel strategies; this affects the possible alignment of 
interests between unions’ core members on the one hand, and either management or 
peripheral employees on the other, and ultimately contributes to determining whether 
unions are going to marginalise or rather organise and represent contingent workers.  
 
The findings do not only contribute to the research on unions’ strategies by identifying 
the conditions and the mechanisms through which union strategies are shifted. They 
also throw new light on the traditional concept of the dual labour market as a stable 
equilibrium between primary and secondary labour markets. Liberalisation opens up 
loopholes employers can exploit for circumventing legal and collectively agreed 
standards. By doing so, in the long run employers challenge the boundaries between 
core and periphery and undermine labour’s bargaining power.  
 
 
2 The liberalisation agenda in Germany 
 
The thesis has explained the growth of contingent work through the erosion of industrial 
relations at sectoral and at company level and the progressive deregulation of the labour 
market. It has mainly focused on the extent to which unions and works councils could 
limit the marketisation of the employment relationship under conditions of declining 
labour power. Given its emphasis on the role of labour, the thesis has paid less attention 
to two further aspects related to the implementation of the liberalisation agenda in 
Germany: the sources of the liberalisation pressure and the role of employers in 
pursuing the liberalisation of the employment relationship. This section discusses the 
literature dealing with these aspects and how they were treated in the thesis.   
 
 
2.1 The pressure for liberalising the employment relationship 
 
There is a broad body of research about the origin of the pressure for liberalising the 
employment relationship in Germany. Existing research has found that the German 
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model has been increasingly exposed to the globalisation of the product and financial 
markets. Scholars in industrial sociology and political economy have focused on the 
liberalisation of financial markets for explaining the increasing short-termism in the 
employment policies of German companies, which is at odd with the traditional 
coordinated model (Dörre 2001, Höpner 2001, Holst, Nachtwey et al. 2009, Haipeter, 
Jürgens et al. 2012, Holst 2012). For instance, Dörre (2001) and Holst et al. (2009) have 
contended that companies use the flexibilisation of the employment relationship as an 
instrument for shifting to employees the risks related to their increased financial 
uncertainty and their dependence on the short-term interests of the shareholders.   
 
Other scholars have focused on changes in the product market, showing that the market 
niche of the Diversified Quality Production (DQP) has become more sensitive to price 
competition over time (Jürgens 2004, Herrigel 2010, Baccaro and Benassi 2014, 
Herrigel 2014). For instance, Jürgens (2004) has argued that the rise of Japanese car 
producers challenged the German DQP because they could produce cars in the same 
variety and quality but at a lower cost. Baccaro and Benassi (2014) have showed that 
the price elasticity of German exports has increased over the last twenty years, pushing 
employers and the government to deregulate industrial relations institutions (e.g. 
encompassing sectoral agreements) in order to maintain the competitiveness of German 
exports.  
 
Not only changes in the demand side but also new developments on the supply side of 
the labour market have contributed to increase the pressure on wages and working 
conditions. In particular, the European enlargement has provided German 
manufacturing companies with cheaper production sites just across the border. Thus, not 
only significant parts of the production were transferred abroad but the new sites were 
also used as a benchmark for the production costs in German plants. Under these 
conditions employers in manufacturing companies could easily obtain concessions from 
the works councils (Blöcker and Jürgens 2008, Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2010).  
 
The increasing exposure of the German DQP model to international price competition 
suggests that there are cheaper alternatives to German products in similar markets, even 
in the high-end segments German export companies are specialised in. Furthermore, the 
outsourcing to Eastern Europe (and to production sites even further away) questions the 
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relevance of the German institutional context for DQP. These trends suggest that there 
are alternative and cheaper production processes for high-quality products than the DQP 
model which characterised German manufacturing in the eighties and at the beginning 
of the nineties: High and homogenous wages, stable employment relationships, high 
and specific skills and complex work organisation (Kern and Schumann 1984, Sorge 
and Streeck 1987, Streeck 1991).  
 
Since the nineties the improvement of Germany’s competitiveness on international 
markets has served as justification for employers’ restructuring strategies in the 
manufacturing sector. The credible threat of outsourcing favoured the diffusion of 
concession bargaining regarding wages and working conditions for core workers and 
the use of subcontractors both offsite and onsite. Thus, German manufacturing 
companies have experienced dramatic restructuring measures since the nineties, such as 
the introduction of lean production management techniques and the increasing use of 
cheap subcontractors (Springer 1999, Jürgens 2004, Doellgast and Greer 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the imperative to save Germany as production site contributed to create a 
general consensus about the necessity to make the German labour market more flexible 
through the reform of industrial relations institutions (Upchurch 2000). The literature 
has shown that between the end of the Nineties and the beginning of 2000s a neoliberal 
consensus dominated the public opinion and the programmes of the main political 
parties, including traditional labour allies such as the Social Democratic Party. Indeed, 
the SPD Prime Minister Schröder launched the controversial neoliberal package of 
reforms “Agenda 2010”, which included also the Hartz reforms (Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Fleckenstein 2007, Bruff 2008, Fleckenstein 2008). This shift towards a neoliberal 
consensus was traced back to the influence of the UK model on German policy-making 
(Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007, Fleckenstein 2008) and to the lobbying 
initiatives of employers – such as the New Social Market Initiatives, which advocated 
the implementation of neoliberal labour market reforms (Kinderman 2005, Bruff 2008).  
 
In the thesis the outsourcing threat and the active role of government in deregulating the 
labour market have been taken into account as factors shifting the balance of power in 
favour of employers. In particular, the second and third paper have emphasised the 
importance of these factors for understanding the bargaining dynamics between labour 
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and management. The papers have shown the weakness of works councils’ bargaining 
position against the local management as they face the trade-off between protecting the 
standards of the core workforce and regulating the employment of agency workers.  
 
This thesis has provided a further piece of evidence in support of the claim that high-
quality products are not necessarily associated with high-road practices by showing that 
cheap and flexible workforce can be used also in the companies’ core without impairing 
product quality or company’s productivity. The second paper has shown that four plants 
can produce similar final products with very different rates of agency workers, which 
depended on the plant-level bargaining dynamics rather than on production 
requirements (e.g. skills). The BMW plant in Leipzig, which produces the luxus car 
BMW-1, was the extreme case with 30% of agency workers also among skilled 
workers. Furthermore, the first paper has shown that in German core manufacturing 
companies skilled workers have become more affected by temporary contracts, 
especially young workers in the transition period between vocational training and 
permanent employment. The employment of temporary workers is facilitated by the 
routine nature of work, which characterises job positions in core manufacturing sectors 
to a higher extent than the narrative of the DQP model would suggest. These findings 
are compatible with research on qualification and work organisation, which has pointed 
at trends towards the “Taylorisation” of work in German manufacturing companies, also 
among the specific-skilled workforce (e.g. Springer 1999, Lacher 2001, Lacher 2006).  
 
To sum up, the increasing competitive pressure on German companies, the reforms 
liberalising industrial relations and labour market institutions, and the opening of new 
outsourcing opportunity in Eastern Europe are not a matter of inquiry of this thesis but 
they are taken into consideration as factors contributing to put under pressure the stable 
employment relationship and labour representation at workplace and at sectoral level. In 
addition, the thesis has shed some lights on the reasons why DQP is not sheltered 
anymore from price competition by showing that also low-road human resource 
practices can be implemented in the production of high-quality manufacturing goods. 
The next section explores further this matter by looking at the employers’ attitudes 
regarding the so called “beneficial constraints” leading to DQP (Streeck 1991), such as 
labour market legislation and collective agreements at company level and at sectoral 
level.    
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2.2 Employers’ strategies  
 
The attitude of German manufacturing employers regarding industrial relations 
institutions is very controversial in the literature. According to the VoC literature, they 
should support the institutions of industrial relations and even shore them up in case of 
erosion because these institutions are the source of comparative advantage on 
international markets (Soskice 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001). The historical 
institutionalist perspective does not expect German employers to leave the path 
designed by existing industrial relations institutions either (Thelen 1999), and, indeed, 
some scholars have contended that German manufacturing employers still support the 
system of sectoral collective bargaining and are still committed to stable employment 
(Hassel 2014, Thelen 2014).   
 
However, existing literature has found German employers to publicly lobby for labour 
market deregulation and for the decentralisation of collective bargaining (Kinderman 
2005, Menz 2005). Furthermore, at manufacturing companies have been progressively 
leaving the sectoral employers’ association (Silvia 2010). At workplace level, German 
employers have been found to use subcontractors in order to avoid collective bargaining 
agreements (Doellgast and Greer 2007, Helfen 2011) and to make broad use of opening 
clauses which amend the standards set through sectoral agreements (Seifert and 
Massa‐Wirth 2005, Haipeter 2011).  
 
This thesis has found evidence in support of the latter body of literature. In the 
interviews human resource managers openly appreciated the employment of agency 
workers because they are cheaper than manufacturing workers on standard employment 
contracts and can be easily dismissed without redundancy costs. In other words, the use 
of agency work is seen as an instrument for avoiding employment protection legislation 
for standard workers and metal sectoral agreements.   
 
The interview with two Gesamtmetall representatives provided an overview of 
employers’ motivations for using agency work. One of the interview partners explained 
that agency work responds to employers’ flexibility needs primarily by giving them the 
freedom of hiring and firing: “In the crisis this was the most important sign of 
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flexibility: You could reduce the number of agency workers without any problem” 
(Gesamtmetall official-1 23.04.2012). Furthermore, agency work is an instrument for 
keeping labour costs low. According to the same Gesamtmetall official, companies 
reported to the employers’ association that they use agency work in order to achieve 
such a wage level that allows them to keep their production in Germany. Otherwise they 
would have to outsource their production abroad because the salaries are too high in 
Germany for “easy jobs”.  
 
While the previous statements suggest that agency workers constitute a volatile 
workforce segment which occupies unskilled positions, the Gesamtmetall official 
openly acknowledged that companies also tend to hire the same agency workers from 
the staff agencies, who, in this way, do not need training and can productively work also 
in skilled positions because they are already familiar with the company’s practices and 
with the machines. The first paper has also reported about other employers’ strategies 
aimed at avoiding legal employment protection without slowing down productivity such 
as hiring trainees on temporary contracts in the transition between apprenticeship and 
permanent employment.  
 
Interestingly, the Gesamtmetall interview partners did not think that the regulation of 
agency work would prevent employers from using employment practices aimed at 
avoiding the national and sectoral standards of employment protection, wages and 
working conditions. According to one Gesamtmetall official, “the idea ‘I achieve the 
regulation for agency work and after that all agency workers will be hired 
permanently’40 is naive. The companies would just look for other options” 
(Gesamtmetall official-1 23.04.2012).  The only type of regulation which seemed to 
worry the Gesamtmetall officials was the increase of codetermination rights in regard to 
agency workers because works councils “are responsible for the company and not for 
the agency workers and there would be great conflicts” in the companies if the 
regulation passed. Ironically, at the end of May 2012, only one month after the 
interview, IG Metall achieved a sectoral collective agreement setting greater 
codetermination rights for works council regarding the hiring of agency workers.  
 
                                                 
40
 The Gesamtmetall official made this example because at the time IG Metall and Gesamtmetall were 
negotiating the metal sectoral agreement containing provisions for the permanent hiring of agency 
workers. 
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The findings from the interview with the Gesamtmetall officials clearly indicate that 
companies do not necessarily follow the behavior prescribed by industrial relations 
institutions, as the VoC literature would expect (Hall and Soskice 2001). In contrast, 
they actively look for solutions which allow them to avoid existing regulatory 
institutions (Doellgast, Batt et al. 2009, Jaehrling and Méhaut 2013).  
 
The thesis has also offered some insights regarding employers’ attitudes towards legal 
and negotiated limitations to the use of agency work, which seem to reflect the 
ambiguity of Streeck’s concept of “beneficial constraints”. In the case studies, 
employers never took the initiative for negotiating agreements on temporary work, 
which was, instead, an outcome of unions’ bargaining efforts. However, once the 
limitations were in place (some) employers seemed to appreciate the importance of a 
stable skilled workforce for the production, even though with some reluctance.  
 
The human resource managers involved in this study explained that the companies’ 
works councils were responsible for the achievement of regulation. According to a VW 
human resource manager, the works council’s primary motivation was that it did not 
want agency work to replace permanent positions (MGMT 09.07.2012). Indeed, 
employers did not see great obstacles to the employment of agency workers, and 
temporary workers in general, both in unskilled and skilled positions, as discussed also 
in the first paper. For instance, a Ford human resource managers explained that, as 
agency workers “are also qualified Facharbeiter, they can be employed almost 
everywhere” in the company (MGMT 07.08.2012). A BMW human resource manager 
explained that the use of agency workers and subcontractors depends on the 
considerations of the company regarding the core business. However, the decision 
regarding the definition of core business is dependent on the economic conditions of the 
company and is taken each year so workers who were considered as core one year could 
be hired on agency contracts or transferred to a subcontractor the following year if the 
company’s economic conditions required their business unit to save personnel costs 
(MGMT 11.09.2012). 
 
The case study of the Ford plant, which is the best regulated among the plants covered 
by this study, provides some evidence regarding employers’ ambiguous attitude towards 
the regulation of agency work. The Ford plant has an agreement which limits the use of 
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agency work to 3% in direct production, and can be extended up to 8% only when two 
production lines (dedicated respectively to an old and a new car model) are running 
parallel for a limited time period. The Ford managers did not openly complain about the 
agreement and one of them rather suggested that, overall, the management was happy 
about it because it ensured “social peace” in the company (MGMT 31.08.2012). 
Furthermore, even though the Ford manager stated that agency work can be potentially 
used in every job positions (see citation above), he also believed that the employment of 
high rates of agency workers in the company could make the production more difficult 
because “the more agency workers I take on board the less possible work organisation 
arrangements such as teamwork become” (MGMT 07.08.2012). At the same time, 
however, the same manager also thought “that in some situations it would actually not 
be bad to take on board some more agency workers”. The works council as well 
reported that the management would be favourable to increase the proportion of agency 
workers (WC-1 19.04.2012; see paper 2).  
 
To sum up, the Ford example suggests that employers, when faced with strict regulation 
of agency work and a determined works council, try to make the best of it and even 
acknowledge the advantages of a stable workforce. However, the interview findings 
have also shown that employers are reluctant to regulate the phenomenon even under 
the pressure from union’s side and adopt different strategies in order to circumvent 
existing regulation. Furthermore, the increase of employers’ use of agency work right 
after the Hartz reforms, which has been broadly discussed in the thesis, suggests that 
employers opt for market-based employment practices when weak institutional 
regulations and labour representation cannot set limits to employers’ action (see also the 
discussion in section 3.3 and 4.2).    
 
 
3 A critique to Varieties of Capitalism from a power resource perspective 
 
This section illustrates the position of this thesis in the broad academic debates about 
the dynamics underlying different models of capitalism and their trajectories of change. 
It illustrates and discusses the points of criticism regarding the approach of Varieties of 
Capitalism and the dualisation literature, which have been raised in the thesis and 
underlie its theoretical contribution (see section 4). The thesis has applied a power 
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perspective to the study of contingent work and of labour responses, showing that the 
power resource approach has greater explanatory power for the phenomena of interest 
than the VoC framework and the dualisation literature. After briefly presenting the 
approach of Varieties of Capitalism, this section illustrates the points of criticism: This 
thesis has contended that the VoC framework is too deterministic in regard to actors’ 
behaviour and national trajectories of change. Therefore, the VoC approach and the 
dualisation literature, which relies to a great extent on the VoC framework, are argued 
to neglect the conflict of interests and the power relations between labour and 
management characterising political economy institutions.  
 
 
3.1 The approach of Varieties of Capitalism  
 
The trajectory of change of capitalist economies has been object of academic debate 
since the seventies. A group of scholars expected that economic factors such as 
technological change, deepening regional integration and increased capital mobility and 
international trade would lead to the convergence of national systems on a liberal 
market economy model (Bell 1973; Baumol, Blackman et al. 1989; Verspagen 1991). In 
response, other scholars contended that countries would maintain and even strengthen 
their institutional differences in terms of labour markets, industrial relations and welfare 
institutions because they constitute a source of comparative advantage on international 
markets (Streeck and Katz 1984; Maurice, Sellier et al. 1986). 
 
Building on the insights of the second literature strand, the Varieties of Capitalism 
framework presented itself as an alternative to mainstream economic approaches which 
neglected the role of national institutions and politics in the study of national economic 
development. The VoC framework suggests that countries can be categorised along the 
well-known dichotomy between Coordinated Market Economies – such as Germany 
and Sweden - and Liberal Market Economies – such as the UK and the US; and that 
both models can be equally successful on the global markets by specialising in different 
products and services. These ideal types are defined along their differences in the 
institutional arenas of industrial relations, corporate governance, training, labour market 
regulation, and interfirm relations. These arenas are interlocked through institutional 
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complementarities, which guarantee the coherence and efficiency of the political 
economy as a whole (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hall and Gingerich 2004).   
 
The firm, which is the central rational actor in the VoC approach, interacts with actors 
such as unions and other companies within the given institutional environment. This 
interaction leads to institutional reproduction because social actors, in particular firms, 
are aware that the institutions constitute the source of comparative advantage of their 
national economy on international markets. Therefore, firms are not only interested in 
maintaining the existing institutional arrangements but they would also re-build these 
institutions if they were eroding (Soskice 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001). For instance, 
Soskice (1999) expects employers in CMEs to shore up the collective bargaining system 
in case unions were losing their bargaining power.   
 
As a result, neither CMEs nor LMEs are expected to change but rather to strengthen 
their distinctive institutional characteristics. Also the so called mixed market economies 
are expected to change in the direction of the coordinated model or the liberal model. 
These political economies, such as France and Italy, are not reducible to one of the two 
ideal types because their institutional arenas reflect a mix of the characteristics of CMEs 
and LMEs. For this reason, VoC scholars consider these economies as dysfunctional 
because the incongruence among the institutional spheres impairs the overall efficiency 
of the economy by hindering the development of institutional complementarities. Thus, 
social actors in mixed market economies are expected to change their institutions in 
order to make the national political economy converge either on the coordinated or on 
the liberal model (Hall and Gingerich 2004).  
 
 
3.2 From institutional determinism to “creative” action 
 
The approach of Varieties of Capitalism has been widely criticised (see for a review 
Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2007, Hancké 2009). Some scholars have argued that there are 
more than two possible models of capitalism, which can be equally successful on 
international markets and do not need to converge on either the liberal or the 
coordinated model (Amable 2003, Schmidt 2003, Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). Other 
scholars have pointed out aspects which have been neglected by Varieties of Capitalism, 
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such as the role of the state for ensuring coordination (Schmidt 2006) or the gender 
dimension (Estevez-Abe 2006). The focus here is on those works who have defined the 
VoC approach as too static and deterministic, a criticism supported by the findings of 
the thesis (Crouch and Farrell 2004, Thelen 2009: 474, Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 6). 
According to the VoC approach, employers (and labour) follow the behaviour 
prescribed by the institutions because these lead to the maximisation of their interests by 
guaranteeing their comparative advantage on international markets. Thus, social actors 
have no interest in changing the status quo and continue reproducing existing 
institutions by following the same pattern of behaviour.  
 
Because of its institutional determinism, VoC cannot explain institutional change 
because the theory does not expect institutional equilibria either in the coordinated or in 
the liberal model to be undone (Pontusson 2005: 165). Some scholars have suggested 
that institutional change might take place as a consequence of changes in the broader 
political and economic context such as an economic or a political crisis. Changing 
external circumstances can cause shifts in the power and preference of actors and/or 
make other institutions more relevant than others (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 16 f., 
Thelen 1999: 383, Crouch and Farrell 2004: 6). The new circumstances do not 
necessarily lead to abrupt change but they might favour endogenous change, which is an 
incremental process of change taking place through the everyday (non)enactment of 
institutions. Thus, actors themselves are the initiators when they do not fully adhere to 
the pattern of behaviour prescribed by institutions. Even though the process of 
endogenous change is incremental, it can be deeply transformative in its outcomes 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005, Hall and Thelen 2009).  
 
While the VoC literature has contended that actors would respond to external changes 
by strengthening the institutional coherence of political economy systems, other 
scholars have suggested that actors would rather use institutions in “creative ways” in 
response to these changes (Crouch 2005, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Wood and Lane 
2011). According to this perspective, institutions should be interpreted as resources 
social actors can employ in different ways rather than as structures of opportunities and 
constraints (Wood and Lane 2011: 11). For instance, Crouch (2005a; 2005b) has argued 
that political economies are incoherent institutional systems which are characterised by 
institutional inconsistencies and redundancies. These can become important when 
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external circumstances change and actors choose to use institutional resources which 
they had not taken into consideration before. Similarly, Jackson (2005) has pointed at 
the multifaceted aspect of institutions in his study on German workplace 
codetermination, and has found that institutions are ambiguous or poorly enforced and 
therefore actors can reinterpret them contextually or circumvent them.  
 
A recent body of literature has emphasised the role of agency for explaining different 
segmentation patterns across countries and sectors, which VoC is unable to make sense 
of.  These works have shown that the strategic action of unions and employers at 
sectoral and company level is determinant for understanding how institutions work and 
the outcomes they produce. On the one hand, the dualisation literature has suggested 
that a reconfiguration of actors’ constellations took place in CMEs, leading to new 
coalitions of interests which changed the way in which institutions perform (Zientara 
2008, Thelen 2009, Peng 2012, Hassel 2014, Thelen 2014). Recent works on Germany 
and France have suggested that a cross-class coalition between business and unions in 
manufacturing formed under the competitive pressure of globalisation and the erosion 
of industrial relations institutions at national level. This producer coalition is supposed 
to still support the coordination in the core of the model, while the service periphery is 
deregulated in order to maintain the cost competitiveness of the export sector. This new 
model implies that the industrial relations institutions and labour management 
cooperation typical of coordinated economies still exists in the core but the institutions 
of industrial relations do not deliver egalitarian outcomes as they did in the past (Thelen 
2009, Hassel 2014, Thelen 2014). 
 
Other scholars have pointed out that institutions represent a system of rules employers 
try to avoid, exploiting their loopholes and their exit options. These works focus on the 
gap between institutional rules prescribing certain behaviour, their enactment and their 
outcomes. In particular, employers were found to purposely avoid existing institutions 
such as employment protection and collective agreements (Doellgast and Greer 2007, 
Doellgast, Batt et al. 2009, Shire, Schönauer et al. 2009, Sørensen and Weinkopf 2009, 
Bosch, Mayhew et al. 2010, Jaehrling and Méhaut 2013). For instance, Jaehrling and 
Méhaut (2013) found that employers in retailing, hospital and hotels in France and 
Germany contributed to the erosion of collective bargaining institutions by making 
broad use of atypical contracts which are not covered by sectoral agreements on wages 
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and working conditions. At the same time, this research strand has also contended that 
unions can counteract employers’ strategies of “institutional avoidance” by using 
existing industrial relations institutions in innovative ways (Greer 2008, Doellgast, Batt 
et al. 2009, Turner 2009). For instance, Doellgast et al. (2009) found that unions in 
European call centres adopted social-movement style strategies such as campaigns or 
coalitions with external actors in order to prevent outsourcing and subcontracting.   
 
This thesis shares the criticism that VoC is too deterministic. By adopting a micro-level 
perspective on the growth of contingent work and on labour responses to this 
phenomenon, the thesis avoids “the fallacies of economic functionalism” of the VoC 
approach and examines instead actors’ strategies within the institutional context 
(Streeck 2009: 3 f.). The thesis has contributed to the latter research strand by providing 
evidence that employers, even in core sectors of CMEs, are willing to and able to avoid 
existing industrial relations institutions by making use of agency work (see discussion 
in section 2). Furthermore, it has also suggested that labour actors can decide, under 
certain constraints, to use industrial relations institutions in different ways. The second 
paper has shown that works councils can use their codetermination rights either for 
excluding agency workers or for bargaining agreements aimed at improving their wages 
and working conditions. Similarly, the third paper has illustrated that the IG Metall 
responded to the labour market deregulation at national level by shifting its strategies 
towards agency workers from exclusive to inclusive. Through initiatives for raising the 
awareness of works councils, IG Metall managed to include provisions in favour of 
agency workers in company-level agreements; at the same time, media and organising 
campaigns contributed to revitalise the IG Metall bargaining structure by enlarging the 
union representation domain.  
 
 
3.3 Uncovering the conflict dimension  
 
The determinism of VoC has led to neglecting the politics underlying political economy 
institutions because the emphasis on institutional complementarity and actors’ 
coordination does not allow accounting for conflicts of interest about the institutional 
status quo (Howell 2003: 110, Pontusson 2005: 164 f.). The VoC approach assumes 
actors to rationally agree on certain institutional arrangements and to reproduce them by 
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following the prescribed pattern of behaviour just because these arrangements were 
found ex post to provide comparative advantages to national political economies, thus 
contributing to the overall societal welfare (Howell 2003: 111). In this framework, 
actors do not have any incentive to undermine the existing institutional equilibrium and 
therefore the VoC framework cannot explain why and how institutional change takes 
place (Pontusson 2005: 165).  
 
Scholars in the research tradition of historical institutionalism have acknowledged the 
conflict of interests underlying existing institutional arrangements, suggesting that some 
actors would defend the existing institutions while others would push for change, when 
they are aware of better alternatives (Hall and Thelen 2009: 27). Thus, institutional 
change is interpreted as the outcome of compromises among actors in certain 
institutional arenas (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 8), and the resulting institutions are 
expected to stay in place as long as “they serve the interests of relevant actors” (Hall 
and Thelen 2009: 11). The historical-institutionalist perspective has suggested focusing 
on actors’ preferences for explaining the direction in which institutions change and the 
form they take (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Thelen 1999, Katznelson and Weingast 
2005).   
 
The coalitional approach to the analysis of institutional change has built on this 
perspective and it has looked at how different actors cooperate in order to build and to 
maintain certain institutional arrangements (Windolf 1989, Swenson 1991, Iversen 
1996, Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 2014, Thelen 2014). The coalitional approach has 
disaggregated the interests of state actors and employers, which seem to be collapsed in 
VoC
41
, and the interests of different components of the workforce. In particular, it has 
distinguished between the interests of “labour market insiders”, who are full-time 
permanent employees in well-established manufacturing industries, and the interests of 
“outsiders”, who typically are service employees and therefore more exposed to flexible 
jobs and unemployment. Given the increase of competitive pressure and the 
retrenchment of the welfare state, the preferences of labour market insiders, represented 
by unions and social-democratic parties, move away from working-class interests and 
become compatible with the preferences of employers, who want to reduce the 
production e.g. by undercutting the labour periphery while retaining their core skilled 
                                                 
41
 Howell 2003: 110. See next section 3.3. 
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workers. This converge of preferences between employers and labour in manufacturing 
leads to a process of dualisation between core manufacturing and service periphery, 
which takes place in continental market economies, where unionisation and bargaining 
coverage is uneven between the manufacturing and the service sector and therefore the 
interests of service sector workers can be easily marginalised (Palier and Thelen 2010, 
Thelen 2012, 2014).  
 
The main difference between VoC and the new coalitional approach is that preferences 
in the rational institutionalist approach of VoC are exogenous and fixed while 
preferences are formed endogenously according to the historical institutionalist 
perspective (Steinmo and Thelen 1992). However, the understanding of institutions as 
outcome of compromises between actors with endogenous preferences has the same 
bias as the rational-institutionalist perspective of VoC because both approaches suggest 
- to put it bluntly - that certain institutions are in place because relevant actors want 
them to be. As a consequence, the historical institutionalist literature has suggested the 
existence of relatively stable institutional equilibria between core and periphery of 
political economies even though it has emphasised that they are the outcome of political 
processes of coalition formation.
42
 The constellation of actors supporting the 
institutional equilibrium might shift if there are significant changes in the external 
conditions of the political economy or in other institutional arenas (Hall and Thelen 
2009: 11, Thelen 2012: 152 f.).  
 
In contrast, scholars adopting a power resource approach have pointed at the conflicts 
underlying the institutions of national political economies. Among others, Streeck 
(2009) has contended that the institutional configuration of markets can be understood 
as a product of the continuous conflictual interplay between societal attempts to regulate 
it through collective institutions and capitalist actors' attempts to undermine regulation 
for individual economic advantage (p. 4). Thus, employers are expected to push for the 
deregulation of industrial relations and labour market institutions, which constitute 
constraints over market forces, rather than to cooperate with (parts of) labour in order to 
maintain the coordinating institutions.  
 
                                                 
42
 See Baccaro and Benassi (2014) for a detailed discussion on the concept of “institutional equilibrium”. 
 182 
 
However, even though Streeck has pointed at the importance of societal conflict for 
understanding change in capitalist economies, his work does not put at the centre of the 
analysis the “struggle between capital and labour” to which “industrial relations is the 
core battleground”, which is at the heart of Marxist approaches to the study of political 
economy institutions (Coates 2014: 26). Marxist scholars have highlighted the tension 
between capital and labour, which is intrinsic to capitalist production, in order to 
understand the functioning and the evolution of capitalist economies. In particular, they 
have combined the study of class relations with a macro-perspective on the type of 
national accumulation regime and on the interconnections between capitalist economies 
(Coates 2005: 22 f.).  
 
The emphasis on the conflictual relationship between labour and capital questions the 
concept of institutional equilibrium and rather points at the intrinsic instability of 
institutions in capitalist economies (Coates 2005, Jessop 2014). According to Jessop 
(2014), institutions rely on an “unstable equilibrium of compromise” or “on open use of 
force” and are set in place in order to secure the conditions for capitalist production by 
postponing the class conflict. However, institutions “cannot prevent social conflicts 
from overflowing them” (p.50). Also the analysis of the linkages between internal 
institutional settlements and the international capitalist system, which is characterised 
by increasing competition and prone to crises, contributes to building a dynamic 
framework for the study of political economies and their evolution. Indeed, the frequent 
shifts in the global capitalist system lead to changes of internal settlements between 
labour and capital as well (Coates 2014: 25; see also next section).   
 
This thesis has provided evidence in support of the power resource approach by 
showing that employers have different interests than unions and that cross-class 
compromises are unstable. It has contended that employers’ strategies which challenge 
existing institutional arrangement in order to pursue the maximisation of their profits 
undermine the (already) shrinking basis of labour power in the long run (see section 2). 
The first and second paper have questioned the extent to which employers have an 
interest in retaining core skilled workers, which constitutes the basis for the compromise 
with manufacturing unions according to the coalitional approach. In addition, the 
second paper and particularly the third paper have illustrated that a coalition of interest 
with the management can only be a phase of the unions’ strategies towards marginal 
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workers. By analysing the IG Metall strategies towards agency workers since the 
Seventies, the third paper has shown that a coalition of interests was detrimental to the 
interests of labour as a whole because it allowed the expansion of contingent work, 
which threatened the standards of the core workforce and so the power basis of IG 
Metall. Therefore, the union strategies shifted from cooperative (with the management) 
and exclusive (towards contingent workers) to conflictual and inclusive, rebuilding a 
united labour front against employers’ interests. 
 
 
3.4 The relevance of power relations  
 
The Varieties of Capitalism and the coalitional approach to institutional change neglect 
the power dimension for explaining institutional change and the resilience of 
institutions in the core of political economies. The VoC literature contends that the 
reproduction of institutional arrangements and the outcomes for workers are the result 
of voluntary coordination between labour and management, who both rationally pursue 
their interests. Thus, in coordinated market economies, employers voluntarily 
coordinate with labour and support stable employment and encompassing collective 
agreement setting high and homogeneous wages for large segments of the workforce 
(Soskice 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001). 
 
The dualisation literature has acknowledged that employers’ coordination with labour 
depends (also) on the extent to which labour presence represents an unavoidable hurdle 
employers have to organise around (Thelen 2012: 155). While sectoral unions in the 
manufacturing sector are still considered strong, in the service sector employers do not 
support coordinating institutions because unions are too fragmented and weak to 
constitute an obstacle to employers (Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 2014, Thelen 2014: 
47). Still, the dualisation literature has not interpreted the dynamics of institutional 
change as an expression of the societal conflict along class lines (Thelen 2012: 155). 
The analysis has focused on the political dynamics among labour and management in 
core manufacturing sectors, who are key actors in the process of institutional change. In 
these sectors unions’ interests are seen as overlapping with those of employers, who 
also want to maintain encompassing bargaining institutions for their skilled employees 
(Thelen 2014: 47). Thus, the power balance in core sectors becomes almost irrelevant to 
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the analysis as both sides of the production process strive for the same goals. Even 
though the dualisation literature tries to take into account the role of power more than 
VoC, its coalitional approach ultimately emphasises actors’ preferences for explaining 
different trajectories of institutional change and institutional outcomes in coordinated 
economies.  
 
Power-based explanations are, instead, central to the critical approaches of the study of 
capitalist models and their trajectories of change. The diversity of capitalist models is 
studied (also) looking at dimensions such as the level of institutionalisation of class 
compromise (Pontusson 2005) and the role of labour for the national economic 
performance (Coates 2000). Furthermore, as the power resource approach 
acknowledges that labour and management have different interests regarding the 
regulation of the sphere of labour markets and welfare state, it can focus on “the power 
balance among political-economic actors”, which “ provides the most obvious point of 
departure of an explanation of why institutions and policies change in a particular 
direction” (Pontusson 2005: 165). Thus, the power resource approach is more sensitive 
to the (changing) constraints under which labour actors operate.  
 
First, the scholars of the power resource approach who are closer to the Marxist 
tradition take into consideration in their analysis that labour is structurally 
disadvantaged in capitalist economies because of the power asymmetry which 
characterises the relationship between the employer and the individual workers (Offe 
and Wiesenthal 1985, Coates 2000: 103). Industrial relations and labour market 
institutions can only partly address the power imbalance between labour and capital  
(Coates 2000: 103) and they exist because labour pushed for them against the interests 
of capital (rather than as an outcome of employers’ coordination) (Korpi 1983, Coates 
2000, Korpi 2006).  
 
Second, as Pontusson (1995, 2005) suggests, the form and functioning of political 
economic institutions should be studied as shaped by economic action in order to better 
understand the “systemic power of capital” (Pontusson 1995: 120). For this reason, 
scholars study national political economies embedded in the big picture of global 
capitalism, showing that common trends at the international level “corrode the viability 
of particular internal settlements between classes” (Coates 2005: 20 f.). For instance, 
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Coates’ analysis of different capitalist models considers the interchange between 
national economies, showing that the increasing competition between “capitalist 
enterprises in a context of globalised labour”  has been leading to a deterioration of 
workers’ outcomes in all national economies, even in coordinated (or trust-based) 
models of capitalism (Coates 2000: 260). These findings are compatible with the works 
by Streeck (2009, 2010), Baccaro and Howell (2011) and Baccaro and Benassi (2014, 
forthcoming), who contend that advanced national economies have been showing a 
common trend towards wage deterioration and higher inequality. 
 
Third, the power resource approach criticises the thin role assigned to the state by the 
VoC literature, which considers the state as the executor of employers’ interests by 
providing and maintaining the conditions for national comparative advantage (Jessop 
2014: 52).
43
 In contrast, according to the power resource approach the state is not a 
neutral actor driven by efficiency considerations but rather constitutes “a terrain upon 
which different political forces attempt to impart a specific strategic direction” (Jessop 
1990: 268). State action is fundamental for setting up institutions which constrain the 
markets and, therefore, limit employers’ liberalising strategies; or, for lifting these 
constraints and leaving social actors to voluntary coordination (Jessop 1990: 268 f., 
Jessop 2002: 110 f.). Streeck’s argument (2009) on liberalisation in Germany ascribes a 
similar role to the state: He defines liberalisation as a shift from Durkheimian to 
Williamsonian institutions, which takes place as the state increasingly delegates to the 
private sphere and withdraws from its role as rule-maker and rule-enforcer so that 
institutions lose their ability “of subjecting economic actors individually or collectively 
to social obligations and public responsibilities” (p.157). From these observations, it 
follows that the balance of power between labour and management is greatly sensitive 
to the role the state takes in the economy, either as regulator or as “liberaliser”. Coates 
(2000) clearly illustrates this point in his narrative of the class struggles and of the 
union decline in the UK, when the conservative government headed by Margaret 
Thatcher started its anti-union offensive, reduced the size of the public sector and of 
welfare provisions (p. 86-94).  
 
                                                 
43
 Some works in the dualisation literature acknowledge the role of the state, which distinguishes 
continental European economies from Scandinavian economies. In Scandinavian countries the state plays 
a bigger role in the labour market (e.g. as employer) and therefore contributes to more solidaristic 
workers’ outcomes (Martin and Thelen 2007, Thelen 2014).   
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This thesis is critical in regard to the concept of voluntary labour-management 
coordination in core manufacturing sectors advanced by VoC and by the dualisation 
literature. The thesis has questioned the extent to which production requirements and 
employers’ interests in retaining skilled workers can explain the (expanding) use of 
contingent work (see paper 1 and 2). Furthermore, it has shown that labour power 
resources are fundamental for ensuring employers’ compliance with industrial relations 
institutions and, in the specific case, with sectoral wage agreements and employment 
protection legislation. In conceptualising the power balance between labour and 
management, the thesis has not only looked at the industrial relations institutions at 
workplace level but it has also included external economic dynamics – such as local 
unemployment rate and the outsourcing pressure. As discussed in section 2, the 
influence of increasing market competition on power relations remained in the 
background, even though the managerial pressure for cutting labour costs and the threat 
of outsourcing, which followed the enlargement to Eastern Europe, were often 
mentioned in the interviews and reported as factors to take into account for 
understanding the power balance between works councils and plant management. In 
addition, the thesis has taken into consideration the influence of state action on the 
power relations between labour and management and has shown that national labour 
market reforms, which lifted constraints from employers’ hiring strategies by 
deregulating the use of contingent work, shifted the balance of power in favour of 
employers both at sectoral and at workplace level.   
 
 
4 Contribution 
 
This PhD thesis has contributed to the existing literature by illustrating the dynamics 
between core and peripheral labour market segments. It has challenged the dualisation 
argument that the two labour market segments are clearly distinct and in a dual 
equilibrium in CMEs. It has shown that labour and management constantly bargain the 
boundaries between the two segments, and the outcome depends on the power balance 
between the parties and the strategies they implement. It has argued that institutional 
changes undermining labour cohesiveness and increasing employers’ discretion 
regarding their staffing strategies cause employers’ increasing use of contingent work, 
slowly eroding the size of the traditional core workforce and developing the competition 
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between contingent and permanent workers. Thus, labour includes contingent workers 
in its representation domain when their presence on the labour market starts threatening 
the standards and the future existence of the core workforce.  
 
By pursuing this main argument, the thesis has challenged three main crucial points of 
the dualisation argument regarding the role of labour in segmented labour markets and 
the relevance of power relations for workers’ outcomes and for the liberalisation 
trajectory of CMEs.  
 
 
4.1 Labour responses to competing core and periphery 
 
The dualisation literature has contended that labour might implicitly agree on the use of 
contingent work because these workers serve as flexibility buffers to the core 
workforce. As suggested in the early segmentation literature (Doeringer and Piore 
1971), core and peripheral workforces are supposed to be in two separate labour market 
segments, which are not in competition with each other because they serve different 
functions (Emmenegger, Häusermann et al. 2012b). Thus, the dualisation literature 
suggests that a new dual equilibrium between core and periphery exists and is supported 
by a cross-class coalition between the management and the labour representation of core 
workers. The interests of the two parties overlap because they want to maintain the core 
workers, who are usually more skilled and perform critical functions in the company, 
while reducing the production costs at the expense of the periphery (Palier and Thelen 
2010, Hassel 2014, Thelen 2014; see discussion in section 3.2).  
 
This thesis has contended that the concept of stable cross-class coalitions relies on the 
misinterpretation of the dynamics between core and periphery as distinct labour market 
segments.  On the contrary, the thesis has shown that the expansion of contingent work 
can threaten the standards of the permanent workforce, pushing labour to expand its 
representation domain to marginal workers. The literature on the revitalisation of union 
strategies has already argued that labour is likely to include marginal workers when its 
membership and institutional power resources have been declining (Heery and Adler 
2004). While some scholars have argued that only unions with traditionally scarce 
institutional resources will expand their membership (Baccaro, Hamann et al. 2003),  
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other scholars have shown that strongly institutionalised unions can also adopt 
revitalising strategies departing from the traditional path (Greer 2008a; Turner 2009). 
However, existing literature has mainly focused on exceptional union campaigns for 
organising marginal workers, preventing an analysis of the conditions under which 
unions abandon insider-focused strategies to adopt inclusive strategies and then to 
institutionalise them in the long term.  
 
This thesis has shown that the competition and substitution dynamics between core and 
peripheral workers constitute the triggers for inclusive union strategies towards 
contingent workers (Paper 2 and 3). Blurring boundaries and competition between core 
and periphery indicate that there is no agreement between management and labour 
regarding the definition of “core workforce”, as the dualisation literature suggests. The 
boundaries are rather a matter of political redefinition between the two parties involved. 
Indeed, the adoption of inclusive union strategies is associated with a departure from a 
compromise-oriented approach towards management, and moves towards a more 
confrontative, or at least distant, approach. This shows the instability of cross-class 
coalitions, suggesting instead that “compromise can function but that is dependent on 
the degree to which institutions can protect it from pressures in the market” (Bélanger 
and Edwards 2007: 728). 
 
Furthermore, this research has shown that the conflict regarding the issue of contingent 
work had to be pursued outside single workplaces and escalated to the sectoral level as 
workplace representation could not prevent the expansion of contingent work. By 
setting sectoral standards and including agency workers in their representation domain, 
labour strengthened its power at each bargaining level. This finding also suggests that 
labour cohesion is necessary in an increasingly fragmented labour market for delivering 
positive outcomes for workers (see also Simms and Dean 2014).  
 
 
4.2 A micro-macro approach to the study of power in the workplace 
 
The dualisation literature contends that labour management coordination is still present 
and stable in core manufacturing sectors, despite the erosion of negotiated and 
legislative employment protection at the national level. In CMEs, employers in core 
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manufacturing sectors have no incentive to withdraw their commitment from the 
traditional human resources practices such as training, employment stability and high 
wages, because they provide them with a competitive advantage on international 
markets (Hall and Soskice 2001). Thus, positive workers’ outcomes in core 
manufacturing sectors are a result of voluntary employers’ coordination with labour and 
commitment to industrial relations institution; the constraining role of institutions and 
of labour actors is not mentioned in the VoC approach and remains in the background in 
the dualisation literature (see section 3.3).   
 
In contrast with this interpretation, this thesis has contended that employers are ready to 
withdraw their commitment to coordinated labour market outcomes if the constraints of 
industrial relations institutions have weakened. As discussed in the third section, 
scholars critical of the VoC approach have pointed out the role of institutions not only 
as a structure of opportunity to companies but also as a power resource for labour. Thus, 
labour power has been regarded as fundamental for ensuring working standards, 
including employment stability, and for developing and supporting a complex work 
organisation and encompassing internal labour markets. Some scholars have illustrated 
the relationship between workers’ outcomes and institutional power resources at the 
macro-level through comparative and longitudinal analysis (Western and Healy 1999; 
Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Korpi 2006; Gallie 2007; Heyes, Lewis et al. 2012). Other 
scholars have focused on cross-company differences in workers’ outcomes by looking 
at the bargaining dynamics and the power balance between labour and management in 
the workplace, mainly within a short time frame (Smith 1994; Doellgast 2008; Shire, 
Schönauer et al. 2009).  
 
This thesis has examined employers’ and labour strategies regarding contingent work 
through workplace comparisons (Paper 2) and through a longitudinal analysis (Paper 1 
and 3). This approach provided further evidence in support of the arguments stressing 
the role of power resources for workers’ outcomes and also allowed studying the causal 
link between institutional changes at national level and employers’ and labour strategies 
in the workplace. The second and third paper have illustrated how the decentralisation 
trends of industrial relations and, most of all, national labour market reforms, have 
changed the labour management dynamics at sectoral and especially at workplace level 
while the first paper has investigated the extent to which these phenomena affect 
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employers’ use of contingent work, with a particular focus on the role of skill specificity 
and of job routine.  
 
By so doing, the present research follows the research direction also proposed by 
Hauptmeier and Vidal (2014), who recommend the integration between the 
institutionalist political economy and the labour process literature. This thesis bridges 
the gap between the two literature strands contributing to developing the 
conceptualisation of the linkages between institutions at the macro-level and actors’ 
strategies and workers’ outcomes at the micro-level (see also Doellgast, Nohara et al. 
2009; Doellgast 2012; Thompson 2013). By so doing, this research suggests that 
understanding actors’ strategies and their outcomes at the micro-level requires 
embedding the analysis in the broader (transforming) institutional and socio-economic 
context. 
 
 
4.3 Germany’s liberalisation trajectory 
 
The central role assigned to power resources for determining workers’ outcomes has 
also implications for the debate on the trajectory of change of advanced capitalist 
economies. On the one hand, the dualisation literature has contended that the dual 
equilibrium between a coordinated manufacturing core and a flexible service periphery 
is stable. This argument is mainly based on macro-level analyses, which rely on the 
theoretical assumption that specific skills need to be associated with stable employment 
because of the complex work organisation (Cusack, Iversen et al. 2006; Gebel and 
Giesecke 2011). Furthermore, existing research has often neglected the overtime 
dimension, conducting instead cross-sectoral or cross-country comparisons which 
provide a static picture of the workforce segmentation (Barbieri 2009; Häusermann and 
Schwander 2010; Marx 2011).  
On the other hand, scholars have contended that the liberalisation of employment 
relations has been progressing in all CMEs and in Germany as a consequence of 
declining labour power due to economic structural factors (e.g. tertiarisation, global 
market integration) and to neoliberal reforms. This literature has taken into 
consideration overtime trends but has not looked specifically at changes in core 
manufacturing, and especially at workplace dynamics (Coates 2000; Streeck 2009; 
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Baccaro and Howell 2011). Alternatively, it has provided company-level case studies 
within a limited time frame, which do not provide information on the trend (Doellgast 
and Greer 2007; Lillie and Greer 2007).  
 
This thesis provides further evidence to the latter literature strand by showing that the 
equilibrium between the two labour market segments is not stable and liberalisation is a 
pervasive phenomenon which will not spare the core. It has illustrated how workers’ 
representation at workplace level - even though present and characterised by formally 
strong codetermination rights - could only partly prevent market-based mechanisms 
from filtering in companies’ internal labour markets over the last ten-twenty years 
(Paper 2 and 3). By adopting a micro-level perspective, it has also shown how 
employers’ use of contingent work has changed over time, concentrating temporary 
contract in routine job positions but also slowly affecting the specific skilled workforce. 
These findings have questioned the often assumed linkage between skills, work 
organisation and stable employment (Paper 1). Thus, this research has provided micro-
level evidence showing that liberalisation has also pervaded the German core 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
However, existing literature has seen liberalisation as an irreversible phenomenon, 
neglecting labour’s ability to counteract the process (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Howell 
2011). In contrast, this study suggests that labour and management are constantly 
engaged in a process of deregulation and reregulation of markets (see similarly Tapia 
and Turner 2013). Even though it is too early to draw conclusions on the IG Metall 
success to reverse the liberalisation process, agency work has indeed been re-regulated 
through collective bargaining. In addition, IG Metall is further pursuing its regulatory 
efforts through the recent campaign on subcontractors, which employers have 
increasingly started using since the re-regulation of contingent work.  
 
 
5 Limitations and further research  
 
The research project has two main limitations: the limited information on changes in the 
labour process and skill content and the focus on one sector in one country. This section 
discusses these limitations and suggests directions for further research.    
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5.1 Further development of the labour process perspective 
 
This thesis has investigated the extent to which the erosion of industrial relations and 
labour market institutions affect employers’ use of contingent work, with a particular 
focus on the role of skill specificity and of work routine. In this way, it has critically 
examined the linkage, often assumed in the political economy literature, between high 
quality products, high skills and good working conditions including stable employment.  
 
Besides the routinisation of work organisation and the relaxation of employment 
protection, other factors might facilitate the use of contingent work, which have not 
been taken into consideration. For instance, the standardisation of technology and 
increased automation might favour the transferability of skills across employers as well 
as the standardisation of the skill content. In addition, technology might reduce the need 
for Facharbeiter and polarise the labour demand between unskilled workers and 
workers with tertiary education.
44
 This trend would also lead to the increasing 
employment of contingent workers as workers’ skills in both categories might be 
considered less “specific” and certainly do not require investments from employers.  
 
Thus, further empirical research is needed to explore how the nature of manufacturing 
work and employers’ demand for skills have changed over time and whether these 
changes are associated with the use of flexible contracts.  
 
 
5.2 Improving generalisability 
 
The present research has exclusively focused only on one sector in one country. Even 
though German core manufacturing is a least-likely case for the comparative political 
economy and industrial relations literature, the generalisability of the findings is limited. 
The present research might help to explain employers’ and unions’ strategies regarding 
contingent work in other CMEs but the framework is less useful for LMEs such as the 
UK and the US. As industrial relations and the vocational training system in CMEs are 
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 For instance, the works by Oesch and Rodriguéz Menés (2011) and by Rohrbach-Schmidt  and   
Tiemann (2011) point towards this direction.  
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more institutionalised than in LMEs, CMEs are likely to experience a more durable 
dualisation phase of the workforce in terms of labour market outcomes and workers’ 
representation because existing institutions, even though declining, are more resilient. 
Thus, both employers and unions in CMEs are faced with a different structure of 
resources and constraints than in LMEs.  
 
Furthermore, the dramatic growth of contingent work and unions’ counteraction might 
be typical only of the traditional manufacturing sector. First, the growth of contingent 
work could be due to the decline of the German manufacturing sector as the production 
model is characterised by complex work organisation and high skills. The 
manufacturing sector has become increasingly automated and has experienced the 
introduction of scientific management techniques, which have probably facilitated the 
use of temporary workers. This might imply that the “core workforce”, which benefits 
from high skills and high wages, is now to be found in other occupations (for example 
engineers) and in other sectors (e.g. IT).  Second, strong unions have traditionally 
dominated the manufacturing sector and their power relies both on their institutionalised 
rights and on their mobilisation capacity; therefore manufacturing unions are likely to 
have a bias towards broad-scope recruiting and bargaining.  Smaller professional unions 
might have a different approach towards contingent workers because they are focused 
on providing services to their members and their strength is based on the cohesion of 
members’ interests rather than on the size of the organisation (Look 1997).  
 
These limitations invite further research in the following directions: First, the analysis 
of employers’ and unions’ strategies regarding contingent workers should be expanded 
to different sectors and occupations. In particular, high-skill occupations such as 
software engineers and researchers would represent interesting case studies because 
skills are high but not necessarily acquired in the workplace, and workers’ 
representation structures are not as developed. Thus, the study of these occupations 
would allow the exploration of further aspects regarding the effect of skills on work 
casualisation as well as unions’ interest and commitment to a homogeneous workforce.  
 
Second, the analysis of labour’s role in plant-levels segmentation could be expanded to 
more workplaces, also in different sectors. This type of research would lead to building 
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a comprehensive framework for understanding labour strategies (and their outcomes) 
towards dualisation in the workplace.  
  
Third, the German manufacturing sector could be compared with similar sectors in other 
countries in order to go beyond the specificity of the German system of industrial 
relations. This direction of research allows the investigation of the effect of institutional 
and societal differences on employers’ and labour strategies regarding contingent work.   
 
 
6 Policy implications 
 
6.1 Industrial relations and labour market reforms 
  
The German model has always raised admiration among researchers and policy-makers. 
Advanced technology, high quality products, a high-skilled workforce, encompassing 
bargaining agreements setting high wages and cooperation between labour and 
management at workplace level seemed to represent a “win-win” situation for all parties 
involved. During the nineties the fascination with Germany was obfuscated by the 
economic boom of UK and US, which relied on the expansion of services - especially 
financial services (Coates 1999; Freeman 2000). In those years and until the beginning 
of 2000s, the German manufacturing sector experienced heavy restructuring, which 
fundamentally changed the functioning of the traditional model, as argued by many 
authors
45
 as well as in this thesis.  
 
Especially since the recent economic crisis, the popularity of the German (export-
manufacturing) model has been revived because Germany recovered from the crisis 
fastest and now has one of the strongest economies among advanced countries. Besides 
advocating a return to manufacturing production as a way out of the crisis, the UK and 
the US governments have encouraged the implementation of vocational training 
schemes similar to the German dual vocational training (The Telegraph 01.03.2014; The 
Atlantic Times 15.11.2013). In addition, European institutions have shown growing 
interest for vocational training as an instrument for reducing unemployment and 
                                                 
45
 Jürgens (2004); Streeck (2009); Baccaro and Benassi (2014).  
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creating “good jobs”, as suggested in the Bruges Communiqué (2010). Furthermore, the 
structural reforms discussed and partly implemented in Southern European countries 
reflect the recent reforms in the arenas of industrial relations and of the labour market 
which are regarded as key elements of the German economic success: The reforms 
regard in particular the decentralisation of industrial relations and the relaxation of the 
employment protection legislation for temporary workers (Anderton, Izquierdo et al. 
2012; Dustmann, Fitzenberger et al. 2014).  
 
Given the political prominence of Germany, this thesis has important policy 
implications because it critically examines the functioning of the German labour market 
and industrial relations institutions. First, this thesis has shown that vocational training 
does not automatically lead to the creation of “good jobs”. This thesis has provided 
evidence that precarious contracts can also spread in high-skill sectors if existing 
industrial relations institutions do not support high wages and employment security. 
Similarly, Streeck’s argument on the “beneficial constraints” (1991; 1992) suggested 
that  the causality between skills and working conditions should not be inverted: The 
obligation to pay high wages and to retain employees led to employers’ investment in 
training, not the other way around.  
 
Second, this thesis has shown that the decentralisation of industrial relations – even in a 
country with strong codetermination rights such as Germany – weakens labour and 
works to the advantage of the management if national labour market legislation and 
sectoral agreements do not set out homogenous and inderogable standards. The 
decentralisation of industrial relations is regarded as the main instrument to increase 
export competitiveness because it incentivises labour-management cooperation at 
company-level around wage issues (Dustmann, Fitzenberger et al. 2014). Industrial 
relations in several European countries have been undergoing a process of organised 
decentralisation, especially in Southern European countries in the post-crisis period 
(Keune 2011; Marginson 2014). For instance, since the recent economic crisis, Italian 
policy-makers have often made reference to the German codetermination model and the 
opening clauses for promoting industrial relations reforms aimed at decentralising the 
bargaining system (Boeri in La Voce 18.07.2005; Sbilanciamoci 27.12.2012). Part of 
the Italian labour movement has agreed to opening clauses derogating the sectoral 
collective agreements in the automotive company FIAT, and to a national framework 
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agreement contributing to the decentralisation of industrial relations (L'Unità 
11.01.2011; La Repubblica 22.11.2012).  
 
Third, the thesis has shown that labour market reforms considered to be “at the 
margins” actually have an impact on the whole workforce. They not only lead to a 
dramatic expansion of precarious work but also undermine the representation and the 
standards of the core permanent workforce. These findings invite policy-makers (at 
least from the left-wing spectrum) to think carefully about the implementation of labour 
market reforms similar to the Hartz reforms, which have been publicly advocated for 
increasing the flexibility of the labour market and creating jobs (Merkel in Bloomberg 
News 19.02.2013; Il Fatto Quotidiano 27.03.2014). As argued in the literature, the 
increase of precarious contracts has consequences not only for workers’ representation 
and industrial democracy but also for the welfare of the wider society (Paugam and 
Russell 2005; Standing 2011; Dörre 2013). Furthermore, the findings question recent 
political claims in Mediterranean countries about the necessity of implementing a single 
labour contract for all workers with lower employment protection. Academics and 
policy makers have promoted these reforms as an egalitarian instrument for bridging the 
unfair divide between labour market insiders and outsiders (Boeri and Garibaldi 2008; 
Ichino 2009; Bentolila, Dolado et al. 2012). The present thesis has shown, instead, that 
the divide is less marked than it is suggested by these political claims, questioning the 
actual need to lower institutionalised protection for the whole workforce.  
 
 
6.2 Unions’ strategies in segmented labour markets 
 
This thesis has two main policy implications for unions. First, unions should expand 
their representation boundaries in increasingly fragmented labour markets. The IG 
Metall campaign has shown that the formulation of inclusive bargaining goals and of a 
united labour front is the most effective instruments for defending collectively-agreed 
labour standards from erosion due to the casualisation of work.  
 
Second, this thesis has shown that unions should not be afraid of building conflict 
potential against employers. When organisation and institutional power resources are 
declining, a compromise-oriented approach is likely to lead to concessions and is not a 
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sustainable strategy in the long-term because it slowly erodes labour power. Active 
recruiting initiatives, demonstrations outside the workplace and the strategic use of 
media for raising public awareness have been found instead to contribute to the success 
of bargaining initiatives.  
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Section 1: Variable description 
 
Variable list 
 
Age: 
Question: (filled in by the interviewer) 
Variable construction: The values have been grouped in five categories: 15-24; 25-34; 
35-44; 45-54; 55-64. 
Values: The categories have been assigned values from 1 to 5. The first category 
includes workers between 15 and 25 years old and takes value 1. Workers between 26-
35 belong to the second category, which has value 2. The remaining categories (from 3 
to 5) have been built in a similar way.   
 
Company size:  
Question: How many employees does the company have? 
Variable construction: The values have been grouped into three categories: n. 
employees <10;   10≤ n. employees≤500; n. employees>500.  
Values: The three categories have the following values: The first category (below 10 
employees) takes value 1. The second category (between 10 and 500 employees) takes 
value 2: the third category (above 500 employees) takes value 3.  
 
Eastern Germany:  
Values: The variable is dummy-coded: The value is equal to 1 if the respondent works 
in a Federal State belonging to the former German Democratic Republic and it is equal 
to 0 if the respondent works in a Federal State belonging to the former Federal Republic 
of Germany. Berlin has been coded as belonging to Eastern Germany.  
 
Gender:  
Question:(filled in by the interviewer) 
Values: 1=male; 0=female 
 
Highest qualification:  
Question: The variable has been constructed by the researchers of the Federal Institute 
for Vocational Training and Education (BIBB) for the waves 1998-2012 and by myself 
for the first two waves, therefore there is no specific question but the surveys contain 
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separate questions, asking whether the respondent has any qualification, a vocational 
training degree, a degree as master craftsman, technician or senior clerk, and tertiary 
education.  
Variable construction: The variable “highest qualification” entails four categories: ‘no 
qualification’, ‘vocational training’, ‘qualification as master craftsmen, technicians and 
senior clerks’, and ‘tertiary education’. In order to build the variable for the first two 
waves, I had to make the assumption that workers obtained degrees in the order in 
which the categories have been presented.
46
 For instance, I created the dummy variable 
“vocational training as highest qualification” and assigned the value 1 to all workers 
who have a vocational training degree but stated they did not have any other education 
degree, and the value 0 to all workers without a vocational training degree or with a 
higher degree. I applied the same procedure to constructing the variables “master 
craftsman or technician as highest qualification” and “tertiary education as highest 
qualification”. A fifth category “other qualifications” was coded as a missing value, 
given the limited relevance from both a numerical and an analytical perspective, and the 
difficulty of classifying the qualification degrees within the four categories of the 
variable in the last three waves. The two qualifications were: civil servants’ training 
(Beamtenausbildung) and professional health training (Schule des Gesundheitswesens). 
I then used the dummies ‘no qualification’, ‘vocational training’, ‘qualification as 
master craftsmen, technicians and senior clerks’, and ‘tertiary education’to build the 
categorical variable “highest qualification” for the last two waves. 
Values: The categories have been assigned values from 1 to 4. no qualification=1, 
vocational training=2, qualification as master craftsmen, technicians and senior 
clerks=3, and tertiary education=4.  
 
Job routine:  
Question: How often do you repeat the same work procedure? 
Variable construction: The answers’ scale changes across waves as follows:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 The procedure has been discussed by email with Dr. Daniela Rohrbach-Schmidt from the BIBB. The 
correspondence can be made available.  
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Value 1985/86 - 1998/99 2005/06 - 2011/12 
1 almost always often 
2 often sometimes 
3 now and then rarely 
4 rarely never 
5 almost never  
 
For the first three waves I recoded the value 1 and 2 into the value 1 and assigned the 
value 0 to all other values. For the last two waves, I assigned value 0 to the values 2,3 
and 4. I then merged the dummy variables into the dummy variable “job routine” across 
waves.  
Values: 1=highly routine; 0=partly or non-routine 
 
Local unemployment rate:  
Variable construction: The variable reports the unemployment rate by Federal State for 
each wave year. The data is from the official statistics of the Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur  für Arbeit 2012c). 
 
Occupational group:  
Question: Which occupational group do you belong to?  
Variable construction: The variable refers to the job position of the respondents rather 
than to their formal qualification, and includes three categories within the bluecollar 
workforce: unskilled, skilled and master craftsmen/technicians/senior clerks. The 
categorisation of master craftsmen, technicians and senior clerks includes both blue 
collar and white collar workers since 1991/92 because the differentiation is due to an 
insurance reform rather than to an actual job differentiation (Meine 2005). In the last 
two waves there is a separate question for this category, which asks whether the 
respondent is a whitecollar worker, master craftsman or technician. The positive 
answers have been included in the categorical variable “occupational group” in the last 
two waves. 
Values: The categories have been assigned values from 1 to 3. 1=unskilled; 2= skilled; 
3= master craftsmen/technicians/senior clerks 
 
Overqualification (only for the waves 1986-1998):  
Question: Could someone with a lower or a different qualification do your job? 
Variable construction: The variable had three values: 1=yes, with a lower qualification; 
2=with a different qualification; 3=no. I assigned value =0 to the values 2 and 3.  
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Values: 1=overqualified; 0=non-overqualified 
 
Overskilling (only for the waves 1998-2012):  
Question: Do you think that the job requirements reflect your skills or do you feel 
overchallenged or underchallenged?  
Variable construction: The variable originally had three values: 1=skills are appropriate 
for my job; 2=I feel overchallenged; 3=I feel underchallenged. I assigned value=1 to 
value=3 and the value 0 to the other answers.  
Values: 1=underchallenged; 0=overchallenged or appropriate skills. 
 
Sectoral dummies:  
Question: In which sector is your company? 
Variable construction: The classification of sectors changes between the waves 1998 
and 2006. This is how the codes correspond across waves:  
 1986-1998 2006-2012 
Automotive  16 34 
Chemical  11 24, 25 
Electronics  19 31,32 
Fine mechanics  20 33 
Glass  12 26 
Machine tool building 15 29 
Ship and aeroplane building 17 35 
Steel and metal 13 27 
 
A dummy variable has been created for each sector.  
Values: 1=it belongs to the sector; 0=it does not belong to that sector.  
 
Skill specificity: 
Question: For the waves 1986-1992: In what occupation have you completed your last 
vocational training? For the waves 1998-2006 there are five different questions asking 
what the occupational code of the respondent’s first, second, third, fourth and fifth 
vocational training is.  
Variable construction: This variable refers to the workers who have their latest 
vocational training qualification – which is not necessarily the highest qualification – in 
an occupation which is immediately relevant to core manufacturing sectors. The 
ISCO88 codes of the occupations are between 10 and 15 and between 19 and 32. The 
corresponding occupations in the wave 1985/86, which precedes the publication of the 
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International Standard Classification of Occupations, take values between 1210 and 
1541 and between 1910 and 3237. I constructed the variable for the last three waves. As 
with the variable “highest qualification”, I consulted Dr. Rohrbach-Schmidt from the 
BIBB for the right procedure. In each wave I have created 5 different dummy variables, 
which take value 1 if the repondent has a vocational training degree in a sector-relevant 
occupation AND if the respondent answered “no” to the other four questions. The 
variables take value 0 if the respondent answered no to having a vocational training 
degree in a sector-relevant occupation or if they answered “yes” to one of the other 
questions.  
Values: 1=vocational training degree in a sector relevant occupation; 0=no vocational 
training degree in a sector relevant occupation 
 
 
Task dummies (Only for the waves 2006-2012):  
Question: There is one question for each of the tasks. Each question asks how often the 
respondent performs tasks including production of goods, quality checks, supervision of 
machinery, maintenance, goods supply, logistics, production planning, product 
development, training others, security, working with IT. 
Variable construction: The answers were 1=often; 2=rarely; 3=never 9=I don’t know, 
which has been recoded as a missing value. The values 2 and 3 have been recoded as 0.  
Values: 1=the task is performed often; 0=the task is performed rarely or never.  
 
Temporary contract:  
Question: Do you have a fixed-term contract? 
Variable construction: Besides the question above, a separate question was introduced 
in the last three waves, whether the worker was employed by a staff agency. Thus, in 
the last three years a dummy variable was created including all temporary workers and 
the agency workers on a permanent contract, assuming that the agency workers who 
have a temporary contract with a staff agency would have answered “yes” to the 
question whether they were employed on a temporary contract.  
Values: 1=temporary contracts; 0=permanent contract 
 
Time:  
Variable construction: Time has been coded as a continuous variable.  
Values: 1=1986; 2=1992; 3=1998; 4=2006; 5=2012. 
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Table A 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Temporary contract 10615 0.068016 0.251783 0 1 
Local unemployment rate 10710 8.42304 3.148066 3.7 20.4 
Gender 10710 0.848847 0.358213 0 1 
Firm size (<10 as reference category) 
<10 10630   0 1 
10-500 10630 0.347549 0.476213 0 1 
>500 10630 0.40258 0.490439 0 1 
Total 10630 0.170538 0.376121 0 1 
Eastern Germany 10710 0.170538 0.376121 0 1 
Specific skills 10420 0.725528 0.446269 0 1 
Routine 10327 0.551602 0.497352 0 1 
Age (15-25 as reference category)   
26-35 10710 0.277284 0.447677 0 1 
36-45 10710 0.276601 0.447337 0 1 
46-54 10710 0.231341 0.421708 0 1 
55-64 10710 0.096413 0.29517 0 1 
Chemical 10710 0.173015 0.378276 0 1 
Glass 10710 0.057216 0.232265 0 1 
Steel 10710 0.116994 0.321427 0 1 
Machine tool 10710 0.200598 0.400465 0 1 
Automotive 10710 0.244748 0.429956 0 1 
Ship and aeroplane building 10710 0.020752 0.142557 0 1 
Electronics 10710 0.152775 0.359786 0 1 
Fine mechanics 10710 0.033903 0.180986 0 1 
Highest qualification (no qualification as reference category)  
vocational training 10678 0.766056 0.423355 0 1 
qualification as master craftsman or 
technician 10678 0.091822 0.288872 0 1 
tertiary education 10678 0.012417 0.11074 0 1 
Overqualification
a 
9548 0.3191 0.466 0 1 
Overskilling
b
  6033 0.1 0.30194 0 1 
a 
only for the waves 1985/85, 1991/92, 1998/99 
b 
only for the waves 1998/99, 1005/05, 2011/12 
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Section 2: Logistic regression analysis 
Table A 2: Multicollinearity table 
Variable  VIF Tolerance 
Age  1.05 0.95 
Eastern Germany 1.43 0.70 
Firm size 1.03 0.97 
Gender 1.22 0.82 
Local unemployment rate 1.44 0.69 
Routine 1.06 0.95 
Specific skills 1.23 0.82 
Time 1.13 0.12 
 
 
Table A 3: Correlation table  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Temporary contract 1        
2. Specific skills -0.170 1       
3. Local unemployment rate 0.119 0.059 1      
4. Gender -0.194 0.688 0.0280 1     
5. Age -0.175 -0.103 -0.011 -0.003 1    
6. Firm size 0.008 -0.135 -0.113 -0.030 0.090 1   
7. Eastern Germany 0.269 0.075 0.699 -0.194 0.062 -0.089 1  
8.Time 0.130 -0.110 -0.160 -0.187 0.2182 0.076 0.201 1 
9. Routine 0.159 -0.325 -0.010 -0.328 0.040 0.129 -0.01 0.010 
 
 
 
Significance of interaction terms  
 
Norton et al. (2004) show that the interpretation of interaction terms in non-linear 
models is less straightforward than in linear models. As the significance and sign of the 
interaction term are not interpretable directly from the table, they suggest analysing the 
interaction terms with the STATA command inteff.
47
 The command, which has to be 
run after the logit, shows the interaction effect and the z-statistics for each observation  
(Norton, Wang et al. 2004).  
 
Figure A1 and A2 below show the analysis of the interaction term specific skills*time, 
run after the logit in Modell II in section 5. The interaction term is negative and 
significant for all observations. Figures A3 and A4 show that the interaction term 
                                                 
47
 By now the literature has reached the consensus that interaction terms should never be interpreted from 
the table, even in linear regressions (Brambor, Clark et al. 2006; Williams 2012).  
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routinisation*time is positive and significant not for all, but for most observations, 
similar to the case illustrated by Norton et al. (2004) (p.166). This shows that reading 
the results from the table can be misleading. However, the analysis of the interaction 
term in the paper has been conducted through the command “margins”, which is now 
considered correct standard practice (Brambor, Clark et al. 2006; Buis 2010; Williams 
2012). Furthermore, the command inteff does not allow analysing interaction terms with 
more than two constituent terms (Norton, Wang et al. 2004).  
 
Figure A 1:  Interaction effect specific skills*time 
 
 
 
  207 
Figure A 2: Z-statistics of the interaction effect specific skills*time 
 
Figure A 3: Interaction effect routine*time 
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Figure A 4: Z-statistics of the interaction effect routine*time 
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Table A 4: Average Marginal Effects of skill specificity at different time points 
 dy/dx   z     P>|z| 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
-.0091898    
(.0063655) -1.44    0.149 -0.021666 0.0032864 
1992 
-.0183747    
(.0059627) -3.08    0.002 -0.0300614 -0.006688 
1998 
-.032023    
(.0065787) -4.87    0.000 -0.044917 -0.019129 
2006 
-.0515403    
(.0110078) -4.68    0.000 -0.0731153 -0.0299654 
2012 
-.0783558    
(.0202764) -3.86    0.000 -0.1180969 -0.0386147 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A 5: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different time points  
| dy/dx    z P>|z| 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
.0117753  
( .0051581) 2.28 0.022 0.0016656 0.021885 
1992 
.0164555 
(.0044331) 3.71 0.000 0.0077668 0.0251442 
1998 
.0226549 
(.004814) 4.71 0.000 0.0132197 0.0320902 
2006 
.0307303 
(.0082351) 3.73 0.000 0.0145898 0.0468708 
2012 
.0410456 
(.01481) 2.77 0.006 0.0120185 0.0700726 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A 6: Adjusted probabilities of being on a temporary contracts among workers with and without 
specific skills 
                               Probability z P>|z| 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
specific skills= 0   
.0423016   
(.0057865) 7.31 0.000 0.03096 0.053643 
1986 
specific skills= 1  
.0331118   
(.0030982) 10.69 0.000 0.02704 0.039184 
1992 
specific skills= 0   
.0591863   
(.0054865) 10.79 0.000 0.048433 0.06994 
1992 
specific skills= 1   
.0408116    
(.002627) 15.54 0.000 0.035663 0.045961 
1998 
specific skills= 0   
.0822319   
(.0060019) 13.7 0.000 0.070469 0.093995 
1998 
specific skills= 1   
.050209   
(.0028368) 17.7 0.000 0.044649 0.055769 
2006 
specific skills= 0   
.1131715   
(.0101613) 11.14 0.000 0.093256 0.133087 
2006 
specific skills= 1   
.0616311   
(.0046519) 13.25 0.000 0.052514 0.070749 
2012 
specific skills= 0   
.1538011   
(.0190771) 8.06 0.000 0.116411 0.191192 
2012 
specific skills= 1   
.0754453   
(.0080436) 9.38 0.000 0.05968 0.091211 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A 7: Adjusted probabilities of being on a temporary contracts among workers in routine jobs and in 
non-routine jobs 
                          Probability z P>|z| 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
routine = 0   
.0296682    
(.0034681) 8.55 0.000 0.022871 0.036466 
1986 
routine = 1  
.0414435    
(.0041529) 9.98 0.000 0.033304 0.049583 
1992 
routine = 0   
.0372164    
(.0029646) 12.55 0.000 0.031406 0.043027 
1992 
routine = 1   
.0536719    
(.0036131) 14.85 0.000 0.046591 0.060753 
1998 
routine = 0   
.0465929    
 (.003296) 14.14 0.000 0.040133 0.053053 
1998 
routine = 1   
.0692478    
(.0038048) 18.2 0.000 0.061791 0.076705 
2006 
routine = 0   
.058189   
(.0056137) 10.37 0.000 0.047186 0.069192 
2006 
routine = 1   
.0889192   
 (.0063799) 13.94 0.000 0.076415 0.101424 
2012 
routine = 0   
.0724517   
 (.0099241) 7.3 0.000 0.053001 0.091903 
2012 
routine = 1   
.1134973   
 (.0115648) 9.81 0.000 0.090831 0.136164 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A 8: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different values of skill specificity 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
Specific skills=0 
0.015934 
(0.004668) 3.41 0.001 0.006786 0.025083 
Specific skills=1 
0.029881 
(0.010279) 2.91 0.004 0.009735 0.050027 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table A 9: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different time points among workers with specific 
skills 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
1986 0.015221 
(0.006823) 2.23 0.026 0.001849 0.028593 
1992 0.017376 
(0.005584) 3.11 0.002 0.006431 0.02832 
1998 0.019656 
(0.006016) 3.27 0.001 0.007866 0.031447 
2006 0.022009 
(0.010025) 2.2 0.028 0.00236 0.041658 
2012 0.024358 
(0.017154) 1.42 0.156 -0.00926 0.057979 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Section 3: Robustness checks 
 
Table A 10: Logistic regression with wave dummies 
 (1) 
VARIABLES  
  
Specific skills -0.509*** 
 (0.0992) 
Job routine 0.413*** 
 (0.0892) 
W1986 as reference category 
 
 
W1992 0.0843 
 (0.146) 
W1998 0.449*** 
 (0.138) 
W2006 0.733*** 
 (0.170) 
W2012 0.957*** 
 (0.181) 
Local unemployment rate 0.0279 
 (0.0213) 
Male respondent -0.213* 
 (0.125) 
Reference category: age 15-25 
 
 
26-35 -1.028*** 
 (0.120) 
36-45 -1.498*** 
 (0.129) 
46-55 -1.562*** 
 (0.139) 
56-65 -1.614*** 
 (0.186) 
Reference category for firm size:<10 employees  
10≤ employees ≤500 0.406*** 
 (0.115) 
>500 employees 0.157 
 (0.118) 
Eastern Germany 0.900*** 
 (0.155) 
Sectoral dummies Yes  
  
Constant -2.383*** 
 (0.345) 
  
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
Pseudo R2 
408.00 
0.000 
0.0841 
Observations 9,922 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 11: Logistic regression with clustered standard errors 
 (I) (II) 
VARIABLES Standard errors clustered 
by sector 
Standard errors 
clustered by sector 
   
Specific skills -0.509*** -0.509*** 
 (0.0880) (0.0852) 
Job routine 0.412*** 0.412*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0929) 
Time trend 0.268*** 0.268*** 
 (0.0842) (0.0781) 
Local unemployment rate 0.0367** 0.0367 
 (0.0185) (0.0296) 
Male respondent -0.215*** -0.215** 
 (0.0660) (0.0977) 
Reference category: age 15-25 
 
  
26-35 -1.037*** -1.037*** 
 (0.128) (0.0973) 
36-45 -1.504*** -1.504*** 
 (0.0858) (0.124) 
46-55 -1.566*** -1.566*** 
 (0.0968) (0.214) 
56-65 -1.624*** -1.624*** 
 (0.203) (0.219) 
   
Reference category for firm size:<10 
employees 
 
  
10≤ employees ≤500 0.406** 0.406*** 
 (0.205) (0.227) 
>500 employees 0.153 0.153 
 (0.190) (0.127) 
   
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes 
   
Constant -2.791*** -2.791*** 
 (0.324) (0.363) 
   
Observations 9,922 9,922 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 12: Logistic regression without Eastern Germany in the sample 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
VARIABLES No 
interaction 
Interaction  
specific 
skills*time 
Interaction  
routine*time 
Full interacted 
model 
     
Specific skills -0.486*** -0.168 -0.485*** -0.589 
 (0.118) (0.270) (0.118) (0.489) 
Job routine 0.547*** 0.545*** 0.426 0.0671 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.262) (0.490) 
Time trend 0.435*** 0.505*** 0.407*** 0.360** 
 (0.0460) (0.0685) (0.0722) (0.144) 
Specific skills*time  -0.110  0.0630 
  (0.0830)  (0.162) 
Job routine*time   0.0436 0.186 
   (0.0853) (0.159) 
Job routine*specific skills    0.573 
    (0.579) 
Job routine*specific 
skills*time 
   -0.233 
    (0.190) 
Local unemployment rate 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) 
Male respondent -0.298** -0.293** -0.297** -0.289* 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) 
Reference category: age 15-
25 
 
    
26-35 -1.138*** -1.139*** -1.139*** -1.138*** 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) 
36-45 -1.716*** -1.718*** -1.718*** -1.718*** 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
46-55 -1.998*** -2.002*** -1.999*** -1.999*** 
 (0.175) (0.176) (0.175) (0.176) 
56-65 -1.989*** -1.998*** -1.994*** -2.001*** 
 (0.221) (0.222) (0.221) (0.222) 
     
Reference category for firm 
size:<10 employees 
 
0.289** 0.293** 0.290** 0.296** 
10≤ employees ≤500 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) 
 0.0441 0.0557 0.0472 0.0608 
>500 employees (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) 
     
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Constant 
 
-3.554*** 
 
-3.767*** 
 
-3.480*** 
 
-3.416*** 
 (0.399) (0.438) (0.425) (0.560) 
     
     
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
Pseudo R2 
319.95 
0.000 
0.0991 
325.23 
0.000 
0.0996 
322.02 
0.000 
0.0992 
331.20 
0.000 
0.1001 
Observations 8,369 8,369 8,369 8,369 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 13: Average Marginal Effects of skill specificity at different time points in the sample without 
Eastern Germany 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
-0.00822 
(0.005982) -1.37 0.170 -0.01994 0.003506 
1992 
-0.01656 
(0.006349) -2.61 0.009 -0.02901 -0.00412 
1998 
-0.03017 
(0.007703) -3.92 0.000 -0.04526 -0.01507 
2006 
-0.05077 
(0.013466) -3.77 0.000 -0.07717 -0.02438 
2012 
-0.07964 
(0.025453) -3.13 0.002 -0.12952 -0.02975 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A 14: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different time points in the sample without Eastern 
Germany 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
0.01335 
(0.004749) 2.81 0.005 0.004042 0.022658 
1992 
0.020306 
(0.004733) 4.29 0.000 0.011029 0.029582 
1998 
0.030157 
(0.005848) 5.16 0.000 0.018696 0.041618 
2006 
0.043461 
(0.010935) 3.97 0.000 0.022029 0.064894 
2012 
0.060404 
(0.021064) 2.87 0.004 0.01912 0.101688 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table A 15: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different values of skill specificity in the sample 
without Eastern Germany 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
Specific skills=0 
0.021104 
(0.005394) 3.91 0.000 0.010532 0.031676 
Specific skills=1 
0.035233 
(0.010612) 3.32 0.001 0.014435 0.056031 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A 16: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different time points among workers with specific 
skills in the sample without Eastern Germany 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
0.011272 
(0.004177) 2.7 0.007 0.003085 0.019458 
1992 
0.015173 
(0.004185) 3.63 0.000 0.006971 0.023376 
1998 
0.020104 
(0.005431) 3.7 0.000 0.00946 0.030749 
2006 
0.02608 
(0.010561) 2.47 0.014 0.005381 0.046778 
2012 
0.032882 
(0.021111) 1.56 0.119 -0.00849 0.074258 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A 17: Logistic regression analysis only on companies with more than 500 employees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES No 
routine 
No 
interaction 
Interaction  
specific 
skills*time 
Interaction  
routine*time 
Full 
interacted 
model 
      
Specific skills -0.200 -0.118 0.494 -0.115 -0.376 
(0.643) (0.162) (0.171) (0.382) (0.171) 
Job routine  0.401*** 0.403*** -0.0970 -0.920 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.342) (0.690) 
Time trend 0.339*** 0.292*** 0.442*** 0.180** 0.159 
(0.0594) (0.0596) (0.0994) (0.0895) (0.197) 
Specific skills*time   -0.213*  0.0259 
  (0.115)  (0.217) 
Job routine*time    0.178 0.388* 
   (0.110) (0.225) 
Job routine*specific skills    1.194 
   (0.793) 
Job routine*specific skills*time     -0.314 
    (0.259) 
Local unemployment rate 0.0528** 0.0244 0.0240 0.0241 0.0243 
(0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0271) 
Male respondent -0.321 -0.400* -0.404* -0.419** -0.438** 
(0.204) (0.211) (0.210) (0.211) (0.213) 
Reference category: age 15-25      
26-35 -
1.191***  
(0.188) 
-1.226***  
(0.194) 
-1.237***  
(0.193) 
-1.229***  
(0.193) 
-
1.239***  
(0.193) 
36-45 -
1.619*** 
(0.206) 
-1.714*** 
(0.212) 
-1.723*** -1.722*** -
1.728*** 
(0.212) (0.213) (0.212) 
46-55 -
1.698*** 
-1.756*** -1.775*** -1.767*** -
1.782*** 
(0.227) (0.226) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227) 
56-65 -
1.992*** 
-2.004*** -2.018*** -2.028*** -
2.038*** 
(0.344) (0.346) (0.345) (0.344) (0.343) 
      
Eastern Germany 0.523*** 0.969*** 0.989*** 0.969*** 0.977*** 
 (0.199) (0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.219) 
 
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant -
2.606*** 
-2.343*** -2.779*** -2.002*** -1.790** 
 (0.536) (0.530) (0.582) (0.567) (0.766) 
      
Observations 4,123 3,911 3,911 3,911 3,911 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 18: Average Marginal Effects of skill specificity at different time points in companies with more 
than 500 employees 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
0.006487 
(.0074753)     0.87 0.386 -0.00816 0.021138 
1992 
0.001771 
(.0073002) 0.24 0.808 -0.01254 0.016079 
1998 
-0.00695 
(.0084793) -0.82 0.413 -0.02356 0.009674 
2006 
-0.02158 
(.0147977)     -1.46 0.145 -0.05059 0.00742 
2012 
-0.04447 
(.028679) -1.55 0.121 -0.10068 0.011736 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A 19: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different time points in companies with more than 
500 employees 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
  .0039355 
(.0071375) 0.55 0.581 -0.01005 0.017925 
1992 
   .0105462 
(.0063222) 1.67 0.095 -0.00185 0.022938 
1998 
  .0205898 
(.0070005) . 2.94 0.003 0.006869 0.034311 
2006 
.0352842  
(.0120202) 2.94 0.003 0.011725 0.058843 
2012 
  .0560274 
(.0221189) 2.53 0.011 0.012675 0.09938 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A 20: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different at different values of skill specificity in 
companies with more than 500 employees 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
Specific skills=0 
0.019398 
(0.00731) 2.65 0.008 0.005064 0.033731 
Specific skills=1 
0.003431 
(0.01302) 0.26 0.792 -0.0221 0.028967 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A 21: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different time points among workers with specific 
skills in companies with more than 500 employees 
 dy/dx z P>z 95% Confidence interval 
1986 
0.012967 
(0.010686) 
1.21 0.225 -0.00798 0.03391 
1992 
0.018984 
(0.008894) 
2.13 0.033 0.001551 0.036416 
1998 
0.026772 
(0.009453) 
2.83 0.005 0.008244 0.0453 
2006 
0.036654 
(0.015412) 
2.38 0.017 0.006448 0.06686 
2012 
0.048943 
(0.026301) 
1.86 0.063 -0.00261 0.100492 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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„Arbeitnehmerüberlassung“. Endbericht zum 29. Mai 2009 . Nurnberg, Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung.  
  224 
Crouch, C. (2005a). Capitalist Diversity and Change: Recombinant Governance and 
Institutional Pioneers. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Crouch, C. (2005b). "Dialogue on ‘Institutional complementarity and political 
economy’." Socio-Economic Review 3(2): 359-382.  
Crouch, C. and H. Farrell (2004). Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? 
Alternatives to the New Determinism. MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/05. Cologne, Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. 
Cusack, T., T. Iversen, et al. (2006). "Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of 
Government Redistribution." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(3): 365-389. 
Davis-Blake, A. and B. Uzzi (1993). "Determinants of Employment Externalization: A 
Study of Temporary Workers and Independent Contractors." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 38(2): 195-223. 
DGB Bundesvorstand (2009). Krise trifft Junge und Ältere besonders stark. 
Arbeitsmarkt aktuell 07/2009. Berlin, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund. 
Die Tageszeitung (17.02.2014). "In der Leiharbeiterfalle." Retrieved 22.05.2012, from 
http://www.taz.de/Beschaeftigungsmodelle-bei-BMW/!133213/  
Doellgast, V. (2008). "National Industrial Relations and Local Bargaining Power in the 
US and German Telecommunications Industries." European Journal of Industrial 
Relations 14(3): 265-287. 
Doellgast, V. (2009). "Still a Coordinated Model - Market Liberalisation and the 
Transformation of Employment Relations in the German Telecommunications Industry 
" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 63(1): 3-23. 
Doellgast, V. (2010). "Collective Voice under Decentralized Bargaining: A 
Comparative Study of Work Reorganisation in US and German Call Centres." British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 48(2): 375-399. 
Doellgast, V. (2012). Disintegrating Democracy at Work. Labor Unions and the Future 
of Good Jobs in the Service Economy. Ithaca, ILR Press. 
Doellgast, V. and I. Greer (2007). "Vertical Disintegration and the Disorganisation of 
German Industrial Relations." British Journal of Industrial Relations 45(1): 55-76. 
Doellgast, V., H. Nohara, et al. (2009). "Institutional Change and the Restructuring of 
Service Work in the French and German Telecommunication Industry." European 
Journal of Industrial Relations 15(4): 373–394. 
Doellgast, V., K. Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, et al. (2013). Institutions and Inequality in 
Liberalized Markets: A Cross-National Comparison. LSE, Unpublished manuscript. 
Doellgast, V., R. Batt, et al. (2009). "Introduction: Institutional Change and Labour 
Market Segmentation in European Call Centres." European Journal of Industrial 
Relations 15(4): 349–371. 
  225 
Doeringer, P. J. and M. Piore (1971). Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. 
Lexington (MA), Heath Lexington Books. 
Dore, R. P. (1973). British Factory, Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity 
in Industrial Relations. Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford, University of California Press. 
Dörre, K. (2001). "Das deutsche Produktionsmodell unter dem Druck des Shareholder 
Value." KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 53(4): 675-704. 
Dörre, K. (2013). "Das neue Elend: Zehn Jahre Hartz-Reformen." Blätter für deutsche 
und internationale Politik 3/2013: 99-107. 
Drago, R. and G. T. Garvey (1998). "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and 
Evidence." Journal of Labor Economics 16(1): 1-25. 
Dribbusch, H. (2004). "Agreements on Cost-Cutting and Job Security Signed at 
Volkswagen." Retrieved 20.05.2014, from 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/11/feature/de0411203f.htm.   
Dribbusch, H. and P. Birke (2012). Trade Unions in Germany. Organisation, 
Environment, Challenges. Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Dustmann, C., B. Fitzenberger, et al. (2014). "From Sick Man of Europe to Economic 
Superstar: Germany's Resurgent Economy." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
28(1): 167-188. 
Eaton, A. E. (1990). "The Extent and Determinants of Local Union Control of 
Participative Programs." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(5): 604-620. 
Ebbinghaus, B. and J. Visser (1999). "When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and 
Decline in Western Europe, 1950‚Äì1995." European Sociological Review 15(2): 135-
158. 
Ebbinghaus, B., C. Goebel, et al. (2008). "Mitgliedschaft in Gewerkschaften: 
Inklusions- und Exklusionstendenzen in der Organisation von Arbeitnehmerinteressen 
in Europa." Working Paper 111. Retrieved 05/03/2009, from http://www.mzes.uni-
mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-111.pdf.   
Edwards, P. and J. Wajcman (2005). Introductions: Why and How Should We be 
Thinking about Work? The Politics of Working Life. P. Edwards and J. Wajcman. 
Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press: 1-18. 
Edwards, P., M. Collinson, et al. (1998). "The Determinants of Employee Responses to 
Total Quality Management: Six Case Studies." Organisation Studies 19(3): 449-475. 
Egger, H. and V. Grossmann (2005). "Non-Routine Tasks, Restructuring of Firms, and 
Wage Inequality Within and Between Skill-Groups." Journal of Economics 86(3): 197-
228. 
Eichhorst, W. (2012). "The Unexpected Appearance of a New German Model." IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 6625. Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labor.   
  226 
Eichhorst, W. and P. Marx (2011). "Reforming German Labour Market Institutions: A 
Dual Path to Flexibility." Journal of European Social Policy 21(1): 73-87. 
Elbaum, B. (1983). "The Internalization of Labor Markets: Causes and Consequences." 
American Economic Review 73(2): 260-265. 
Emmenegger, P. (2009). "Specificity versus Replaceability: The Relationship between 
Skills and Preferences for Job Security Regulations." Socio-Economic Review 7(3): 
407-430. 
Emmenegger, P., S. Häusermann,  et al. (Eds) (2012a). The Age of Dualization: The 
Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrialising Societies. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Emmenegger, P., S. Häusermann, et al. (2012b). How Rich Countries Cope with 
Deindustrialization. The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in 
Deindustrializing Societies. P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier and M. Seeleib-
Kaiser. Oxford, Oxford Univ Press: 304-320. 
Erickson, C. L., C. L. Fisk, et al. (2002). "Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons 
from Three Rounds of Negotiations." British Journal of Industrial Relations 40(3): 543-
567. 
Estevez-Abe, M. (2006). "Gendering the varieties of capitalism. A study of 
occupational segregation by sex in advanced industrial societies." World Politics 
59(01): 142-175 
Estevez-Abe, M., T. Iversen, et al. (2001). Social Protection and the Formation of 
Skills: a Reinterpretation of the Welfare State. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. P. A. Hall and D. Soskice. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 145-83. 
European Ministers for Vocational Education and Training and the European Social 
Partners and the European Commission (2010). The Bruges Communiqué on Enhanced 
European Cooperation in Vocational Education and Training for the Period 2011-2020. 
Bruges. 
Fine, J. (2006). Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
Fleckenstein, T. (2008). "Restructuring welfare for the unemployed: the Hartz 
legislation in Germany." Journal of European Social Policy 18(2): 177-188. 
Focus Magazin (29.11.2010). "Boss einer schrecklich netten Familie." Focus Magazin 
48(10). 
Focus Online (23.03.2012). "Betriebsrat unterliegt erneut im Streit um Leiharbeiter." 
Retrieved 21.05.2014, from http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/auto-betriebsrat-
unterliegt-erneut-im-streit-um-leiharbeiter_aid_726983.html. 
  227 
Ford (2013). "Report Sustainability 2012/2013. Market Shares and Sales ". Retrieved 
23.05.2014, from http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2012-
13/financial-data-market#b  
Ford (10.06.2014). "Ford to Build Next-Generation Ford Fiesta in Cologne, Germany; 
Improved Flexibility, Efficiency Actions Ensure Competitiveness." Retrieved 
28.06.2014, from 
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/feu/en/news/2014/06/10/ford-to-build-next-
generation-ford-fiesta-in-cologne--germany--i.html. 
Franke, G. R. (2010). Multicollinearity. Wiley International Encyclopedia of Marketing, 
Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons. 
Frankfurter Rundschau (29.03.2012). "Mund halten und weiter arbeiten."Retrieved 
20.05.2016, from http://www.fr-online.de/arbeit---soziales/leiharbeit-bei-bmw--mund-
halten-und-weiter-arbeiten-,1473632,13863548.html.  
Franz, W. and V. Zimmermann (1999). Mobilität nach der beruflichen Ausbildung: 
Eine empirische Studie für Westdeutschland. ZEW Discussion Paper 99-21. Zentrum 
für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim. 
Freeman, R. B. (2000). The US Economic Model at Y2K: Lodestar for Advanced 
Capitalism? NBER Working Paper 7757. Cambridge (MA), National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Frege, C. and J. Kelly (2003). "Union Revitalization Strategies in Comparative 
Perspective." European Journal of Industrial Relations 9(1): 7-24. 
Frege, C. and J. Kelly (Eds.) (2004). Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union 
Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Frost, A. C. (2000). "Explaining Variation in Workplace Restructuring: The Role of 
Local Union Capabilities." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 53(4): 559-578. 
Gajewska, K. and J. Niesyto (2009). "Organising campaigns as revitaliser for trade 
unions? The example of the Lidl campaign." Industrial Relations Journal 40(2): 156-
171. 
Gallie, D. (2007). "Production Regimes and the Quality of Employment in Europe." 
Annual Review of Sociology 33: 85-104. 
Garcia-Serrano, C. and M. A. Malo (2002). "Worker Turnover, Job Turnover and 
Collective Bargaining in Spain." British Journal of Industrial Relations 40(1): 69-85. 
Gautiè, J. and J. Schmitt (Eds.) (2010). Low-Wage Work in the Wealthy World. New 
York, Russell Sage Foundation Publications. 
Gebel, M. and J. Giesecke (2011). "Labor Market Flexibility and Inequality: The 
Changing Skill-Based Temporary Employment and Unemployment Risks in Europe." 
Social Forces 90(1): 17-39. 
  228 
Gesamtmetall (2010). Die Bedeutung der Zeitarbeit für die Metall- und Elektro-
Industrie. Gesamtmetall Pressekonferenz 3. Juni 2010. Berlin. 
Gesamtmetall (2012). "Zeitarbeiter M+E-Berufe - Noch Deutlich unter 
Vorkrisenniveau." Retrieved 10.02.2012, from 
http://www.gesamtmetall.de/gesamtmetall/meonline.nsf/id/DE_Zeitarbeiter?OpenDocu
ment&popup=1.  
Giaccone, M. (2011). Annual Review of Working Conditions 2009–2010. Eurofound. 
Luxembourg. 
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1984). The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies 
in Modern Western Societies. Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. J. H. 
Goldthorpe. New York, Oxford University Press: 315-342. 
Gooderham, P. N. and O. Nordhaug (1997). "Flexibility in Norwegian and UK Firms: 
Competitive Pressure and Institutional Embeddedness." Employee Relations 19(6): 568-
580. 
Gramm, C. L. and J. F. Schnell (2001). "The Use of Flexible Staffing Arrangements in 
Core Production Jobs." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54(2): 245-258. 
Greer, I. (2008a). "Social Movement Unionism and Social Partnership in Germany." 
Industrial Relations 47(4): 602–624. 
Greer, I. (2008b). "Organised Industrial Relations in the Information Economy: the 
German Automotive Aector as a Test Case." New Technology, Work and Employment 
23(3): 181-196. 
Greer, I., T. Schulten, et al. (2013). "How Does Market Making Affect Industrial 
Relations? Evidence from Eight German Hospitals." British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 51(2): 215-239. 
Gries, T. and A. Birk (1999). "Die amerikanische Dienstleistungsgesellschaft-ein 
Modell für Deutschland?" Wirtschaftsdienst 79(5): 300-306. 
Grimshaw, D. and J. Rubery (1998). "Integrating the Internal and External Labour 
Markets." Cambridge Journal of Economics 22(2): 199-220. 
Grimshaw, D., K. G. Ward, et al. (2001). "Organisations and the Transformation of the 
Internal Labour Market." Work Employment & Society 15(1): 25-54. 
Grugulis, I. and C. Lloyd (2010). Skill and the Labour Process: The Conditions and 
Consequences of Change. Working Life. Renewing Labour Process Analysis. P. 
Thompson and C. Smith. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 91-112. 
Guest, D. (2004). "Flexible Employment Contracts, the Psychological Contract and 
Employee Outcomes: An Analysis and Review of the Evidence." International Journal 
of Management Reviews 5(1): 1-19. 
  229 
Gumbrell-McCormick, R. (2011). "European Trade Unions and ‘Atypical’ Workers." 
Industrial Relations Journal 42(3): 293-310. 
Haipeter, T. (2011). "‘Unbound employers' associations and derogations: erosion and 
renewal of collective bargaining in the German metalworking industry." Industrial 
Relations Journal 42(2): 174-194. 
Haipeter, T., et al. (2012). "Employment relations in the banking and automotive 
industries in Germany." The International Journal of Human Resource Management 
23(10): 2016-2033. 
Hall, P. A. and D. Soskice (2001). "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism". 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. P. A. 
S. Hall, D. . Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1-68. 
Hall, A. and D. Gingerich (2004). Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Complementarities in the Macroeconomy. An Empirical Analysis. MPIfG Discussion 
Paper 04/5. Cologne, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Hall, P. A. and K. Thelen (2009). "Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism." 
Socio-Economic Review 7(1): 7-34. 
Hancké, B. (2000). "European Works Councils and Industrial Restructuring in the 
European Motor Industry." European Journal of Industrial Relations 6(1): 35-59. 
Hancké, B., M. Rhodes, et al., (Eds.) (2007). Beyond varieties of capitalism: conflict, 
contradictions, and complementarities in the European economy. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Hancké, B. (Ed.) (2009). Debating Varieties of Capitalism: A Reader. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Hassel, A. (1999). "The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations." British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 37(3): 483-505. 
Hassel, A. (2007). "The Curse of Institutional Security: The Erosion of German Trade 
Unionism." Industrielle Beziehungen 14(2): 176-191. 
Hassel, A. (2014). "The Paradox of Liberalisation — Understanding Dualism and the 
Recovery of the German Political Economy." British Journal of Industrial Relations 
52(1): 57-81. 
Hassel, A. and B. Rehder (2001). Institutional Change in the German Wage Bargaining 
System: The Role of Big Companies. MPIfG Working Paper 01/09. Cologne, Max-
Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung.  
Hassel, A. and C. Schiller (2010). Der Fall Hartz IV: wie es zur Agenda 2010 kam und 
wie es weitergeht, Campus Verlag. 
  230 
Hassel, A. and T. Schulten (1998). "Globalization and the Future of Central Collective 
Bargaining: the Example of the German Metal Industry." Economy and Society 27(4): 
484 - 522. 
Häusermann, S. and H. Schwander (2010). Varieties of Dualization. Labor Market 
Segmentation and Insider-Outsider Divides across Regimes. Paper presented at the 
conference “The Dualisation of European Societies?”, Oxford. 
Hayen, R. P. (2005). Entwicklung der Zeitarbeit in Deutschland Zeitarbeit als 
Betriebsratsaufgabe. D. Beck. Düsseldorf, Hans Böckler Stiftung: 7-10. 
Heery, E. (2009). "Trade Unions and Contingent Labour: Scale and Method." 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2(3): 429-442. 
Heery, E. and B. Abbott (2000). Trade Unions and the Insecure Workforce. The 
Insecure Workforce. E. Heery. London, Routledge: 155-180. 
Heery, E. and L. Adler (2004). "Organizing the Unorganized". Varieties of Unionism: 
Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy. C. Frege and J. Kelly. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 45-69. 
Helfen, M. (2011). "Tarifpolitisch Parallelwelten." Besser mit Tarif. Wer stabilisiert das 
System? Die Mitbestimmung(7+8). 
Herrigel, G. (1993). "Identity and Institutions: The Social Construction of Trade Unions 
in the United States and Germany in the Nineteenth Century." Studies in American 
Political Development 7(2): 371-394. 
Herrigel, G. (1997). The Limits of German Manufacturing Flexibility. Negotiating the 
New Germany. Can Social Partnership Survive. L. Turner. Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press: 177-205. 
Herrigel, G. (2010). Manufacturing Possibilities: Creative Action and Industrial 
Recomposition in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Oxford/New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
Herrigel, G. (2014). "Globalization and the German Industrial Production Model." 
Journal for Labour Market Research forthcoming. 
Heyes, J., P. Lewis, et al. (2012). "Varieties of Capitalism, Neoliberalism and the 
Economic Crisis of 2008–?" Industrial Relations Journal 43(3): 222-241. 
Heyes, J., P. Lewis, et al. (2014). Varities of Capitalism Reconsidered: Learning from 
the Great Recession and Its Aftermath. Comparative Political Economy of Work. M. 
Hauptmeier and M. Vidal. London/New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 33-51. 
Holgate, J. (2005). "Organising Migrant Workers: a Case Study of Working Conditions 
and Unionisation at a Sandwich Factory in London." Work Employment and Society 
19(3): 463-480. 
  231 
Holst, H. (2013). "'Commodifying Institutions: Vertical Disintegration and Institutional 
Change in German Labour Relations." Work, Employment & Society 28(1): 3-20. 
Holst, H., Nachtwey, O. et al. (2009). Funktionswandel von Leiharbeit. Neue 
Nutzungsstrategien und ihre arbeits- und mitbestimmungspolitischen Folgen. Eine 
Studie im Auftrag der Otto Brenner Stiftung. Frankfurt/Main, OBS-Arbeitsheft 61. 
Holst, H., O. Nachtwey, et al. (2010). "The Strategic Use of Temporary Agency Work – 
Functional Change of a Non-standard Form of Employment " International Journal of 
Action Research 6(1): 108-38. 
Holst, H. (2012). "Die Konjunktur der Flexibilität – Zu den Temporalstrukturen im 
Gegenwartskapitalismus." Kapitalismustheorie und Arbeit. Neue Ansätze 
soziologischer Kritik,  Dörre, K. , D. Sauer, et al. (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main/New York, 
Campus Verlag : 222-239. 
Holtgrewe, U. and V. Doellgast (2012). "A Service Union's Innovation Dilemma: 
Limitations on Creative Action in German Industrial Relations." Work, Employment & 
Society 26(2): 314-330. 
Holweg, M. (2008). The Evolution of Competition in the Automotive Industry. Build 
To Order. The Road to the 5-Day Car. G. Parry and A. P. Graves. London, Springer: 
13-34. 
Höpner, M. (2001). Corporate governance in transition: Ten empirical findings on 
shareholder value and industrial relations in Germany, MPIfG discussion paper 01/05. 
Cologne, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. 
Houseman, S. and M. Osawa (2003). Introduction. Nonstandard Work in Developed 
Economies: Causes and Consequences. S. Houseman and M. Osawa. Michigan, W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research: 1-14. 
Howell, C. (2003). "Review: Varieties of Capitalism: And Then There Was One?" 
Comparative Politics 36(1): 103-124. 
Huber, B. (2007). "Beteiligung noch mehr leben." Retrieved 22/10/2011, from 
http://www.igmetall-bayern.de/News-Ansicht.26+M514f6fac000.0.html.  
Hyman, R. (1996). "Changing Union Identities in Europe". The Challenges to Trade 
Unions in Europe: Innovation or Adaption P. Leisink, J. Van Leemput and J. Vilrokx. 
Cheltenham/Northampton, Edwar Elgar: 53-73. 
Hyman, R. (2001). Understanding European Trade Unionism. Between Market, 
Class&Society. London/New Delhi/Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications. 
Hyman, R. (2013). Foreword. Decommodification and After. Non-Standard 
Employment in Europe. Paradigms, Prevalence and Policy Responses. M. Koch and M. 
Fritz. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: xiii-xvii. 
Ichino, P. (2009). "Disegno di legge per la transizione a un regime di flexsecurity." 
Retrieved 20.06.2014, from http://www.pietroichino.it/?p=2511.  
  232 
ICTWSS (2011). "Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between1960 and 2007." 
Retrieved 26.05.2013, from http://www.uva-aias.net/208.  
IG Metall (1992). “Moderner Sklavenhandel”: Fremdfirmeneinsatz durch Leiharbeit 
und Werkverträge. Eine Handlungsanleitung für betroffene Betriebsräte und 
ArbeitnehmerInnen. Frankfurt am Main, IG Metall. 
IG Metall (2007a). Sozialreport Zeitarbeit. Berlin, IG Metall Bezirksleitung Berlin-
Brandenburg-Sachsen. 
IG Metall (2007b). Gemeinsam besser. Frankfurt, IG Metall Bezirk Frankfurt. 
IG Metall (2008a). Gemeinsam für Gerechtigkeit. Aktionsbuch für 
Betriebsräte,Vertrauensleute und Aktive. Frankfurt, IG Metall Vorstand. 
IG Metall (2008b). Fokus Leiharbeit. Informationen für eine gerechtere Arbeitswelt. 
Frankfurt am Main, IG Metall Vorstand. 
IG Metall (2009). Schwarzweißbuch Leiharbeit. Frankfurt, IG Metall Vorstand. 
IG Metall (2010). "Betriebsräteumfrage der IG Metall zur Leiharbeit." Retrieved 
25/11/10, from http://www.igmetall.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-0A456501-
BA041359/internet/style.xsl/betriebsraeteumfrage-zur-leiharbeit-5541.htm. 
IG Metall (2012). Schwarzbuch Leiharbeit. Frankfurt am Main, IG Metall. 
IG Metall (2013). "Ausbildungssituation 2013 – Eine Analyse der IG Metall. Rückzug 
der Unternehmen aus der Ausbildungsverantwortung verhindern!". Retrieved 
20.04.2014, from 
http://www.igmetall.de/internet/docs_2013_Ausbildungsbilanz_IG_Metall_4f2339f7c8
4cb11117600db380908ea18bed0603.pdf. 
IG Metall (21.05.2012). "Mehr Rechte für Leihbeschäftigte und Betriebsräte." Retrieved 
20.06.2014, from http://www.igmetall.de/tarifabschluss-sichert-faire-leiharbeit-
10140.htm. 
IG Metall (23.05.2012). "Tarifergebnis unbefristete Übernahme. Großer Erfolg für 
Auszubildende." Retrieved 20.04.2014, from http://www.igmetall.de/tarifergebnis-
unbefristete-uebernahme-10138.htm  
IG Metall (23.07.2012). "Von der Ausbildung in die Perspektivlosigkeit. Gefangen in 
den Mühlen der Leiharbeit." Retrieved 20.04.2014, from http://www.igmetall.de/von-
der-ausbildung-in-die-perspektivlosigkeit-9802.htm. 
IG Metall Jugend (13.08.2010). "Die IG Metall-Jugend macht für die Zukunft mobil." 
Retrieved 25.04.2014, from http://www.igmetall.de/jupo-operation-uebernahme-bunt-
schraeg-und-erfolgreich-5346.htm. 
IG Metall Köln-Leverkusen (2014). "Fiesta-Produktion bleibt in Köln." Retrieved 
20.05.2014, from 
  233 
http://netkey40.igmetall.de/homepages/koeln_neu/aktuelles/2014/fiesta-
produktionbleibtinkln.html. 
IG Metall Niedersachsen (17.12.2013). "Tarifpaket geschnürt!". Retrieved 23.05.2014, 
from http://www.igmetall-nieder-sachsen-anhalt.de/uploads/media/2013-12-
17_mn_VW_Zeitarbeit.pdf. 
IG Metall Niedersachsen (August 2009). "Mehr Geld für Zeitarbeiter." Retrieved 
20.05.2012, from http://www.igmetall-nieder-sachsen-
anhalt.de/uploads/media/FB_Zeitarbeit_Wob_AG_AutoVision_082009.pdf. 
Il Fatto Quotidiano (27.03.2014). "Più lavoro ma precario: Hartz IV e Jobs act, i 
programmi che uniscono Renzi e Merkel." Retrieved 25.04.2014 from 
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/03/22/piu-lavoro-ma-precario-hartz-iv-e-jobs-act-i-
piani-occupazione-che-uniscono-renzi-e-merkel/919776/. 
International Labour Organisation (2009). Private Employment Agencies, Temporary 
Agency Workers and Their Contribution to the Labour Market. Working Paper 1997/81. 
Geneva, International Labour Organisation. 
International  Labour Organisation (2013). Global Employment Trends 2013. 
Recovering from a Second Jobs Dip. Geneva, International Labour Organisation.  
Iversen, T. (1996). "Power, flexibility, and the breakdown of centralized wage 
bargaining: Denmark and Sweden in comparative perspective." Comparative Politics 
28(4): 399-436. 
Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2001). "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences." 
American Political Science Review 95(4): 875-893. 
Jackson, G. (2005). "Contested Boundaries. Ambiguity and Creativity in the Evolution 
of German Coordination". Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economies. W. Streeck and K. Thelen. New York, Oxford University Press: 
229-254. 
Jackson, G. (2009). Actors and Institutions. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Analysis. G. Morgan, J. L. Campbell, C. Crouch, O. K. Pedersen and R. Whitley. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 63-86. 
Jacobi, L. and J. Kluve (2006). "Before and After the Hartz Reforms: The Performance 
of Active Labour Market Policy in Germany." IZA Discussion Paper 2001. Bonn, 
Institute for the Study of Labor. 
Jacobi, L. and S. Schaffner (2008). Does Marginal Employment Substitute Regular 
Employment?: A Heterogeneous Dynamic Labor Demand Approach for Germany. Ruhr 
economic paper 56. Ruhr University, Bochum.  
Jacoby, S. M. (1983). "Industrial Labor Mobility in Historical Perspective." Industrial 
Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 22(2): 261-282. 
  234 
Jaehrling, K. and P. Méhaut (2013). "‘Varieties of Institutional Avoidance’: Employers' 
Strategies in Low-Waged Service Sector Occupations in France and Germany." Socio-
Economic Review 11(4): 687-710. 
Jessop, B. (1990). State theory: putting the capitalist state in its place, Cambridge, 
Polity. 
Jessop, B. (2002). "Time and Space in the Globalization of Capital and their 
Implications for State Power." Rethinking Marxism 14(1): 97-117. 
Jessop, B. (2014). "Capitalist diversity and variety: Variegation, the world market, 
compossibility and ecological dominance." Capital & Class 38(1): 45-58. 
Johansson, J. (2003). "Mid-Level Officials as Policy Makers: Anti-Corporatist Policy 
Change in the Swedish Employers’ Confederation, 1982–1985." Scandinavian Political 
Studies 26(4): 307-325. 
Jones, C. (1996). Careers in Project Networks: The Case of the Film Industry. The 
Boundaryless Career:  A New Employment Principle for a New Organisational Era. J. 
B. Arthur and D. M. Rousseau. Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press: 58-75. 
Jürgens, U. (1984). Die Entwicklung von Macht, Herrschaft, und Kontrolle im Betrieb 
als politischer Prozess. Eine Problemskizze zur Arbeitspolitik. . Arbeitspolitik, 
Leviathan Sonderheft Nr. 5. U. Jürgens and F. Naschold, Opladen: 58-91. 
Jürgens, U. (1997). Germany: Implementing Lean Production. After Lean Production: 
Evolving Employment Practices in the World Auto Industry. T. A. Kochan, R. D. 
Lansbury and J. P. MacDuffie. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press: 109-116. 
Jürgens, U. (2004). "An Elusive Model–Diversified Quality Production and the 
Transformation of the German Automobile Industry." Competition and Change 8(4): 
411-423. 
Jürgens, U. (2008). Globalization and Employment Relations in the German 
Automotive Industry. Globalization Employment Relations in the Auto Assembly 
Industry. Comparative Bulletin of Labor Relations. R. Blanpain, R. D. Lansbury, J. 
Kitay and N. Wailes: 49-72. 
Jürgens, U. and M. Krzywdzinski (2006). Globalisierungsdruck und 
Beschäftigungssicherung-Standortsicherungsvereinbarungen in der deutschen 
Automobilindustrie zwischen 1993 und 2006. WZB Discussion Papers SP III. Berlin, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
Jürgens, U. and M. Krzywdzinski (2010). Die Neue Ost-West-Arbeitsteilung. 
Arbeitsmodelle und industrielle Beziehungen in der europaeischen Automobilindustrie. 
Frankfurt, Campus Verlag. 
Jürgens, U., T. Malsch, et al. (1993). Breaking from Taylorism: Changing Forms of 
Work in the Automobile Industry. New York, Cambridge Univ Pr. 
  235 
Kahn, L. M. (2007). "The Impact of Employment Protection Mandates on Demographic 
Temporary Employment Patterns: International Microeconomic Evidence" The 
Economic Journal 117(521): F333-F356. 
Kalleberg, A. L. (2001). "Organizing Flexibility: The Flexible Firm in a New Century." 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 39(4): 479-504. 
Kalleberg, A. L. (2003). "Flexible Firms and Labor Market Segmentation: Effects of 
Workplace Restructuring on Jobs and Worker." Work and Occupations 30(2): 154-175. 
Kalleberg, A. L. (2009). "Precarious Work, Insecure workers: Employment Relations in 
Transition." American Sociological Review 74(1): 1-22. 
Kalleberg, A. L., J. Reynolds, et al. (2003). "Externalizing Employment: Flexible 
Staffing Arrangements in US Organisations." Social Science Research 32(4): 525-552. 
Katz, H. C., R. Batt, et al. (2002). "Revitalization of the CWA: Integrating Collective 
Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
56(4): 573-89. 
Katznelson, I. and B. Weingast (2005). Intersections between Historical and Rational 
Choice Institutionalism. Preferences and Situations. I. Katznelson and B. Weingast. 
New York, Russell Sage Foundation: 1-26. 
Kern, H. and M. Schumann (1984). Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung? Rationalisierung in 
der industriellen Produktion. Munich, C.H Beck. 
Kerr, C. (1954). The Balkanization of Labor Markets. Labor Mobility and Economic 
Opportunity. E. W. Bakke and P. M. Hauser. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press: 92-110. 
Keune, M. (2011). "Decentralizing Wage Setting in Times of Crisis? The regulation and 
use of wage-related derogation clauses in seven European countries." European Labour 
Law Journal 2(1): 86-94. 
Kinderman, D. (2005). "Pressure from Without, Subversion from Within: The Two-
Pronged German Employer Offensive." Comparative European Politics 3(4): 432-463. 
Kinkel, S. and G. Lay (2003). "Fertigungstiefe – Ballast oder Kapital? Stand und 
Effekte von Out- und Insourcing im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe Deutschlands." 
Mitteilungen aus der Produktionsinnovationserhebung 30 (August 2003). Fraunhofer-
Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung, Karlsruhe. 
Koch, M. (2013). Employment Standards in Transition: From Fordism to Finance-
Driven Capitalism. Non-Standard Employment in Europe: Paradigms, Prevalence and 
Policy Responses. M. Koch and M. Fritz. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 29-45. 
Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Korpi, W. (2006). "Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in 
Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism." World Politics 58(2): 167-
206. 
  236 
Korpi, T. and M. Tåhlin (2010). Changing Work-Life Inequality in Sweden: 
Globalization and Other Causes. Unpublished manuscript. Swedish Institute for Social 
Research, Stockholm.  
Krämer, H. (1999). Dienstleistungen: Motor für Wachstum und Beschäftigung in 
Deutschland?. Schriftenreihe des Promotionsschwerpunkts Makroökonomische 
Diagnosen und Therapien der Arbeitslosigkeit 5/1999. Stuttgart, Evangelisches 
Studienwerk. 
Kroos, D. and K. Gottschall (2012). Dualization and Gender in Social Services. The 
Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies. P. 
Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier and M. Seeleib-Kaiser. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 100. 
Krull, S. (2007). "Das Modell VW: Auto 5000-Schön geredet und gesund gebetet " 
Sozialistische Zeitung (März 2007). 
Krull, S. (2007). "Jeder so frei wie er gut ist?" Zeitschrift für sozialistische Betriebs- 
und Gewerkschaftsarbeit 7(07). 
La Repubblica (22.11.2012). "Produttività, accordo senza la Cgil." Retrieved 
21.06.2014, from 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2012/11/22/produttivita-
accordo-senza-la-cgil.html. 
La Voce (18.07.2005). "Salario minimo e decentramento della contrattazione." 
Retrieved 21.06.2014, from http://archivio.lavoce.info/articoli/-lavoro/pagina1658.html.  
Lacher, M. (2001). "Standardisierung und Gruppenarbeit - ein gegensatz? Zum Wandel 
der Aggregatenmontagekonzepte in der Grossserienfertigung." Angewandte 
Arbeitswissenschaft 167: 16-29. 
Lacher, M. (2006). Ganzheitliche Produktionssysteme, Kompetenzerwerb und 
berufliche Bildung. Produktionssysteme und Kompetenzerwerb. Zu den Veränderungen 
moderner Arbeitsorganisation und ihre Auswirkungen auf die berufliche Bildung. 
Stuttgart. U. Clement and M. Lacher. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag: 73-93. 
Lam, A. (2002). "Work Organisation, Skills Development and Utilisation of Engineers." 
Changing Forms of Employment: Organisations, Skills and Gender. Crompton, R., D. 
Gallie et al.: 182-206. 
Lee, C.-S. (2005). "International Migration, Deindustrialization and Union Decline in 
16 Affluent OECD Countries, 1962–1997." Social Forces 84(1): 71-88. 
Lehndorff, S. (2012). German Capitalism and the European Crisis: Part of the Solution 
or Part of the Problem. A Triumph of Failed Ideas. European Models of Capitalism in 
the Crisis. S. Lehndorff. Brussel, ETUI: 79-102. 
Lepak, D. P. and S. A. Snell (1999). "The Human Resource Architecture: Toward a 
Theory of Human Capital Allocation and Development." Academy of Management 
Review 24(1): 31-48. 
  237 
Lepak, D. P. and S. A. Snell (2002). "Examining the Human Resource Architecture: 
The Relationships among Human Capital, Employment, and Human Resource 
Configurations." Journal of Management 28(4): 517-543. 
Lepak, D. P., R. Takeuchi et al. (2003). "Employment Flexibility and Firm 
Performance: Examining the Interaction Effects of Employment Mode, Environmental 
Dynamism, and Technological Intensity." Journal of Management 29(5): 681-703. 
Lester, R. A. (1951). "Range Theory of Wage Differentials" Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 5(4): 483. 
Letourneux, V. (1998). Precarious Employment and Working Conditions in Europe. 
Dublin, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Lévesque, C. and G. Murray (2005). "Union Involvement in Workplace Change: a 
Comparative Study of Local Unions in Canada and Mexico." British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 43(3): 489-514. 
Lillie, N. (2012). "Subcontracting, Posted Migrants and Labour Market Segmentation in 
Finland." British Journal of Industrial Relations 50(1): 148-167. 
Lillie, N. and I. Greer (2007). "European Construction Sector Industrial Relations, 
Migration, and Neoliberal Politics: The Case of the European Construction Sector." 
Politics&Society 35(4): 551-581. 
Lillie, N., I. Wagner, et al. (2014). ‘The Logic of Inappropriateness': Migration and the 
Politics of Labour Relations in the European Construction Industry’. The Comparative 
Political Economy of Work and Employment Relations. M. Hauptmeier and M. Vidal. 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 312-331. 
Lindbeck, A. and D. Snower (1986). "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-
Outsider Relations." American Economic Review 76(2): 235-239. 
Lindbeck, A. and D. Snower (2002). The Insider-Outsider Theory: A Survey. Bonn, 
Institute for the Study of Labour  
Linne, G. and B. Vogel (2003). Leiharbeit und befristete Beschäftigung. Neue Formen 
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List of interviews  
 
 Function Organisation Place Phone/face
-to-face 
Date Length 
1 Works 
councillor 
BMW Leipzig Face-to-
face 
20/04/201
2 
1:10’+sit
e visit 
2 Works 
councillor 
BMW Dingolfing Phone 17/07/201
2 
34’ 
3 Works 
councillor 
BMW Munich Face-to-
face 
10/09/201
2 
1:02’+sit
e visit 
4 Union 
representative 
BMW/IG Metall Munich Face-to-
face 
11/09/201
2 
1:40’+sit
e visit 
5 Works 
councillor 
BMW Munich Face-to-
face 
11/09/201
2 
30’ 
6 Works 
councillor 
BMW Munich Face-to-
face 
11/09/201
2 
49’ 
7 HR manager BMW Munich Face-to-
face 
11/09/201
2 
21’ 
8 Works 
councillor 
Bosch
a 
Stuttgart Phone 05/11/201
2 
43’ 
9 Union official Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund 
(DGB) 
Berlin Face-to-
face 
05/07/201
1 
57’ 
10 Works 
councillor 
Ford Cologne Face-to-
face 
19/04/201
2 
50’ 
11 Works 
councillor 
Ford Cologne Face-to-
face 
19/04/201
2 
1:08’+sit
e visit 
12 HR manager Ford Cologne Phone 07/08/201
2 
53’ 
13 HR manager Ford Cologne Phone 31/08/201
2 
39’ 
14 Employers’offici
al 
Gesamtmetall Berlin Face-to-
face 
23/04/201
2 
1:13’ 
15 Employers’offici
al 
Gesamtmetall Berlin Face-to-
face 
16 Union official IG Metall Berlin Face-to-
face 
06/07/201
1 
1:03’ 
17 Union official IG Metall Düsseldorf Phone 25/11/201
1 
42’ 
18 Union official IG Metall Wolfsburg Face-to-
face 
25/01/201
2 
1:24’ 
19 Union official IG Metall Frankfurt 
am Main 
Face-to-
face 
18/04/201
2 
1:02’ 
20 Union official IG Metall Munich Face-to-
face 
12/09/201
2 
20’ 
21 Union official IG Metall Wolfsburg Face-to-
face 
24/09/201
2 
1:01’ 
22 Union official IG Metall Cologne Face-to-
face 
07/03/201
3 
1:52’ 
23 HR manager Opel
a 
Rüsselshei
m 
Phone 26/09/201
2 
21’ 
24 Works 
councillor 
SKF
a 
Schweinfurt Phone 02/10/201
2 
26’ 
25 Expert  SOFI Göttingen Phone 06/08/201
2 
52’ 
26 Works 
councillor 
VW Wolfsburg Face-to-
face 
25/04/201 
 
1:06’ 
 
27 Assistant of the 
works councillor 
VW Wolfsburg Face-to-
face 
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28 HR manager VW Wolfsburg Phone 09/07/201
2 
50’ 
29 Ex-works 
concillor 
VW Wolfsburg Face-to-
face 
24/09/201
2 
1:17’ 
30 HR manager VW Wolfsburg Phone 04/04/201
3 
38’ 
31 Expert University of Jena Berlin Face-to-
face 
29/01/201
2 
About 2 
hours
b 
32 Expert Wissenschaftszentru
m Berlin 
Berlin Face-to-
face 
24/01/201
2 
1:39’ 
a 
These interviews have been conducted extra for the project on collective bargaining in networked 
companies funded by the Hans Böckler Foundation. The counterparts from either management side or 
employees’ side have been interviewed by other team members and therefore have not been reported in 
this table. Within the PhD project, these interviews have been used for robustness checks for the findings 
regarding the main case studies.  
b 
The interview, conducted in an informal setting, has not been recorded.  
 
 
 
 
